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Abstract 
The thesis examines mode of trial decisions in magistrates' courts within the 
context of a theoretical framework that views courtroom interaction as 
multifaceted and complex. The history of the mode of trial decision has seen an 
extension of summary jurisdiction; for reasons of cost and efficiency successive 
reforms have aimed at reducing the number of cases that are committed to the 
Crown Court. It is thought that inappropriate cases are being committed to the 
Crown Court, yet the magistrates' court is criticised for providing poor quality 
justice. This thesis therefore examines the dynamics of the mode of trial decision 
in order to understand how the process operates. 
The theoretical framework examines different influences upon social 
interactions; psychobiography, the courtroom setting, the dynamics of 
interactions and wider social structures that frame behaviour. This is conducted 
through an examination of the narrative (re)production practices of courtroom 
professionals. 
The thesis finds that legal considerations dominate the mode of trial process with 
local legal cultures deeply influencing the decision. However, where discretion 
remains, sociological influences can be ascertained as impacting upon behaviour. 
For instance, the treatment of domestic violence cases show how institutional and 
professional concerns enter the mode of trial decision; prosecutors, utilising the 
ability to control information that comes before the court, minimise the impact of 
cases so as to persuade the magistrates to retain jurisdiction. Additionally, the 
legal narratives (re)produced in the courtroom highlight a number of 
considerations for the nature of law. Law, when taking defendant's, witnesses' 
and complainant's stories, translates these into narratives that are appropriate for 
the legal process. As a result, the voices of the participants are lost in the 
courtroom narrative. 
I, 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
.1 
Introduction 
This thesis analyses the mode of trial decision in magistrates' courts for either 
way offences. Historically, the mode of trial decision has been regarded as 
problematic; the cost of Crown Court proceedings, combined with a concern to 
reduce delay, have led to an increase in the extent of summary jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, the belief that inappropriate cases are being committed to the 
Crown Court, either because defendants have elected Crown Court trial only to 
subsequently plead guilty or cases have been committed and received, after 
conviction, a sentence within the powers of the magistrates' court, has resulted in 
continued dissatisfaction with the mode of trial process. This study was therefore 
initiated with the aim of examining the decision making practices of magistrates 
and the mechanics of the mode of trial decision. This legal process has been 
examined within a theoretical framework that seeks to understand courtroom 
interactions as multifaceted with numerous influences on decision making. While 
acknowledging the importance of legal reasoning to the courtroom process, the 
theoretical framework develops an understanding of courtroom processes that 
looks to different levels of social interaction as influential. The importance of 
personality, the particular setting of the courtroom, the nature of law, the 
mechanics of social interactions and the structures that frame beha<iour are all 
cxin fined. 
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The research was conducted by direct court observation of two courts within the 
same CPS area; the researcher was attached to this CPS area for the duration of 
the fieldwork. The findings of the research show legal considerations to be 
dominant in the mode of trial process. A multitude of case factors interact to help 
influence the prosecutor's recommendation on venue and the decisions of 
magistrates. Practice has also resulted in the creation of legal cultures whereby 
some categories of offences are routinely processed in a predictable way. 
However, discretion remains in the process; it is here that sociological influences 
upon behaviour can be seen. The treatment of domestic violence cases have been 
highlighted as a discrete category where the practices of the prosecution are 
influenced by institutional constraints; in an effort to avoid Crown Court trial, 
cases are managed so as to minimise the impact of the allegations. 
1.2 The value of the thesis 
It is worthwhile taking time briefly to examine the nature of the research and 
explain how this builds upon earlier work. A small body of research has already 
been completed on mode of trial decisions. ' While this thesis examines the same 
subject matter, it is different in a number of important respects. The earlier work 
was predominantly focused upon the defendant's decision to elect. While the 
prosecutor's and magistracy's role was examined in this earlier work, this was 
either a side issue, or did not receive adequate attention. This thesis is different, 
in that the researcher was attached to a CPS office. While prosecutor's views 
1 See section 2.5. 
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were sought in the past, this did not take place in the context of direct 
observation with the ability to converse with prosecutors. This leads to the 
second feature of this research; the methods employed. Previous research 
consisted of interviews with courtroom professionals or defendants on their 
views on mode of trial or examined records. The research for this thesis was 
conducted within two magistrates' courts and was based on direct observation. 
The subtleties of the courtroom interaction were therefore directly observed with 
the ability to speak to prosecutors `on the ground'. Relations were developed 
with prosecutors over eight months, allowing for a thorough understanding of the 
courtroom actor's work. Finally, the thesis locates the mode of trial decision in a 
wider analysis of social interactions. The theoretical framework developed in the 
thesis, while understanding the importance of the legal decision, reaches out to 
sociological understandings of interactions. Courtroom decisions are viewed not 
as simple legal decisions, nor as pertaining to a simple `black-box' response- 
stimulus model of interaction. Rather, courtroom interactions are described as 
multi-faceted, where different aspects of the social environment are highlighted 
as influencing and framing decisions. While priority is given to the nature of law 
and the narrative (re)production process within the courtroom, other methods of 
understanding are noted. 
However, it is this examination of courtroom narrative (re)production where the 
importance of the research lies. While there has been an increased interest in law 
and narrative, the approach of the thesis in examining the storytelling practices of 
lawyers is uncommon in legal analysis and offers valuable insights into the 
nature of legal practice. Law and Narrative is a relatively new discipline, with 
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most research originating in the US. While Narratology is an established literary 
discipline, and has been utilised in other areas, its application in law is a recent 
phenomenon. This interest in narrative has mostly focused upon how stories can 
bring a different perspective to the law. Storytelling, with its emphasis upon the 
particular and specific, is seen as a useful challenge to the generality of law, with 
its focus upon the universal and the norm. Storytelling is thereby seen as a means 
of providing opposition to dominant legal discourse and the ideals contained 
within law (Brooks and Gewirtz, 1996; Minow, 1996; Posner, 1998). However, 
this thesis pierces this simplistic view of the usefulness of narratives in law 
through an examination of law's narrative (re)production practices. The thesis 
suggests that lawyers (re)produce narratives in a particular form; one focused 
upon legally relevant details. As a result, the details selected for inclusion point 
to the generality and universality that exists in law. While this questions the 
conclusions of the particular US Law and Narrative school examined above, it 
also offers insights into the nature of law and the stories that people take to legal 
professionals. The translation process inherent in the construction of legal 
narratives alters the stories that people take to the law. What is more, this process 
is inevitable as it concerns the application (or construction) of `facts' to fit with 
legal criteria; the very essence of legal practice. 
1.3 The development of the thesis 
While the thesis developed in a manner that led to an examination of the 
narrative (re)production practices of prosecutors, this was not the initial aim of 
the thesis. Rather, the research was undertaken with an eye on the policy debates 
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surrounding mode of trial and what was regarded by commentators and policy 
makers as the problematic nature of the decision making process. 2 It was hoped 
that the research would answer numerous questions on the mode of trial process 
that are addressed in Chapter 2. However, as is made clear in more detail in 
Chapter 5, the aims of the research developed for both practical and theoretical 
reasons. A number of the questions that were to be addressed were outside of the 
competencies of a lone researcher; a research team would be necessary to track 
cases through to the Crown Court and this was simply not possible. More 
importantly, while in the field, the nature of the mode of trial decision making 
process was seen to be such that a change of focus was necessitated. Early 
expectations as to the form of verbal statements within the courtroom did not 
prove to be as anticipated. Rather than interaction taking place through a 
conversational turn-taking sequence (Atkinson and Drew, 1979), the participants 
effectively seemed to be delivering a narrative, with the prosecutor being the 
main protagonist. Indeed, defence solicitors usually remained silent while one of 
the most important features of magistrates' courts work - negotiation and 
bargaining (Baldwin and McConville, 1977) - was largely absent from the mode 
of trial process. While defence solicitors would frequently speak to prosecutors 
about venue, they rarely attempted to influence the decision. Also, given the 
manner in which prosecutors were able to control the information placed before 
the court, 3 a picture emerged of the importance of the prosecutor in the mode of 
trial process above all other participants. 
2 See Chapter 2. 
3 See Chapter 7. 
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The thesis is therefore presented in a manner that adequately represents this 
developmental aspect to the research. Chapter 2 outlines the policy debates 
alluded to earlier and examines the history of mode of trial and the legislative 
and administrative reforms that have been implemented. This chapter, to some 
extent, represents the starting point of the research and throws light on the early 
development of the thesis. Chapter 3 continues this through an examination of 
magistrates' courts and magistrates' justice. This chapter represents the initial 
focus of the research; the debates on mode of trial frequently addressed the 
quality of justice in magistrates' courts and the mode of trial decision takes place 
within the magistrates' court. This early chapter therefore situates the work in 
Chapter 2. However, the development of the thesis, as outlined above, was such 
that some of the issues addressed in Chapter 3 were left behind. As a result, 
Chapter 4 develops a more theoretical approach to courtroom decision making, 
and turns towards wider social theory in an effort at understanding courtroom 
interaction. These three chapters, 2,3 and 4, all evidence the development of the 
issues and show a progression from a narrow to a wider focus. The mode of trial 
debate is initially described on narrow policy grounds and situated within the 
debates on magistrates' justice. However, Chapter 4 then looks even further to 
sociological understandings of decision making. After a discussion of methods 
and methodology in Chapter 5, the analysis Chapters, 6 and 7, revisit this 
progression. Chapter 6 provides a mainstream qualitative analysis of the mode of 
trial hearing while Chapter 7 examines micro- and macro-influences on 
behaviour through narrative (re)production processes. Given the importance of 
the prosecution, as outlined above, both of these chapters focus upon the way in 
which prosecutors frame their recommendations. 
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This should explain the development of the thesis and outline the very different 
approaches inherent in each chapter. The thesis, in utilising these very different 
ideas, therefore examines mode of trial from numerous perspectives that have to 
be understood as a coherent whole. The thesis manages this through a 
presentation of the different stages of development of the research with different 
chapters focusing upon different aspects of the decision. It is also clear that 
throughout the thesis further development of many of these ideas could have 
been expressed, but this was not possible due to reasons of space. On one level 
therefore, the thesis provides a general examination of the decision making 
process, but for practical and theoretical concerns, only some of these aspects 
have been examined in detail. Before the thesis moves to an examination of the 
issues, a more detailed overview of the thesis is in order. 
1.4 Overview 
Chapter 2 introduces the procedure for determining venue, the categories of 
criminal cases that are subject to the venue decision, and the political debates that 
bound this legal framework. Jury trial is regarded by many commentators as a 
fundamental legal right existing from Magna Carta. However, successive 
legislative and administrative reforms have eroded this right and increased the 
extent of summary jurisdiction. The right of election has been regarded as 
problematic, in that defendants have exercised it inappropriately; either sentences 
are within the powers of the magistrates' court or the defendant has pleaded 
guilty, thereby not utilising the supposed advantages of Crown Court trial. 
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However, while reforms have increased the extent of summary jurisdiction, the 
right to elect Crown Court trial in either way cases has remained. Additionally, 
while some research has noted the importance of the magistracy and prosecution 
for mode of trial, reforms have merely tinkered with their roles. As a result, 
Chapter 2 calls for an appreciation of the importance of the magistracy and 
prosecution in the mode of trial decision. 
Chapter 3 builds upon this call in Chapter 2 by reviewing the literature on 
magistrates' justice. The evidence on the magistracy's composition - while the 
bench is now predominantly gender balanced with ethnic minority communities 
well represented, there remains a preponderance of middle aged and middle class 
magistrates - is examined with an analysis of the quality of justice in 
magistrates' courts. 
Chapter 4 widens the focus of the research; a theoretical framework is advanced 
that moves towards a sociological appreciation of courtroom interactions. 
Layder's (1997) theory of social domains is utilised as a template to organise 
earlier research on courtroom behaviour. The theory of social domains suggests 
that any social interaction is influenced on four different levels; the 
psychobiological, the interaction, the setting, and the contextual resources that 
each party brings to the interaction. The psychobiological looks to the 
importance of individual personality and life history upon an interaction. The 
interaction itself is bounded by informal rules and norms that guide the 
construction of interactions. The setting is concerned with the institutional 
pressures that shape and frame an interaction, whereas contextual resources are 
f 
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wider social structures within which interactions take place. The focus of the 
thesis is upon contextual resources with particular emphasis placed upon 
language, narrative form, the nature of law as social practice, and legal discourse. 
Overall, Chapter 4 seeks an understanding of courtroom behaviour firmly 
situated as social practice within a specific legal site. 
Chapter 5 discusses methodology and the methods utilised to collect and analyse 
the data. The narrative of the research project is outlined, along with a defence of 
direct observation as a data collection method. Narrative analysis, used as one 
tool to analyse the data, is also described and its utilisation explained. 
Chapter 6 is the first of two analysis chapters; this Chapter examines the legal 
basis of the mode of trial decision. While sociological aspects of the decision- 
making process are important, Chapter 6 firmly grounds the analysis in an 
understanding of the legal factors that guide decision making. This Chapter is 
important for two reasons. Firstly, sight must not be lost of the legal aspects of 
the process. While law may be one of many contextual resources brought to the 
interaction, it is of fundamental importance for the manner in which it bounds the 
behaviour of the courtroom participants and how it is all pervasive in their work. 
Secondly, an understanding of law is vital when attempting to assess the 
influence of other social domains. 
Chapter 7 examines the evidence on the influence of social domains upon action. 
This is predominantly achieved through an analysis of the storytelling practices 
of the prosecutor. Analyses of these narratives show how lawyers tell stories in a 
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manner that may be alien to many outside the courtroom. Domestic violence 
cases are examined as a particular example of narrative (re)production processes. 
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by drawing the threads together, examining the 
mode of trial process and making a number of observations on the nature of law 
and criminal legal practice. The importance of legal considerations for the mode 
of trial process are highlighted along with the discretion inherent in the decision. 
Consideration is given to the sociological explanations of behaviour, the 
narrative construction practices of lawyers and how these result in a silencing of 
complainants, defendants and witnesses. Finally, reform of the mode of trial 
process is contemplated along with an appraisal of the possibility of (re)finding 
the voices of the participants. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE MODE OF TRIAL CONUNDRUM 
2.1 Introduction 
Throughout recent times we have seen many periods of prolonged public anxiety 
concerning crime and anti-social behaviour (Cohen, 2002). Although there is 
nothing new in these moral panics about deviance (Pearson, 1983), there has 
been a qualitative shift in the response of state authorities and politicians to the 
problem of crime. The post-war consensus on criminal justice issues has been 
consigned to history with crime now firmly on the political agenda (Morris, 
1989), while politicians and the agents of social control have had to grapple with 
the paradox of being seen to do something about the problem while recognising 
the increasing ineffectiveness of state action (Garland, 1996). The calls for an 
official response to the problem have led to an increase in the workload of 
criminal justice agencies with a corresponding increase in the official rates of 
recorded crime. This higher workload has contributed to a radical shift in the 
culture of criminal justice; gone forever are the halcyon days of Dixon of Dock 
Green to be replaced by the search for a modern, effective and efficient criminal 
justice system. 4 The search for economy and effectiveness encapsulated by the 
New Public Management ethos5 has spread to the criminal justice process and 
other areas of the public sector. This has resulted in criminal justice agencies 
increasingly accounting for their resource allocation, combined with the adoption 
° See Reiner (1992) for instance for a brief examination of some of the problems of modern 
policing. 
See Osbourne and Gaebler (1994) for an elaboration of New Public Management. 
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of managerialist cultures consisting of performance measurement and output 
orientated audit procedures (Raine and Wilson, 1993). This search for economy 
and effectiveness has influenced a reformist agenda that is revisiting the 
effectiveness of ancient institutions with long and often cherished histories. 6 
In order to modernise these institutions, there has been an unprecedented level of 
legislative activity and management focused reorganisations over the last twenty 
years. Even the Crown Prosecution Service, a relatively recent creation, has been 
subjected to numerous reviews and reports since its establishment in 1986 (Home 
Office, 1998c). As part of this process, mode of trial has been subjected to 
regular scrutiny and legislative activity. It has been the subject of dispassionate 
reviews, such as that conducted by the James Committee (Home Office and Lord 
Chancellor's Office, 1975), and polemic exchanges, as seen in both Houses of 
Parliament during the debates on the recent Criminal Justice (Mode of Trial) 
Bills in 1999 and 2000. Throughout the consideration of this vexed question, 
there exists a tension between the preservation of ancient traditions and 
institutions and the perceived needs of a modem age. 
This Chapter introduces the issues concerning mode of trial; the research 
conducted on this question will be examined, the reviews in this area will be 
analysed and the relevant legislative activities from the past thirty years will be 
considered. This history of mode of trial will introduce issues that reappear 
throughout the thesis. Before these tasks are performed, the classification of 
criminal offences and the procedure for determining venue will be addressed. 
6 The Metropolitan Police date from 1829 (Reiner, 2000), the office of Justice of the Peace dates 
back to 1361 and the Statute of Westminster of that year (Milton, 1967; Moir, 1969), while the 
roots of trial by jury can be traced to Norman times (Auld, 2001). 
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2.2 The classification of criminal offences 
Enacted in the wake of the deliberations of the James Committee (Home Office 
and Lord Chancellor's Office, 1975), the Criminal Law Act 1977 reorganised the 
classification of criminal offences in England and Wales into three different 
categories: indictable, summary and triable either way. 7 Prior to the report of the 
James Committee there was a need for simplification, due to the sheer number of 
categories and a lack of any overarching coherence to the categories (Thomas, 
1972). 
Schedule 1 to the Interpretation Act 1981 defines the new categories of 
summary, indictable and either way offences; indictable offences are any that can 
be tried on indictment (in the Crown Court) while summary offences must be 
tried summarily (in the magistrates' court). Offences that are triable either way 
can be tried in either the magistrates' or Crown Court. The arrangements for the 
classification of individual offences depend upon whether or not the offence is a 
statutory or common law offence. Common law offences are indictable only 
offences, unless they are listed in Schedule 1 of the Magistrates' Court Act 1980. 
Statutory offences are either classified by the creating statute or listed in 
Schedule 1. If a statute provides for conviction summarily and on indictment, 
with differing penalties for each, then the offence is triable either way. If the 
statute imposes a maximum penalty that is within the range of the magistrates' 
court and provision is not made for trial on indictment, then the offence is 
7 Strictly speaking there are only two categories as either way offences are a sub-category of 
indictable offences. 
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summary only. If the statute only provides for conviction on indictment then the 
offence is indictable only, unless it is listed in Schedule 1. A short list of either 
way offences would include: burglary, theft and related dishonesty offences, 
middle ranking assaults under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 such as 
assault occasioning actual bodily harm, indecent assault, criminal damage, 
affray, and violent disorder. 
2.3 The procedure for determining venue 
All criminal proceedings are initiated in the magistrates' court: summary 
offences remain in the magistrates' court while indictable only offences are sent 
to the Crown Court. 8 The procedure for either way offences involves the court 
making a decision on venue, with the defendant retaining a right to elect Crown 
Court trial. 9 Initially the magistrates ask the defendant to indicate a plea to the 
offence charged. If the defendant indicates a plea of guilty, the bench will accept 
jurisdiction and either sentence the defendant, adjourn for pre-sentence reports, 
or commit the defendant to the Crown Court for sentencing. l° If the defendant 
indicates a plea of not guilty, or declines to indicate a plea, the bench must next 
decide the correct venue for any subsequent trial. Both the prosecution and 
defence are invited to make representations and in making its decision, the court 
must consider a number of different factors that include: the nature and 
8 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, section 51. 
9 Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, section 49. 
10 Magistrates Court Act 1980, section 38, as amended by the Criminal Justice Act 1991, section 
25. 
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seriousness of the case, whether the court's sentencing powers are sufficient or 
any other relevant circumstances. " 
These considerations are supplemented by the National Mode of Trial Guidelines 
that were initially advertised in a practice note in 1990 and subsequently 
amended and reissued in 1995.12 The guidelines consist of two sections; the first 
outlines general considerations while the second details offence specific 
guidelines. In the general guidelines, the court is advised that any decision should 
not to be based upon `convenience or expedition', the court is to assume that the 
prosecution can prove their version of events, previous convictions or mitigating 
circumstances are not to be taken into account, and the Crown Court is more 
appropriate for difficult questions of fact or law. Courts are reminded of the 
power to commit for sentence if the defendant is subsequently found guilty and 
the powers of the trial court are deemed to be insufficient. Finally, the guidelines 
create a presumption that cases should be tried in the magistrates' court. 13 This 
presumption is rebutted when the court's sentencing powers are insufficient and 
the case has one or more features outlined in the office specific guidelines. These 
guidelines relate to specific offence categories such as offences against the 
person, drugs offences, property offences and public order offences. For instance, 
the court should consider declining jurisdiction in any assault charge if the 
sentencing powers of the magistrates' courts are deemed to be insufficient and 
the defendant used a weapon that was likely to result in serious injury or used a 
11 Magistrates' Court Act 1980, section 19(2)(b) and 19(3). 
12 [1990] 3 All E. R. 979-981. The new guidelines have not been published as a practice note, 
although they can be found in Blackstone's Criminal Practice (Murphy and Stockdale, 2003), 
while the 1990 direction has not been withdraw (White, 1996). 
13 Contrast with the Report of the James Committee that recommended that there be no 
presumption either way. See section 2.6.1. 
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weapon that caused serious injury. 14 The guidelines aim to influence magistrates 
to retain cases: 
Practice Directions and Notes as presently published can give little idea of the 
presentational devices used in the little red booklet [given to magistrates]. For example, 
on almost every page of the booklet a formula is repeated which drives home the 
message (although not in these words) `try the case summarily if you possibly can' 
(White, 1996: 476). 
The desire to retain cases within magistrates' courts is explained in the research 
conducted into mode of trial, official statistics on mode of trial, and the ways that 
these statistics and research findings have been used in subsequent reviews, 
reports and as a basis for legislation. 
2.4 Official statistics 
Before any statistics are examined, attention will be drawn to the counting 
practices of the different agencies that compile criminal statistics. 15 The analysed 
statistics are: Judicial Statistics (Department for Constitutional Affairs, 2003b); 
Criminal Statistics (Home Office, 2002a); and statistics provided by the CPS 
(Crown Prosecution Service, 2003). 16 Criminal Statistics on court proceedings, 
14 The remaining guidelines for assaults concern the method of any assault (kicking or head- 
butting), characteristics of the victim (public servants, the elderly or infirm etc. ) and the existence 
of any racial motivation. 
15 For a fuller analysis of the counting practices used for official statistics, see Chapter 4 of the 
Glidewell report (Home Office, 1998c). 
16 The reports listed here are the most recent reports of each type; although they provide statistics 
for previous years earlier reports have also been analysed to obtain a more comprehensive data 
set. For Criminal Statistics the reports for 1993,1994,1995,1996,1997 and 2001 have been 
examined (Home Office, 1994; 1995a; 1996; 1997a; 1998b; 2002a). In addition to Judicial 
Statistics for 2002 those for 1997 have been consulted (Constitutional Affairs, Department of, 
20036; Lord Chancellor's Department. 1998a). Finally, seven different Annual Reports of the 
29 
CPS statistics and Judicial Statistics all record information on defendants; each 
defendant in a criminal proceeding counts as one person or case. If a defendant 
pleaded guilty in one set of criminal proceedings to three different offences, that 
would be recorded as one case. The information received for court proceedings 
for Criminal Statistics is provided by magistrates' courts and Crown Courts, the 
CPS produce their own figures and the Court Service produce Judicial Statistics. 
The discrepancies between the three sets of figures is somewhat surprising given 
that they originate from similar sources and use similar accounting practices 
(Home Office, 1998c). However, there are reasons for the differences. Judicial 
Statistics include prosecutions by all agencies, while the CPS only counts 
prosecutions in which it is the prosecuting authority. Prosecutions by the Inland 
Revenue and Customs and Exercise are excluded. Criminal Statistics and 
Judicial Statistics work on the basis of calendar years while the CPS compiles 
figures for financial years (Home Office, 1998c). As well as these general 
counting practices there are two other issues to consider. Firstly, the CPS has 
recorded statistics in their current form from 1991.17 Secondly, the relevant 
tables in Criminal Statistics were first produced in their current form in 1989.18 
So long as these problems are appreciated, and there is no attempt to directly 
compare one set of figures with another, there is merit in inspecting the figures to 
gain an impression of any general trends and patterns in the courts' workloads. 
CPS were inspected (Crown Prosecution Service, 1992; 1993; 1994; 1995; 1997; 1999; 2001 a; 
2003). 
17 Information is available on the proportion of indictable cases sent to the Crown Court on the 
direction of magistrates or the election of the defendant for the years 1987 and 1988. 
18 Any information previous to this year concerns defendants over the age of 17, while the 
information available after that date concerns defendants over 18. 
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The division in workload between the two courts is clearly identifiable: there has 
been a gradual reduction in the workload of the Crown Court since the early 
1990s and most criminal cases remain in the magistrates' court. The data 
reproduced below fails to account for summary matters, yet it still remains that 
the vast majority of cases are conducted in the magistrates' court. Finally, plea 
before venue'9 has resulted in a large-scale reduction in committals for trial and 
magistrates are now responsible for more committals to the Crown Court. 
Table 1 gives the first indication of the general decline in committals for trial 
from a peak in the early 1990s and late 1980s. 
Table 1: Cases received in the Crown Court - committals for trial and sentence20 
Year Committals for trial Committals for sentence 
1987 98,873 11,653 
1988 106,524 13,091 
1989 98,668 13,178 
1990 103,011 15,270 
1991 104,754 16,554 
1992 100,994 14,883 
1993 86,849 11,088 
1994 89,301 11,485 
1995 81,186 11,718 
1996 83,328 12,002 
1997 91,110 14,871 
1998 75,815 29,774 
1999 74,232 31,928 
2000 71,022 27,591 
2001 80,551 25,960 
2002 83,449 28,837 
Source: Judicial Statistics. 
From Table 1 it is apparent that the workload of the Crown Court was at its 
height in 1988 and peaked next in 1991. This peak coincides with the 
deliberations of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (1993), that 
19 See section 2.6.4. 
20 Committals for sentence only pertain to either way cases whereas committals for trial include 
indictable only and either way cases. 
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recommended the right of defendants to elect jury trial be restricted, and the 
introduction of the National Mode of Trial Guidelines that created a presumption 
in favour of summary trial for either way offences. 21 Since this peak, there has 
been a gradual reduction in the workload of the Crown Court. 22 Turning to CPS 
statistics in Table 2, there is a similar reduction in elections by defendants and in 
the number of cases that magistrates decline jurisdiction. 
Table 2: Crown Court - source of committals for trial 
Year Magistrate's direction 
Defendant's 
election 
Indictable 
only 
Magistrates direction as a 
percentage of either way cases 
1987-1988 48,787 49,740 16,529 50 
1991-1992 61,867 35,584 21,719 63 
1992-1993 54,738 32,865 20,707 62 
1993-1994 46,954 25,249 19,545 65 
1994-1995 51,181 26,612 20,163 66 
1995-1996 50,158 24,768 22,083 67 
1996-1997 49,026 21,472 23,872 70 
1997-1998 56,069 21,653 27,341 72 
1998-1999 44,269 18,391 26,918 71 
1999-2000 40,097 18,572 28,162 68 
2000-2001 38,914 16,351 27,333 70 
2001-2002 36,740 14,956 32,639 71 
2002-2003 40,274 15,051 39,221 73 
Source: CPS Annual Reports. 
This general pattern of high Crown Court workloads in the early 1990s with 
subsequent reductions can also be seen in figures from Criminal Statistics in 
Table 3. Table 3 deals with all either way cases committed to the Crown Court. 
This shows a peak in the early 1990s of committals for trial, with a subsequent 
decline and a more marked reduction after 1997 that resulted from the 
introduction of plea before venue. 
1 [1990] 3 All E. R. 979-981. 
22 The marked difference between 1997 and 1998 for both columns in Table 1 is attributable to 
plea before venue, an administrative reform that will be analysed in section 2.6.4. 
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Table 3: Persons aged 18 and over proceeded against and committed for trial for either way 
offences 
Year Number proceeded 
against (Thousands) 
Committed for trial 
(Numbers, thousands) 
Committed for trial (Percentage 
of those proceeded against) 
1989 360.5 75.5 21 
1990 379.0 75.9 20 
1991 399.7 77.3 19 
1992 401.7 70.6 18 
1993 392.6 64.7 16 
1994 402.1 67.2 17 
1995 367.4 59.0 16 
1996 363.5 58.7 16 
1997 384.4 63.2 16 
1998 402.9 49.1 12 
1999 405.0 48.2 12 
2000 382.4 45.9 12 
2001 384.4 47.0 12 
Source: Criminal Statistics. 
Table 3 also shows the total number of either way cases in the magistrates' court 
from 1989. As a proportion of all either way offences, committals for trial have 
declined and there is a large reduction in 1998 from the introduction of plea 
before venue. The gradual decline in the number of committals for trial cannot be 
accounted for in any reduction in either way cases before the magistrates' court, 
but is rather the result of a smaller proportion of such cases being sent to the 
Crown Court. Table 2 suggests this decrease is the result of fewer elections by 
defendants and magistrates retaining jurisdiction in more cases. 
Table 3 also suggests that most criminal cases are disposed of in the magistrates' 
court; in 2001 only 12 percent of either way cases were committed for trial to the 
Crown Court. 23 When committal rates were at their height in the statistics 
presented in 1989, only 21 percent of all either way offences were committed to 
the Crown Court. In other words, the vast majority of either way cases remain in 
the magistrates' court. Add to this preponderance of either way offences in the 
23 Further either way cases would have been sent to the Crown Court as committals for sentence 
after a finding of guilt. 
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magistrates' court the numerically largest category of summary only offences. 
and it is apparent that magistrates' courts preside over the vast majority of 
criminal cases; over 93 percent (Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, 1993). 
Even though most either way offences remain in the magistrates' court, these 
constitute the majority of cases in the Crown Court, although they are reducing 
as a proportion of all cases. This is evident from Table 2. As magistrates have 
retained more cases and elections by defendants have been falling, there has been 
an increase in indictable only cases in the Crown Court from 16,529 in 1987- 
1988 to 39,222 in 2002-2003. Despite this, indictable only cases merely 
constituted 41 percent of the Crown Court's workload in 2002-2003, although 
they did constitute a mere 14 percent in 1987-1988. However, caution should be 
exercised, as these figures do not include committals for sentence that greatly 
increased after the introduction of plea before venue. 
The Tables evidence a clear reduction in committals to the Crown Court for trial 
post 1997, with a corresponding increase in committals for sentence. Before the 
introduction of plea before venue in October 1997, magistrates decided upon 
venue before the defendant entered a plea. The effect of this change is that the 
court now requests from the defendant an indication of plea before considering 
venue. Only if the defendant pleads not guilty, or refuses to indicate a plea, will 
the bench consider jurisdiction. As a result, any defendant who intended to plead 
guilty, and previously either elected Crown Court trial or was committed to the 
Crown Court because the magistrates declined jurisdiction, was no longer 
committed to the Crown Court for trial. Instead, their indication of plea is 
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accepted as an effective guilty plea and the court then proceeds to sentence. 
Some cases that were previously deemed not suitable for summary trial by 
magistrates before the entering of pleas are now committed for sentencing after 
the acceptance of a guilty plea and a decision by magistrates that their sentencing 
powers are insufficient. The effect has been to change the status of cases that are 
committed to the Crown Court from committals for trial to committals for 
sentence, with no obvious large scale reduction in the numbers of cases that 
reach the Crown Court (Bridges, 1999). 
2.5 Research on mode of trial 
Although there has been no shortage of reviews, reports and legislative activity 
in this area, there is paradoxically a lack of interest from the research 
community. A small number of research studies directly examine mode of trial 
decisions and an equally small amount of research considers mode of trial in 
some other context. Additionally, this research is of an age that caution should be 
exercised when utilising the findings to comment upon the procedure as it now 
exists. If nothing else, a number of administrative reforms (such as plea before 
venue) may have amended courtroom practices to the extent that this research is 
no longer relevant. Having regard to these caveats, the research will be examined 
in three parts; the first outlines how cases get to the Crown Court, the second 
examines what happens to these cases, and the third looks at the claim that 
Crown Court trial should be restricted. 
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2.5.1 How cases get to the Crown Court 
Magistrates are now responsible for the majority of cases that reach the Crown 
Court; more either way cases are sent to the Crown Court because magistrates 
decline jurisdiction rather than defendants electing Crown Court trial. However, 
there is a lack of research explaining their decision making processes. In 
comparison, there is more research on defendant's choices, but nevertheless there 
is still insufficient material to draw any firm conclusions from this data. 
Riley and Vennard (1988), in a sample of 909 cases in four Crown Courts and 
four magistrates' courts, reported that of those cases that went to the Crown 
Court (466), magistrates declined jurisdiction in 165 cases, the defendant elected 
trial in 244 cases, with this information not available in 57 cases. Therefore, on 
the basis of the available information, the bench declined jurisdiction in 40 
percent of cases that were committed to the Crown Court. This average figure 
masked a wide variation between Crown Court areas with magistrates 
responsible for 64 percent of either way cases reaching one court and 21 percent 
in another. Subsequent research suggested that magistrates were increasingly 
responsible for the majority of cases committed to the Crown Court. Compare 
the rates of Riley and Vennard to those of Hedderman and Moxon: 
Of the 2,416 defendants in the Crown Court sample on whom such information was 
available, 41 per cent (980) had elected Crown Court trial and 59 per cent (1,436) had 
been sent for trial because the magistrates declined jurisdiction (1992: 7). 24 
24 Data was not available on 540 cases due to a lack of systematic recording in one Crown Court 
centre. 
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In addressing why magistrates decline jurisdiction it is necessary to understand 
the role of the prosecution. All research studies in this area have reported 
widespread agreement between the prosecutor's recommendation and the 
bench's decision. Riley and Vennard (1988) noted that the bench agreed with the 
prosecution in 96 percent of cases, Hedderman and Moxon (1992), without 
quoting any figures, also reported agreement between bench and prosecution, 
while Herbert (2003) noted that in a sample of 123 mode of trial hearings, a lay 
bench disagreed with the prosecutor (when unchallenged by the defence) in only 
one case. Stipendiary magistrates disagreed with the prosecutor in two out of 40 
cases. 
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Given this degree of conformity, understanding the prosecutor's recommendation 
may offer an insight into magistrates' decision making practices. However, the 
evidence is inconclusive. Riley and Vennard simply referred to the Code for 
Crown Prosecutors and how this guided decisions that "were closely linked to 
their assessments of offence seriousness" (1988: 11). Hedderman and Moxon 
provided an analysis of interviews conducted with prosecutors and these 
indicated guidelines and principles that helped to structure the decision making 
process. In addition to the bland statement that prosecutors were guided by the 
Code for Crown Prosecutors, the report outlined some rules of thumb. For 
instance, in some courts all domestic burglaries would be sent to the Crown 
Court. For other property offences, if the value of the goods taken was over 
25 All three studies suggested different reasons for this agreement. Herbert suggested that the 
bench simply accepted the prosecutor's recommendation. Riley and Vennard suggested a number 
of reasons; the prosecution outlined the version of events, both applied similar criteria and 
prosecutors were engaged with the local culture. Hedderman and Moxon also pointed to a local 
culture. 
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£2,000, or if the offence was committed in breach of trust, the prosecutor would 
recommend the bench decline jurisdiction. The report also listed specific case 
factors with the eventual decision on venue for the cases that contained these 
factors. It is here that we see a problem; the list of factors in this table in no way 
enabled the reader to analyse possible interactions between different factors. This 
is especially true if a case involved one factor that suggested Crown Court trial 
while another suggested magistrates' court trial. Hedderman and Moxon reported 
that as a general rule, in property offences where the value of the property 
exceeded £2,000, the prosecution would recommend that the bench decline 
jurisdiction. Given that they reported that the decision of a bench and the 
recommendation of the prosecutor usually correlated, we could expect this 
general rule to be converted into practice. However, out of 42 cases with an 
allegation that a property offence was committed where the value of the property 
exceeded £2,000, the magistrates' declined jurisdiction on 29 occasions. The 
case remained in the magistrates' court on two occasions and the defendant 
elected Crown Court trial in a further 11 cases. Therefore, out of the 42 cases 
mentioned, the general rule was not applied in 13 cases. In other words, the 
intricacies of the decision making process had not been adequately explored in 
the report; there was no explanation as to why these 13 cases did not conform to 
the general rule that was outlined elsewhere. 
The statistics above make it clear that defendants are less responsible for cases 
going to the Crown Court. Of those who do choose Crown Court, most do so 
because of a perceived problem with the quality of justice in magistrates' courts. 
A succession of studies have shown why defendants elect. Bottoms and McClean 
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(1976) reported that defendants believed they had a better chance of acquittal in 
the Crown Court and would receive a fairer trial. The convicted defendants 
interviewed by Hedderman and Moxon (1992) noted a better prospect of 
acquittal, a belief that magistrates were pro-police, increased disclosure, and a 
greater likelihood of receiving bail as reasons for electing. 28 percent of their 
sample also wanted to delay proceedings while 24 percent wanted to serve part 
of their sentence on remand. Riley and Vennard (1998), when interviewing 
defence solicitors, reported a similar list of reasons. Judges were regarded as 
better qualified while magistrates were said to favour the prosecution. Finally, 
the research commissioned by the James Committee (Home Office and Lord 
Chancellor's Office, 1975; Appendix C) drew similar conclusions. 26 
2.5.2 Case outcome in the Crown Court 
The research suggests that not all cases committed to the Crown Court need 
necessarily be sent there. Hedderman and Moxon collected information on 2,273 
cases in the magistrates' court and 2,956 cases in the Crown Court. In order to 
glean further information on this sample, 666 defendants were selected for 
interview. 27 Having regard to the disappointing response rate, Hedderman and 
Moxon reported that 73 percent of the 130 defendants interviewed who had been 
26 At the time the Criminal Law 1976 progressed through Parliament, doubt was cast on whether 
a defendant did have greater prospect of acquittal in the magistrates' court (26 January, H. L. 
Debs., Vol. 379, Cols., 601-602). These figures were shown to be unreliable (Vennard, 1981) 
while later evidence supports the initial view. Vennard (1982; 1985), when controlling for 
evidential case features, suggested that venue has a bearing on conviction with a greater chance 
of acquittal in the Crown Court. Hedderman and Moxon also reported greater conviction rates in 
the magistrates' court. 
'' The report stated that only the most recent cases would be suitable for interview due to 
anticipated problems in contacting defendants. 
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dealt with at the Crown Court would have consented to summary trial. 28 Riley 
and Vennard examined a sample of 1,285 cases from court records and they 
obtained an interview in 909 cases. In 457 they interviewed both the prosecutor 
and the defence solicitor and in a further 65 they interviewed the defence 
solicitor only. They noted that "about two-fifths (24) of defendants (whose venue 
preferences were known) would have consented to summary trial if they had 
been given the option" (Riley and Vennard, 1988: 22). This figure must be 
treated with caution. Using the rough figure quoted of two-fifths it can be 
estimated that Riley and Vennard were aware of the preferences of defendants in 
around 60 cases. Defence solicitors were interviewed in 522 cases out of a 
sample of 1,285. What is more, Riley and Vennard reported that these 1,285 
cases represented around 70 percent of the total number of either way cases 
processed in the sample courts during the research period. If it is also considered 
that the statements on the defendant's wishes did not come from the defendant, 
but from the defence solicitor, it is difficult to know what weight to place upon 
these figures. 29 
Even if it could be shown that a large number of defendants would consent to 
summary trial, the decision to decline jurisdiction is nevertheless appropriate if 
Crown Court trial is merited on the facts. However, Riley and Vennard noted 
Criminal Statistics indicated 55 percent of all convictions for either way offences 
in the Crown Court resulted in sentences within the powers of the magistrates' 
court. Hedderman and Moxon were more specific on this point: they noted that 
28 282 Defendants (42 percent) were interviewed. 
29 However, in an earlier study Bottoms and McClean (1976) reported that 25 percent of 
defendants would have consented to summary trial in their cases where magistrates declined 
jurisdiction. 
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of the 1,436 sentenced cases that were sent to the Crown Court on the direction 
of the magistrates, 52 percent of defendants received immediate custody. In other 
words, there were at least 48 percent of defendants who received sentences 
within the powers of the magistrates' courts. We can add those who received 
sentences of less than six months. Flood-Page & Mackie (1998), in a study of 
sentencing practices in the magistrates' and Crown Courts, have noted how 
overall, 62 percent of defendants in their study committed for sentence received a 
sentence within the powers of the magistrates' court. 
Both reports gave reasons as to why this may well have been the case. Riley and 
Vennard suggested that magistrates might have declined jurisdiction for reasons 
that were not related to the likely sentence, such as when a co-defendant elected 
Crown Court trial. Similarly, the Crown Court may have been aware of 
mitigation that could not be raised at the mode of trial hearing. Hedderman and 
Moxon noted how the mode of trial decision was made in the absence of 
information on previous convictions and mitigating circumstances; both 
influential in the sentencing process. Additionally, the defendant may have 
pleaded guilty to a lesser offence that warranted a sentence within the range of 
magistrates' powers. Hedderman and Moxon specifically questioned the 
information that was available to magistrates and suggested this as a possible 
reason for cases being sent to the Crown Court that subsequently received a 
sentence within the powers of the magistrates' court. 
Additionally, evidence exists that defendants elect Crown Court trial to secure 
what is perceived to be a better standard of justice, only for the defendant to 
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subsequently plead guilty and therefore fail to challenge the prosecution's case. 
Riley and Vennard (1988) reported that of the 244 defendants who elected trial, 
74 percent (180) eventually pleaded guilty to all charges. Hedderman and Moxon 
(1992) noted that of those defendants who elected, 70 percent pleaded guilty to 
all charges while a further 14 percent offered mixed pleas. 30 Contrast with the 
research commissioned for the James Committee (Home Office and Lord 
Chancellor's Office, 1975) that suggested of the 166 defendants who elected, 69 
percent pleaded not guilty to all charges with 85 percent initially intending to 
plead not guilty. 
At first glance, it may seem a little counterintuitive for a defendant to elect 
Crown Court trial, in the belief that it offers a better chance of acquittal, only to 
subsequently plead guilty. Hedderman and Moxon (1992) explored the reasons 
for the existence of this paradox. Just over a quarter (27 percent) always intended 
to plead guilty from the outset because they expected a lighter sentence or a 
fairer hearing. 51 percent of those who changed their plea stated that they did so 
because charges were dropped, while 22 percent, often on the basis of legal 
advice, thought that to enter a not guilty plea would be futile. Riley and Vennard 
reported that 20 percent of defendants who elected intended to plead guilty at the 
time of election, whereas 74 percent of those who elected pleaded guilty. Similar 
reasons were offered for these new pleas: some defendants changed pleas due to 
lawyer's advice, while others did so because of "a bargain with the prosecution" 
or "information about probable sentence" (1988; 20). Herbert (2003) commented 
30 It is important to reflect here that Hedderman and Moxon's sample concerned convicted 
defendants and so therefore excluded those defendants who elected Crown Court trial, pleaded 
not guilty, and were subsequently acquitted. Had they been included, a lower ratio of defendants 
electing Crown Court trial and pleading guilty would have been reported. 
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on the inadequacy of advanced disclosure as received by the defence and on the 
propensity for charges to be amended after plea has been initially entered. 
2.5.3 Restricting Crown Court trial 
Both Hedderman and Moxon (1992) and Riley and Vennard (1988) suggested 
strategies for reducing the number of either way cases committed to the Crown 
Court. Both were clear in their belief that case outcomes did not justify Crown 
Court trial with its associated expense. 
Hedderman and Moxon (1992) suggested, in cases where the defendant elected 
Crown Court trial and was subsequently convicted, the Crown Court was five 
times more likely to use custody and sentences were about four times longer. 
Using a multivariate statistic analysis to account for case factors, the choice of 
trial venue was found to be the most influential in any decision to impose 
custody. After allowing for such factors, they concluded that in like for like cases 
custody was used three times as often and sentences were two and a half times 
longer; an aggregate difference that suggested the Crown Court imposed custody 
at more than seven times the rate used by magistrates. 3 1 Those defendants who 
chose Crown Court trial initially intending to plead not guilty but subsequently 
changing their plea were exposing themselves to the possibility of a custodial 
31 Criticism can be made of Hedderman and Moxon's use of multivariate analysis. In their 
appendix, they noted the factors used to control for the importance of venue; these being, 
"convicted of more than one offence, having one or more previous convictions, having previously 
served a custodial sentence. being in breach of a court order, being remanded in custody, the 
nature of the principle offence, the offender's sex, the amount stolen in property cases, final plea, 
the availability of a social inquiry report, being under 21 year of age and having codefendants" 
(1992: 43). In contrast, Hood utilised over 70 case variables when examining the impact of race 
on sentencing (1992: Appendix 2). It could well be that in restricting the variables accounted for, 
Hedderman and Moxon have omitted important variables that impacted upon the custody 
decision, thereby weakening their conclusion. 
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sentence and for a longer period than that likely to be imposed in the magistrates' 
court. Defendants were therefore playing a form of roulette when electing Crown 
Court trial, whereby they gambled the possibility of a lesser sentence for an 
increased prospect of acquittal. However, as so many subsequently pleaded 
guilty, they lost the benefit yet still paid the price. 
Both Hedderman and Moxon (1992) and Riley and Vennard (1988) referred to 
efficiency and economy as reasons for the adoption of strategies that reduce the 
workload of the Crown Court. Riley and Vennard noted the higher cost of Crown 
Court trials: the increased use of custody in the Crown Court significantly 
inflated the prison population thereby increasing the costs of that system; the 
large numbers of cases committed to the Crown Court increased delays that 
increased the numbers held on remand; and legal aid costs more in the Crown 
Court. Hedderman and Moxon provided detailed costs for 1988/9: a trial in the 
magistrates' court cost £295 compared to £3,100 in the Crown Court; 
prosecution costs were £50 compared to £460; defendants in the Crown Court 
were more likely to have a social inquiry report produced at a cost of £210 per 
defendant. They also noted that legal aid costs were higher in the Crown Court, 
and finally they reported that the largest cost differential was produced by 
differential sentencing that resulted in higher costs for the prison population. 32 
Given all the arguments referred to, Hedderman and Moxon were unambiguous 
in their belief that as things stood, Crown Court trial was a costly business that 
was not being used appropriately. They noted that public confidence in the 
32 Recent evidence suggests that magistrates have increased their use of imprisonment. For 
instance, the Halliday report noted that custodial sentencing for adults in the magistrates' court 
increased by 191 percent between 1989 and 1999, from 18,200 to 53,000 adults given custodial 
sentences (Home Office, 2001b). 
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system was important and that such confidence was engendered by jury trial. 
However, they suggested that the perceived benefit of a higher acquittal rate in 
the Crown Court was not being utilised when defendants pleaded guilty. They 
concluded that: 
the high cost of Crown Court trial, both in terms of direct costs and the indirect costs of 
more severe sentences and a higher remand population, seems to offer few tangible 
benefits, least of all for the defendants (1992: 41). 
Bottoms and McClean suggested the task of administrators was one of balancing 
arguments on cost and efficiency with the rights of defendants. However, they 
were much more unambiguous in their justification of jury trial, not only as a 
symbolic effigy utilised to rally public confidence in the criminal justice system, 
but also as an authentic right of the defendant in the criminal justice system: 
it is perfectly possible to argue that, as in many other legal contexts, the demands of 
adequate justice are opposed to those of economy and administration. On this view, 
everyone pleading not guilty is entitled to a judgment by his peers, the twelve good men 
and true of the English jury, the bulwark of liberty. On this view, trial by the magistrates 
is a form of second-class proceedings (Bottoms and McClean, 1976: 177-178). 
These reports set the scene for the subsequent debates as well as reflecting what 
had gone before. They are part of the wider agenda of the search for a modem 
and efficient criminal justice system that respects the long and cherished 
traditions of its institutions. 
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2.6 The growth of summary jurisdiction: Reviews, reports and legislation 
The decrease in the Crown Court's workload over the last 15 or so years, 
examined above, is a continuation of a long-term redistribution of business from 
the higher to the lower criminal courts. This prolonged shift suggests a 
reorganisation of the court system rather than simple fluctuations in the 
distribution of cases within that system. However, jury trial continues to be 
viewed as a bulwark of liberty; a right to be enjoyed by every citizen; the jewel 
in the crown of the criminal justice process; the ideological support that 
legitimises that process. The reality is that Crown Court trial is the exception 
rather than the rule (Darbyshire, 1997b). 33 
This has a long history; the first landmark on this road occurred in 1847. Pre this 
date, choice of trial venue was straightforward: indictable offences were tried 
before a jury at Assizes or Quarter Sessions and non-indictable offences were 
heard before Justices of the Peace (Jackson, 1937). 34 The 1847 Act introduced 
summary trial for larceny if the defendant was under the age of 14, the Justices 
thought this appropriate, and the parents of the child consented. 35 More reforms 
of a similar ilk followed: the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 1855 
extended the procedure to larceny of less than five shillings for adults; the 
Summary Jurisdiction Act 1897 lifted the five shillings threshold to forty 
shillings; in 1899 another Summary Jurisdiction Act provided for malicious 
33 Not only do most cases remain in the magistrates' court, but of those that are committed to the 
Crown Court a plea of guilty is the norm, thereby dispensing with the need for a trial. In 2001,62 
percent of all defendants pleaded guilty in the Crown Court (Home Office, 2002a). 
4 Assizes and Quarter Sessions were replaced by the Crown Court as a result of the Courts Act 
1971, after a recommendation to this effect by the Royal Commission on Assizes and Quarter 
Sessions (1969). 
35 An Act for the more speedy Trial and Punishment of Juvenile Offenders, 10 and 11 Vict. c. 82. 
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damage to be tried by Justices of the Peace with a corresponding threshold of 
forty shillings; and finally in 1915 this forty shillings boundary was raised to 
twenty pounds by the Criminal Justice Administration Act. These reforms 
tinkered at the margins; 1925 saw the first major extension of summary 
jurisdiction for indictable offences (Thomas, 1972). Among the offences to be 
reclassified to allow summary trial by the Criminal Justice Act 1925 were; 
attempted suicide, malicious damage, malicious wounding, assault occasioning 
actual bodily harm, more larceny offences from the 1916 Larceny Act and 
certain forgery offences. 
These early reforms were explained and justified as reducing delay and saving 
resources. The preamble to the 1847 Act stated that the purpose of the legislation 
was to "ensure the more speedy trial of juvenile offenders" while the long title to 
the 1855 legislation was "an Act for diminishing expense and delay in the 
administration of criminal justice" (Home Office and Lord Chancellor's Office, 
1975: 8). 36 Not only did these reforms reduce the workload of Quarter Sessions 
and Assizes, they were so successful that in a short space of time it soon became 
doubted if they could ever be reversed without placing an unbearable burden on 
the workload of the higher courts (Jackson, 1937). Piecemeal reform continued 
in 1962 with the Criminal Justice Administration Act that allowed for summary 
trial for indictable offences such as indecent assault, child abandonment and 
concealment of birth. 
36 The debates on the 1855 Act in Parliament centred upon the competence of magistrates to hear 
these cases, while recognising that costs and delays were growing. In many respects, these reflect 
the concerns expressed recently on the attempts to restrict trial by jury. For the debates on the 
1855 Act see: 26 February 1855, H. L. Debs., Third Series, Vol. 136, Cols. 1871-1880; 27 
February 1855, H. L. Debs., Third Series, Vol. 136, Cols. 1958-1961. 
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While summary jurisdiction was being extended for existing offences, newly 
created offences allowed for summary trial or trial on indictment, further 
increasing the range of offences with a choice as to venue. Additionally, 
defendants received a right to jury trial for summary offences where the 
maximum sentence exceeded three months. 37 The result of all this activity was a 
complex classification of criminal offences in urgent need of restructuring. 38 
With this in mind, the James Committee was asked to: 
consider within the framework of the existing court structure what should be the 
distribution of criminal business between the Crown Court and magistrates' courts; and 
what changes in law and practice are desirable to that end (Home Office and Lord 
Chancellor's Office, 1975: 128). 
2.6.1 The report of the James Committee 
A conflict between principle and economy lay at the heart of the perceived 
problem. Commentators thought the review to be little more than an exercise in 
reducing the workload of the Crown Court (Griew, 1977; Scott and Latham, 
1976). The Home Secretary stated that he was conscious of the need to reduce 
the workload of the Crown Court, while protecting the interests of defendants 
(Home Office and Lord Chancellor's Office, 1975). In interpreting its terms of 
reference the Committee was unambiguous in its belief that they did not restrict 
the Committee to simply searching for means to reduce the Crown Court's 
workload: 
37 Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879, section 17. This was replaced by section 25 of the 
Magistrates' Court Act 1952 with the right of election remaining. 
38 See section 2.2 above. 
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We have not interpreted our terms of reference as limited by the wording of the 
Question giving rise to them. We have not regarded as our main objective the finding of 
a means of relieving the Crown Court of work. We have approached the issues from a 
standpoint of principle (Home Office and Lord Chancellor's Office, 1975: 3). 
Nevertheless, the Committee enquired into delay and economy: comparative 
costs between trial venues were examined; concern about the Crown Court's 
workload was expressed; and the lack of delay in magistrates' courts' 
proceedings was noted. The report concluded that if the workload of the Crown 
Court continued to increase, this would have necessitated a large scale increase 
in court accommodation, staff and judges. This was seen as unlikely given the 
severe restraints on the Court Service's finances. The Committee therefore asked 
the question, "whether the interests of society can be served fairly and efficiently 
without some redistribution of work" (Home Office and Lord Chancellor's 
Office, 1975: 15). The Committee considered options with differential impacts 
upon the Crown Court's workload. One suggested removing the defendant's 
right to elect jury trial and leaving the decision either with the magistrates or the 
prosecution. The second was a reclassification of offences from indictable to the 
categories now known as either way or summary. The Committee observed that 
the choice of trial venue could not be given to the prosecutor (as was the position 
in Scotland) because of the very different nature of the Scottish Procurator 
Fiscal. 39 On the defendant's right to elect, the Committee noted the 
unpredictability inherent in any exercise of that choice but considered 
nevertheless that the right should remain. The claim that the exercise of the right 
39 At the time, the police were responsible for the prosecution of offenders in England and Wales. 
Prosecutors did not therefore share the independence of the Prosecutor Fiscal. 
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of election was abused was regarded as overstated and discarded as the evidence 
suggested that defendants valued jury trial. 40 The Committee fell short of 
recommending the removal of the right to elect and instead considered 
reclassification as an alternative. The classification of offences used today 
resulted from the deliberations of the Committee and they made a number of 
suggestions that removed an existing right to elect in some cases, and moved 
other indictable only offences into the new either way category. Finally, they 
recommended that any right of election for summary offences be removed. These 
proposals amounted to a major reclassification exercise: the indictable offences 
of burglary, unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl under 16, bigamy, and 
causing death by reckless or dangerous driving were to be placed in the either 
way category. Meanwhile, driving whilst intoxicated and careless or reckless 
driving were to lose the right of election. 41 The Committee also recommended 
that low value theft and criminal damage lose the right of election. There was 
one final recommendation; a removal of the presumption of Crown Court trial for 
either way offences, to be replaced by a neutral perspective. 
The report expected that the proposals taken together would reduce the workload 
of the Crown Court by around 6,000 to 8,000 cases a year. 42 This represented a 
reduction of around nine to 12 percent of cases committed to the Crown Court in 
1974, and a substantial step towards the stated aim that the Crown Court should 
be reserved for the most serious two to three percent of all offences. These 
40 The Committee commissioned the Office of Population, Census and Surveys to research the 
views of defendants on the right of election. This was also a question addressed by Bottoms and 
McClean (1976) and they too found that defendants attached great importance to the right to elect 
jury trial. 
41 This list is not exhaustive and simply gives a flavour of the extent of the recommendations. 
42 The Committee stated that these figures were largely the result of guesswork. 
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costings were a substitute for any deliberation on the merits of summary justice. 
At no time did the Committee adequately address the supposed imbalance 
between the quality of justice in the magistrates' and Crown Court. There was no 
serious engagement with the belief, widespread among defendants and their 
counsel, that the defendant benefited from a more impartial tribunal in the Crown 
Court. 
There is very little information available on which to compare the quality of justice 
dispensed by the two courts, and we do not attempt to express a concluded view on the 
matter (Home Office and Lord Chancellor's Office, 1975: 18). 
The proposals of the committee were implemented in the Criminal Law Act 1977 
with one major omission; the reclassification of low value theft. The Committee, 
acknowledging that a theft conviction could result in a substantial loss of 
reputation, nevertheless considered that when deciding venue "no distinction 
should be drawn based upon the offender as opposed to the offence" (Home 
Office and Lord Chancellor's Office, 1975: 38). In the face of public hostility, 
the relevant clause was removed from the Bill. In a Times leader, the right to 
elect trial by jury was praised as a fundamental liberty of citizenship: 
Trial by jury is deeply embedded in the national consciousness as a bulwark against 
tyranny, a safeguard for the individual against tyranny, a safeguard for the individual 
against oppression from the State and one of the distinguishing features of a free society. 
It must therefore not be restricted severely unless that is absolutely necessary for the fair 
and efficient functioning of the system of criminal justice. 43 
43 January 6 1977. 
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This general defence of trial by jury was a feature of the House of Lords debates 
on the Bill. The proposal to remove the right of election for low value theft was 
also criticised on the grounds that an allegation of dishonesty could have such a 
serious negative impact on a person's reputation, that the right to elect trial by 
jury should be preserved. Lord Brockway saw jury trial as `a bulwark against 
tyranny : 
I regard trial by jury as an absolutely fundamental instrument of a free society. The right 
to say when one is charged with an offence, that the decision as to whether one is guilty 
shall be by juries of ordinary men and women seems to me to be in the very fabric of a 
society of liberty. 44 
Sensing defeat, the Lord Chancellor accepted an amendment that removed the 
proposal to reclassify low value theft, but not before stating that this would have 
serious implications for the Crown Court's workload. 45 
2.6.2 The Criminal Justice Act 1988 
The next reclassification occurred in 1988 with the Criminal Justice Act of that 
year. A Home Office Consultation Paper and a White Paper canvassed opinion 
on proposals suggesting reclassification to summary only the offences of 
common assault, driving whilst disqualified and taking a motor vehicle without 
consent (Home Office, 1986a; Home Office, 1986b). The consultation paper also 
suggested a statutory presumption that low value dishonest offences be tried 
4427 January 1977, HL Debs., Vol. 379, Col. 643. 
45 27 January 1977, HL Debs., Vol. 379, Col. 703. The proposal to remove the right of election 
for low value criminal damage was not altered by the amendment. 
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summarily. The three offences above were all reclassified as summary offences 
and the threshold before criminal damage became an either way offence was 
raised to £2,000. No effort was made to implement the proposed presumption in 
relation to dishonesty offences. The justification for this reclassification 
concerned delay and economy. In the second reading debate in the House of 
Commons, the Home Secretary noted the benefit of the Bill: 
The proposals will remove about 5,000 cases a year which is just over 5 per cent., from 
the Crown Courts and help to relieve a little of the formidable pressure . 
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2.6.3 The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice 
As the establishment of the Royal Commission (1993) was announced on the day 
that the Birmingham Six were released, the widespread view that the 
Commission would propose sweeping changes to the criminal justice process, to 
avoid similar miscarriages of justice, was to be expected (Field and Thomas, 
1994). However, the Report of the Commission has been widely condemned as 
contributing to a climate whereby criminal justice policy is dominated by `law 
and order" and `tough talking' politics (Belloni and Hodgson, 2000; McConville 
and Bridges, 1994). When the Commission examined mode of trial, it was 
heavily influenced by the research findings outlined above. 47 These observations 
were mobilised to recommend the defendant lose their right to elect despite the 
problematic nature of the research. There was no acknowledgement that the vast 
majority of either way cases were dealt with in the magistrates' courts. There was 
46 27 November 1986, HC Debs., Vol. 106, Cols. 469-470. 
47 See section 2.5 
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no inquiry as to the reasons for sentences in the Crown Court for either way 
offences being within the powers of the magistrates. There was no recognition 
that the work of Hedderman and Moxon (1992), relied upon extensively by the 
Commission, related to convicted defendants, and therefore misrepresented the 
actual numbers who elected and then pleaded guilty (Bridges, 1994). Finally, 
there was no appreciation that magistrates send more cases to the Crown Court 
compared to elections (Ashworth, 1993). 
The Commission recommended the removal of the defendant's right to elect jury 
trial in either way cases. The Commission proposed that the decision be made by 
agreement between the defence and prosecution and if no agreement could be 
reached, the magistrates would be the final arbiters in the process. The proposal 
was made without any in-depth discussion of the merits of the respective trial 
venues and instead was largely based upon cost considerations (Belloni and 
Hodgson, 2000; Field and Thomas 1994). The Commission acknowledged that 
defendants are more likely to be acquitted in the Crown Court, but responded by 
asserting that "[m]agistrates' courts conduct over 93% of all criminal cases and 
should be trusted to try cases fairly" (Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, 
1993: 88). 
A 1995 consultation paper (Home Office, 1995b) sought views on implementing 
the recommendations of the Royal Commission, reclassifying low value theft and 
other offences and on the possibility that the defendant be required to enter a plea 
before any decision on venue be addressed. The Government implemented plea 
54 
before venue, while the proposal to remove the right of election met fierce 
resistance. 
2.6.4 Plea before venue 
This procedure was enacted in the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 
1996; the defendant is expected to indicate a plea before the venue decision is 
made. This reform was expected to reduce the number of cases that were 
committed to the Crown Court; it was hoped that magistrates would be more 
likely to accept jurisdiction after a guilty plea, on the basis that a sentencing 
discount could be considered48 and defendants would no longer be able to elect 
Crown Court trial after a guilty plea. Although defendants could have bypassed 
the reform by pleading not guilty with an intention to change plea (Redmayne, 
1996) the statistics suggest that this has not occurred. As the sentencing discount 
is maximised by an early guilty plea, this acts as a disincentive to changing pleas. 
Although there may have been a reduction in committals for trial there has been 
an increase in committals for sentence, suggesting a change in the status of cases 
that are committed to the Crown Court (Bridges, 1999). 
2.6.5 The Narey Report 
The Narey Report, although primarily concerned with delay, constituted another 
contribution to the mode of trial debate (Home Office, 1997b). The author was 
asked to report on delays within the criminal justice process and as the workload 
48 Section 48(1) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 places a duty on a sentencing 
court to indicate if it reduces the sentence due to a guilty plea. 
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of the Crown Court was seen to exacerbate the problem, the distribution of 
criminal business found its way onto the agenda. Narey recommended that the 
defence lose the right to elect trial by jury, on the grounds that it was subject to 
abuse and was not cost effective. The report rehearsed many of the arguments 
analysed above and made a number of assertions that failed sufficiently to take 
account of available evidence. Again, Hedderman and Moxon (1992) were used 
without an appreciation that they examined convicted defendants and therefore 
overestimated the numbers of defendants who elect jury trial but subsequently 
plead guilty. The evidence did not support the statements in the report that 
defendants elect jury trial to delay proceedings. 49 Nevertheless, the proposal to 
give the bench the final decision on venue was aired for consultation by the New 
Labour Administration with a Bill finally placed before Parliament (Home 
Office, 1998a). 
2.6.6 The Mode of Trial Bills 
In a press release that coincided with the publication of the Criminal Justice 
(Mode of Trial) Bill, Jack Straw, then Home Secretary, announced that the main 
purpose of the Bill was to remove the right of election in either way cases. The 
justification for this proposal was to reduce costs and delay: 
Too many defendants have been working the system, demanding Crown Court trial 
purely to delay proceedings. Not only does this cause suffering and distress to victims 
`9 This was also rejected by the James Committee (Home Office and Lord Chancellor's Office, 
1975). 
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and witnesses, but it also costs the taxpayer a lot of money in extra court costs. We 
estimate that this Bill would save the taxpayer over £100 million. 50 
The Explanatory Notes to the Bill suggested that it would reduce the number of 
Crown Court trials by around 12,000 a year, resulting in a net saving of about 
£105 million. 
Clause 1 of the Bill proposed amending section 19 of the Magistrates' Court Act 
1980 so that the court would make the decision on venue, after hearing 
representations from the defence and prosecution. The framework within the Bill 
also considered the issues, raised in the report of the James Committee, on the 
importance of Crown Court trial for those of previous good character charged 
with dishonesty offences. In addition to taking into account the "nature of the 
case", the court could also enquire, "whether the accused's livelihood would be 
substantially diminished" or "whether the accused's reputation would be 
seriously damaged as a result of conviction". In addressing the accused's 
reputation the court could be informed of any previous convictions. Finally, the 
Bill also created a right of appeal against the decision of the bench. 
The Bill was introduced in the House of Lords and, on second reading, Lord 
Williams, the Attorney-General, introduced the debate and suggested that the 
proposals were needed for a number of different reasons. 51 These shared a 
common concern with costs and delay, expressed through the notion that 
inappropriate cases were committed to the Crown Court, wasting time and 
so 19 November 1999. Press release 363 of 1999. 
51 For the second reading debate, see 2 December 1999, H. L. Debs., Vol. 340, Cols. 919-1004. 
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money. Many of the previously examined reasons for restricting Crown Court 
trial were raised and direct reliance was placed upon the reports of the Royal 
Commission and the Narey Review. 52 Lord Williams also remarked upon Crown 
Court delays and praised the magistracy as being a voluntary representative body 
of the people. Although the Bill progressed to Committee, it was roundly 
savaged by a number of Lords. 
The thrust of the criticisms of the proposals can be grouped into five categories. 
Firstly, the impact of the Bill on ethnic minority defendants was considered. 53 
Secondly, the Bill was condemned for creating a two-tier system of justice as 
questions of reputation could be considered in determining venue. Thirdly, the 
arguments on cost and delay were said to be spurious. Fourthly, a number of 
Lords examined the failings identified in the literature and suggested that the 
problems lay elsewhere. 54 Finally, the proposals were seen as a fundamental 
attack on an important civil liberty; the right to trial by jury. It is on this last 
subject that the Lords rallied against the Bill. Many Lords waxed lyrical on the 
historic basis of jury trial; its democratic credentials; its role in encouraging civic 
responsibility and the exercise of civic duty; its potential to set aside oppressive 
laws; and its role in legitimising the criminal justice system. Moreover, if all of 
the other arguments put forward by the Government were suspect, this simply 
added to the view that the attack on jury trial was an unwarranted restriction of a 
fundamental right. The issue was one of principle as opposed to economy: 
52 At Col. 923. 
53 See Bridges et. al. (2000) for a fuller exploration of this point. Particular emphasis was placed 
upon the representative nature of juries. A view roundly condemned by Darbyshire as being naive 
at best; random selection does not necessarily lead to representative juries (1991). 
S` Improved charging practices, better advanced disclosure and a more thorough CPS review were 
said to provide better alternatives for keeping inappropriate cases out of the Crown Court. 
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the fact is that for the purposes of saving money this Government seeks to deprive 
defendants of their right to be tried by a fairer and more up-to-date system. 55 
Even though the Lords read the Bill for a second time, in Committee the same 
arguments resurfaced and the Bill was defeated. 56 However, the Government 
vowed to re-introduce the Bill into the House of Commons and to make use of 
the Parliament Acts. 
The Bill was reintroduced to Parliament; the Criminal Justice (Mode of Trial) 
(No. 2) Bill received its second reading on 7 March 2000.57 To alleviate the fears 
expressed in the Lords on the first Bill, the Government removed references to 
the livelihood and reputation of the accused. Instead, the court was to decide 
venue on the basis of the circumstances of the alleged offence alone. In addition 
to this change in substance in the Bill, there was also a presentational change. 
Although figures now suggested savings in the region of £ 120 million a year, the 
Bill was justified not on grounds of cost, but as introducing the most appropriate 
procedure for determining venue. The right to elect was described by Jack Straw 
as "an antiquated and time-wasting procedure" and removing the right of election 
was part of a wider "programme to modernise the criminal justice system. "58 
Nevertheless, the Bill still received a rocky ride through the Commons, both at 
ss Lord Thomas of Gresford at Col. 934. 
56 For the Committee stage of the Bill in the House of Lords see 20 January 2000, H. L. Debs., 
Vol. 608, Cols. 1246-1298. 
57 H. C. Debs., Vol. 345, Cols. 886-980. 
58 At Col. 886. The same arguments about inappropriate elections and savings in time and money 
were still advanced. In the third reading debate Charles Clarke suggested that the Government 
published the figures on expected savings, not because they were important as a justification of 
the proposals, but because they were required by law to do so. See 25 July 2000, H. C. Debs., Vol. 
354, Col. 999. 
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second and third reading. 59 In addition to the arguments advanced in the Lords, 
new objections were raised that concerned the inability of the bench to take into 
account reputation. It was stated that the Royal Commission introduced this as an 
important safeguard when suggesting abolition of the right of election. Not being 
able to elect when one's reputation was at stake was seen as intolerable. By this 
time, the question of mode of trial formed part of the brief of Lord Justice Auld 
who had yet to conclude; many asked why this reform was introduced before 
Auld reported. 60 The Bill, however, successfully progressed to the Lords where it 
failed to make it past second reading for the same reasons that it failed on the 
first occasion. 61 In a reflection of the Commons debates, the inability of the 
bench to take reputation into account, even though this change was driven by the 
debates on the first Bill, led some Lords to withdraw their support for the 
measure. As in the Commons, many enquired into the appropriateness of 
requesting Lord Justice Auld to report and then legislating before he did so. 
Many felt justified in standing firm against the Commons on the basis that the 
Bill was not a manifesto commitment and it was frequently noted how the thrust 
of the Bill was opposed by New Labour when in opposition. Nevertheless, the 
Government subsequently indicated that it intended to continue with the proposal 
to remove the right of election in either way cases. 62 
59 At third reading the Bill was subjected to a three line whip and a guillotine motion that 
attracted criticism from all sides of the House. For the debates at third reading see, 25 July 2000, 
H. C. Debs., Vol. 354, Cols. 938-1022. 
60 The conclusions of Lord Justice Auld will be reviewed in section 2.6.7. 
61 28 September 2000, H. L. Debs., Vol. 616, Cols. 961-1034. 
62 See Charles Clark's answers to questions: 26 October 2000, H. C. Debs., Vol. 355, Col. 212 and 
5 March 2001, H. C. Debs., Vol. 364, Col. 36. 
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2.6.7 The Auld Review 
Lord Justice Auld was requested to undertake a wholesale review of the criminal 
courts, with terms of reference directing an inquiry into "the practices and 
procedures of the criminal courts at every level" (Auld, 2001: 1). As part of the 
review, Auld addressed mode of trial and the defendant's right to elect. Auld 
recommended that the categorisation of offences remain and that his reforms 
should work within this system. However, he recommended the defendant lose 
the right to elect; in a manner reminiscent of the report of the Royal Commission 
and the Narey Review, Auld made the same observations on the right to elect. 
However, the report examined the evidence through sceptical lenses. The 
misreading of Hedderman and Moxon was noted and he looked at the reasons for 
elections where the defendant subsequently pleaded guilty. However, rather than 
suggest reforms that addressed these issues, Auld grasped the nettle and 
recommended the right of election be removed. For Auld, the issue was of 
determining the appropriate method of deciding venue, and as this was an 
objective decision in which the public had an interest, it should be made by a 
court. Auld was particularly scathing on those who suggested that the right of 
election was a historic and fundamental right of citizenship. Such views were: 
over-emotive and legally and historically mistaken arguments exaggerating the status, 
longevity and extent of a defendant's elective right to trial by jury (2001: 195). 
This opinion is in some ways contradictory to what had gone before. Previously, 
Auld outlined the history of electing and how elections were created by the 
introduction of summary trial for indictable cases. Any description of this 
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movement towards summary trial illuminates the revisions to history performed 
by the pro-election camp. It is correct to state that pre 1847 a right to elect did 
not exist. However, that was because nearly all cases were heard in the higher 
courts and summary jurisdiction was limited. Therefore, although the right to 
elect is a relatively recent creation, jury trial itself has a much longer pedigree. 
To say that reliance on the historical longevity of jury trial is mistaken somewhat 
misses the point; the creation of venue choice was introduced to facilitate a 
reduction in the caseload of higher courts. This is the trend that pro-election 
campaigners are trying to resist; it is paradoxical that earlier reforms are used to 
justify further reform. This remains the case if one accepts Auld's view that the 
increase in summary jurisdiction has to be placed "in the context of the harsher 
criminal law and justice process of the day in which the trial process provided 
very few of the protections currently afforded to defendants" (2001: 197). In 
addition to removing the right to elect, Auld also recommended the option of 
committal for sentence be removed; Auld recognised that removing the right of 
election, while retaining the possibility of committal for sentence, was unfair in 
that the defendant would be denied jury trial while still subject to higher 
penalties in the Crown Court. 
The proposed removal of this right to elect needs to be viewed in the context of 
other recommendations in the report. More specifically, the creation of a `third 
tier' court; an intermediate tier between the magistrates' and Crown Court with a 
maximum penalty of two years' imprisonment. This court was to consist of a 
mixed panel of two lay magistrates and a District Judge (Magistrates' Courts). 
The benefit of this system was the combination of lay representation and judicial 
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experience acting as a collective (Sanders, 2001). Given the increased sentencing 
powers of this mixed tribunal, this would have resulted in a radical reduction in 
the Crown Court's workload as large numbers of cases would be sent to this 
intermediate tier. Perhaps conscious of the combined effects of these proposals, 
the Government chose not to implement this part of the Auld Review. 63 In fact. 
the Government failed to act on the proposal to remove the defendant's right to 
elect in the subsequent legislation. 
2.6.8 The Criminal Justice Act 2003 
While Lord Justice Auld was deliberating, but prior to reporting, the Government 
published a policy paper, Criminal Justice: The Way Ahead (Home Office, 
2001a). While promising to give Lord Justice Auld's recommendations their full 
consideration, the Government did not wait for these on mode of trial. They 
proposed, to speed up justice for victims and witnesses, "to give the courts, rather 
than the defendant, the power to decide whether a triable either way case would 
be heard in the Crown Court" (2001 a: 61). 64 In the White Paper Justice for All, 
the Government rehearsed the arguments examined above that suggested the 
right to elect be restricted (Home Office, 2002b). However, the Government 
acknowledged elections were a "small and diminishing proportion" of either way 
cases sent to the Crown Court and there were "issues of principle" inherent in the 
63 There are a number of possible reasons as to why the Government may have declined to 
implement these proposals. The Government may have suspected that an intermediate tribunal 
would provide insufficient safeguards (Jackson, 2002). Alternatively, given the failure of the two 
previous Criminal Justice (Mode of Trial) Bills, the Government may have considered that the 
proposals seen in the round may have given the impression of constituting a fundamental attack 
on trial by jury. Such a view is all the more likely when placed alongside proposals restricting 
jury trial in cases of serious fraud or when the defendant chose trial by judge alone. 
64 See section 2.5. 
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right of election (2002b: 73). As a result, the Government announced they would 
retain the defendant's right of election. However, other proposals aimed to 
address the concerns raised and thereby reduce the number of elections. It 
appeared the Labour administration heard the calls from the Lords and therefore 
proposed to tackle Crown Court delays through means other than removing the 
right to elect. Some remedies can be traced to the Lords who opposed the 
Criminal Justice (Mode of Trial) Bills. For instance, in order to deal with 
defendants who changed their pleas after electing, the Government suggested 
three proposals. Firstly, giving the responsibility for charging to the CPS and 
new CPS administrative arrangements would result in fewer instances of 
overcharging, and a correlating reduction in elections designed to prompt a fuller 
review. Secondly, a clearer system of graduated sentencing discounts for guilty 
pleas would reduce not guilty pleas where the defendant was guilty. As part of 
this process, the court would be able to give an indication of sentence before 
considering venue. This would encourage guilty pleas. Finally, the Government 
proposed abolishing committal for sentence so that if a defendant consented to 
summary trial this would restrict the sentence to the magistrates' maximum. In 
order for this to work effectively, and to facilitate informed decision making, the 
bench would be informed of previous convictions. In addition to these proposals, 
the Government also suggested an increase in magistrates' maximum sentence to 
one year, with an option to move to 18 months. 65 The recommendations in the 
White Paper were aimed at the specific complaints raised earlier, but rather than 
using the blunderbuss tactic of removing the right to elect, the proposals dealt 
with each specific point utilising bespoke solutions. However, the overall aim 
65 Evidence suggests that magistrates do not wish for this increased maximum penalty (Herbert, 
2003). 
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was to reduce the Crown Court's workload thereby reducing delay and saving 
resources. 
These proposals all found a place in the Bill that formed the Criminal Justice Act 
2003. There are many indications that reveal the intentions behind this part of the 
Bill. The Government, in addressing the concerns of the Home Affairs 
Committee that the proposed increase in magistrates' sentencing powers would 
increase imprisonment, stated that: 
the increase in magistrates' sentencing powers is closely tied in with the changes to 
allocation of offences between courts set out earlier in the Bill, both of which encourage 
magistrates to retain more cases (Home Office, 2003: 11). 
A House of Commons research paper came to a similar conclusion on the aims of 
the Bill; "the Government envisages significant reductions in the number of 
cases going to the Crown Court and in `the abuse of the right to elect for jury 
trial"' (Broadbridge, 2002). 
Section 29 gives the CPS the responsibility for charging defendants. Section 154 
increases the sentencing powers of magistrates to one years imprisonment; the 
proposal to allow the Home Secretary to increase this to 18 months was removed 
in the Lords. 66 Section 41 provides for the enactment of Schedule 3 that 
66 8 October 2003, H. L. Debs., Vol. 653, Cols., 296-299. At third reading, the Lords also 
attempted to link the increased sentencing power to the introduction of custody plus (a new 
sentence introduced that is part custody, and part intensive supervision upon release). Baroness 
Scotland for the Government observed that there would be "anticipated benefits" from the 
increase in powers independent of custody plus (the ability of magistrates' to retain more cases) 
that justified rejecting the suggested amendment. (See 5 November 2003, H. L. Debs., Vol. 654, 
Cols., 824-828. ) Similarly, Paul Goggins for the Government in the Commons, when addressing 
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implements many of the proposals examined above. Schedule 3 amends the 
Magistrates' Court Act 1980 in a number of significant ways. There is no 
alteration to the plea before venue procedure; the defendant must still indicate a 
plea and venue will only be considered in the event of a not guilty plea. If there is 
a plea of guilty, the court can sentence immediately, adjourn for reports or 
commit the defendant to the Crown Court for sentencing. If the court needs to 
consider venue, the defence and prosecution are allowed to make representations. 
Information on previous convictions will be available; this facilitates the removal 
of the option of committal for sentence. Armed with this information, and having 
"regard to any allocation guidelines", the bench must decide upon venue. If the 
bench decides that the allegations are more suitable for the Crown Court, that is 
the end of the matter. However, if they accept jurisdiction, then the defendant is 
asked to consent to summary trial. It is at this point that two devices have been 
introduced to reduce elections. Firstly, the defendant is informed that if he does 
consent to summary trial he may be committed to the Crown Court for sentence 
in limited situations. 67 Secondly, the defendant is able to request an indication of 
sentence. The court may give an indication, but only addressed as to whether or 
not they would impose custody. The defendant is then asked if she would like to 
reconsider her plea. This indication would only be binding on any future 
sentencing court if the defendant changed her plea. If the defendant maintains the 
not guilty plea, then she either accepts summary jurisdiction or elects Crown 
this suggested Lords amendment, noted the "benefits to the administration of justice" that would 
pertain from dealing with more cases in the magistrates' court. The Commons rejected this 
amendment. (See 18 November 2003, H. C. Debs., Vol. 413, Cols., 724-732. ) When the Bill was 
returned to the Lords, they did not insist on this amendment. (19 November 2003, H. L. Debs., 
Vol. 654, Cols., 2005-2007. ) 
67 The Schedule has not fully removed the option for committal for sentence as suggested in the 
White Paper. Elsewhere, the Act provides for extended sentences for dangerous violent and sex 
offenders and, if the defendant qualifies for such an extended sentence, the power to commit for 
sentence remains. 
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Court trial. If the defendant changes her plea then the court proceeds to 
sentencing accepting the indication of plea as a plea of guilty. 
These proposals received little opposition as the Bill progressed through 
Parliament. David Blunkett, the Home Secretary, when introducing the second 
reading debate made clear, if this were needed, these proposals were aimed at 
reducing delay and saving resources. 68 Although the aims were the same, the 
means had changed and as a result, relatively little of the debate was addressed to 
these clauses in the Bill. Instead, the Government's opponents rounded on what 
was regarded as another assault upon jury trial; the proposals to introduce trial by 
judge alone in a number of situations: if the defendant requested, if there was, or 
a threat of, jury intimidation and in long and complex cases. Once more, MPs 
waxed lyrical on the merits of jury trial and its place within the criminal justice 
system. However, little of this was aimed at the mode of trial proposals as the 
defendant retained a right of election, even though the Bill would place 
maximum pressure on defendants to dissuade them from exercising that right. 69 
The mode of trial proposals easily passed the committee stage and were again 
infrequently addressed at third reading. 70 In the Lords, many Lords at second 
reading again felt the need to defend jury trial, but this defence was aimed at the 
proposals for trial by judge alone; little was said on the mode of trial proposals. 7' 
The Lords did defeat the proposals for trial by judge alone in Committee, 
68 For the second reading debate see: 4 December 2002, H. C. Debs., Vol. 395, Cols. 912-1014. 
69 There were the occasional dissenters on these proposals due to the effect that they would have 
on the number of jury trials. For instance, see Mr. Kidney who, in the second reading debate, 
described his observations as a "footnote" (at Col. 970). 
70 For the relevant proceedings of the Standing Committee see: 25 February 2003, HCSCB, Cols. 
1082-1098. For the third reading see: 19 May 2003, H. C. Debs., Vol. 405, Cols: 688-813 and 20 
May 2003, H. C. Debs., Vol. 405, Cols. 865-983. 
71 For the second reading debate see: 16 June 2003, H. L. Debs., Vol. 649, Cols. 558-654. 
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removing the relevant clauses from the Bill. 72 The Government's insistence on 
these measures being adopted resulted in the Bill being sent back and forth 
between the Commons and Lords before a final compromise was accepted. When 
first returned to the Commons, the relevant clauses were reinserted into the Bill, 
with the availability of trial by judge alone in long and complex cases, restricted 
to serious fraud cases. 73 When the Bill was returned to the Lords on the next day, 
they rejected the Commons' reinstatement of the relevant clauses and removed 
them once again from the Bill. 74 Faced with the possibility of deadlock, and loss 
of the Bill as Parliament was about to be prorogued, the Government offered 
concessions. Clause 41, which offered the defendant a choice of trial by judge 
alone, was amended to allow judicial discretion as to whether the defendant's 
application would be accepted. Also, trial by judge alone for serious fraud cases 
would only be permissible with the consent of the Lord Chief Justice. The tests 
pertaining to whether or not trial by judge alone was permissible in cases of 
alleged, or threatened, jury tampering were also made more rigorous. 75 Before 
the Bill was considered again in the Lords, the Government attempted to broker a 
deal to ensure the passage of the Bill. Clause 41, pertaining to judge alone trials 
on the application of the defendant, was to be removed to ensure the enactment 
of clauses 43 and 45 on judge alone trials for cases of jury tampering. Clause 42 
on serious fraud cases remained a stumbling block. However, the Government 
removed the amendments that would have enacted this compromise resulting in 
allegation and counter allegation as to who was to blame. The Lords therefore 
blocked the passage of the Bill once again by removing clauses 41 and 42, while 
72 For the relevant parts of the Committee stage in the Lords see: 15 July 2003, N. L. Debs., Vol. 
651, Cols. 768-823. 
'} 18 November 2003, H. C. Debs., Vol. 413, Cols., 648-688. 
7+ 19 November 2003, H. L. Debs., Vol. 654, Cols., 1942-1972. 
75 19 November 2003, H. C. Debs., Vol. 413, Cols., 876-903. 
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amending the clauses on jury tampering so as to make the tests even more 
restrictive. 76 Upon being returned to the Commons once again, the Government 
accepted the previous compromise and removed clause 41 from the Bill, securing 
clauses 43 and 45 on jury tampering. Clause 42 was amended so that adoption 
could only be effected upon affirmative resolution of both Houses of Parliament. 
In the meantime, the Government promised to investigate alternative approaches 
to dealing with cases of serious fraud. 77 The Lords accepted the compromise 78 
and the Bill received Royal Assent that day. 79 
2.7 Conclusions 
Since the introduction of a category of offences that could be tried in different 
courts in 1847, there has been a gradual transformation in the workload of 
criminal courts with a prolonged and steady drift away from trial on indictment. 
Successive reviews and legislative reforms have justified this growth in summary 
jurisdiction on grounds of reducing cost and delay. The right of a defendant to 
elect Crown Court trial has come under close scrutiny and, although it appears 
safe for the time being, the reforms in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 will further 
dissuade defendants from exercising that right. All of this has taken place 
without any clear discussion as to the merits of summary jurisdiction, other than 
a vague appreciation that defendants usually believe that jury trial is fairer with 
an increased chance of acquittal. Even so, compared to the knowledge of 
76 20 November 2003, H. L. Debs., Vol. 654, Cols., 2053-2066. 
" 20 November 2003, H. C. Debs., Vol. 413, Cols., 1025-1034. 
78 20 November 2003, H. L. Debs., Vol. 654, Cols., 2105-2110. 
7920 November 2003, H. C. Debs., Vol. 413, Col. 1037. 
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magistrates' practices, the research evidence relating to the defendant's actions 
appears to be voluminous. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
MAGISTRATES 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 introduced the quality of justice in magistrates' courts as an issue 
intensely bound up with the mode of trial debate, yet inadequately addressed 
within that debate. Frequent note was made of the defendant's belief that 
magistrates' courts are an inferior venue (Bottoms and McClean, 1976; Home 
Office, 1986b; Hedderman and Moxon, 1992; Riley and Vennard, 1988). 
Defendant's distrust is reflected in a general belief among the public that 
magistrates are `out of touch' and do a `poor job' (Mattinson and Mirrlees-Black, 
2000; Hough and Roberts, 1998), although this could result from a mistaken 
belief that magistrates use their sentencing powers leniently (Hough and Roberts, 
1998). 80 The dearth of information about magistrates' justice in the mode of trial 
debates is symptomatic of the lack of research evidence. While the Auld Review 
(2001) lists an extensive bibliography of jury research there is no comparable list 
of research on magistrates' justice. Nevertheless, research on the magistracy 
exists and this Chapter assesses models of the magistracy, the recruitment of 
magistrates, the composition of the bench, the role of professional magistrates 
and the quality of justice in magistrates' courts. 
8° A survey reported in Morgan and Russell (2000) suggested that public confidence in the 
magistracy was not as low as that suggested in the British Crime Survey. 65 percent of 
respondents reported that they were either very confident or fairly confident in the ability of 
magistrates to do their job properly. Sanders (2001) showed a confused public perception of the 
magistracy with 60 percent of respondents to the survey acknowledging the lay status of the 
magistracy, yet 46 percent believing that magistrates were subjected to "full legal training" 
(2001: 16). 
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As explained in Chapter 1, this chapter links the examination of mode of trial 
conducted in Chapter 2 with the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 4. 
The research progressed from an initial intention to examine mode of trial 
decisions from an exclusive policy perspective to one whereby mode of trial 
decisions were to be situated within wider theories of social interaction. The 
focus of the research therefore shifted, and Chapters 2,3 and 4 represent this 
shift. Initially, it was felt that the mode of trial decision would be best located 
within an understanding of magistrates' justice. However, the wider theoretical 
concerns that will be outlined in Chapter 4 moved the discussion on somewhat 
into social theories of interaction. Nevertheless, this chapter is still important as it 
helps to unearth a wider view decision making within the magistrates courts, 
although it is acknowledged that restrictions on space have limited the extent to 
which these issues can be pursued in further chapters. However, the shift in this 
chapter from examining the composition of the magistracy towards more a 
sophisticated understanding of magistrates' justice, assists in describing the 
development of the research and the linkages between the differing ideas within 
the thesis. 
3.2 Appointment to the bench 
The criteria for appointment to the bench are fully outlined in the Judicial 
Appointments Annual Report (Department for Constitutional Affairs, 2003a). 
The Lord Chancellor appoints magistrates after a recommendation from 
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Advisory Committees that are frequently supported by Sub-Committees. 8' These 
Committees institute a two-stage interview process, with the first enquiring into 
suitability for appointment and the second examining `judicial aptitude'. In 
assessing suitability, candidates are required to display `six key qualities'; "good 
character, understanding and communication, social awareness, maturity and 
sound temperament, sound judgement, and commitment and reliability" (Lord 
Chancellor's Department, 2002: 59). This process explores candidates' attitudes 
on criminal justice issues. The second interview tests judicial aptitude through an 
examination of case studies that represent the staple diet of a magistrates' 
workload. In recommending candidates for appointment, the Advisory 
Committee is: 
to have regard to the number of vacancies and the need to ensure that the composition of 
the bench broadly reflects the community which it serves in terms of gender, ethnicity, 
geographical spread, occupation and political affiliation (Lord Chancellor's Department, 
2002: 60). 
Advisory Committees also ensure that professional interests do not dominate any 
particular bench and that any profession constitutes at most 15 percent of any one 
bench (Home Affairs Committee, 1996). In other words, the Lord Chancellor 
aims to achieve a composition where the bench is a "microcosm of the local 
community within which it operates" (Skyrme, 1983: 67). 
This selection procedure, privileging as it does a conception of the magistracy as 
a microcosm of the local community (Dignan and Wynne, 1997), has been 
8! The Duchy of Lancaster has similar powers to appoint Justices with the Duchy. 
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shaped by two Royal Commissions: the Royal Commission on the Selection of 
Justices of the Peace (1910) and the Royal Commission on the Justices of the 
Peace (1948). The first Royal Commission was established by the Liberal 
Government in response to widespread dissatisfaction with the social 
composition of the magistracy, resulting from the switching of political 
allegiances by magistrates after the Home Rule Crisis (Burney, 1979; Skyrme, 
1983; Vogler, 1990). This unease at the Conservative majority survived the 
removal of the property qualification in 1906 by the Liberal Administration 
(ibid). The first Royal Commission led to the installation of the Advisory 
Committee system and a desire to achieve a range of social views on the bench, 
especially those of the working classes. The first Committees were appointed in 
1912 (Skyrme, 1983), although they did little to dispel the perception that the 
bench was predominantly a Conservative, middle-aged, middle-class, white, 
male82 institution (Vogler, 1990). The appointment procedures were therefore 
readdressed by the Royal Commission on Justices of the Peace (1948). This 
Commission recommended retention of the Advisory Committee system, while 
restating the principles expressed in the 1910 Commission. The problem was 
identified as one of over-reliance on established sources of recruitment such as 
political parties and "certain sections of the community" (1948: para. 72). The 
Commission recommended Advisory Committees have a limited membership of 
political appointees and their "paramount consideration [was] the person's fitness 
for the discharge of judicial duties" (ibid: para. 84a). 83 While the Commission 
recommended political influence should have a limited role for the appointment 
82 The prohibition on the appointment of women magistrates was removed in 1919. 
83 In a dissenting memorandum, Lord Merthyr, Mr. Stapleton Cotton and Mr. John Watson 
rejected political affiliation as a consideration for appointment to Advisory Committees due to 
the possibility of politics playing an unwarranted role in the appointments procedure. 
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of Advisory Committee members, it was praised as a method of ensuring that the 
bench represented a cross-section of the community. However, the Commission 
expressed concern with the practice of rejecting candidates on the basis of 
political viewpoints if such views were already well represented on the bench. 
3.3 Models of the lay magistracy 
While the composition of the magistracy may have serious implications for the 
public image of the criminal justice process (Baldwin, 1976), any claim that it 
also impacts upon the quality of justice in magistrates' courts must be taken 
seriously. The existence of the lay bench may well perform a number of 
interlinked functions such as contributing to a general sense of civic 
responsibility, involving lay participants in the administration of criminal justice, 
opening law to general scrutiny and restricting professional power (Seago et. al., 
2000). 84 For our purposes however, a more useful starting point may well be the 
work of Dignan and Wynne that identified four possible models of the 
magistracy: magistrates as social elites; magistrates as a meritocracy; magistrates 
as a microcosm of the local community; and magistrates as representatives of 
their local communities (1997). 
They expanded upon these models by examining alternative purposes of the 
magistracy, some of which have serious implications for the quality of justice in 
the magistrates' courts. The first purpose saw the magistracy as a "quasi- 
professional panel" of fact finders (ibid: 196). Dignan and Wynne asserted that 
84 All the while being relatively inexpensive. For a more general discussion on the benefits and 
pitfalls of lay participation in the criminal justice process with specific reference to the 
magistracy see Darbyshire (2002), Morgan and Russell (2000) and Sanders (2001). 
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this purpose presupposes that appointments be based upon merit to recruit the 
best qualified magistrates. The second purpose saw the magistracy as a judicial 
safeguard, an injection of lay common sense into the legal system. Dignan and 
Wynne viewed this role as similar to the role of the jury: lay participation 
necessitates keeping law simple and intelligible; it acts as a check against 
oppressive legislation; and it results in legal interpretation that draws upon 
everyday conceptions of the world. For Dignan and Wynne, this model 
necessitates a divergence of views on the bench and recruitment practices that 
enlist "ordinary people coming from all walks of life" (ibid: 196). The third 
function was the magistracy as a democratic safeguard. This exalts the local in 
magistrates' courts and the diffusion of power from a "centralised system" into 
"the hands of local representatives" (ibid: 196). This necessitates recruitment 
practices going further than required for the `judicial safeguard' argument as 
magistrates would need to be drawn from "not only the local community as a 
whole, but also of its constituent localities" (ibid: 196). 
Each of these models has something to say, either expressly or by implication, on 
the composition of the bench and its relation to the judicial function of 
magistrates. Both the second and third functions call for a degree of widespread 
community involvement although to differing extents. If the magistracy is to act 
as a judicial or democratic safeguard against the worst excesses of an isolated 
and remote legal system, this necessitates a sufficiently broad spread of social 
views on the bench. As for the first function, Dignan and Wynne underestimate 
the degree to which a balanced bench is desirable for fact finding. Dignan and 
Wynne suggested fact finding is best achieved by a "quasi-professional panel of 
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suitable qualified people" (ibid: 196), whereas it may be that everyone is suitably 
qualified, as panels do not find facts out there but rather invest evidence with 
credibility (McConville et. al., 1994). More will be said on this later, 85 but for the 
time being it is sufficient to assert that whether or not evidence is viewed as 
reliable or coherent, and therefore accepted as the truth, is not a function of that 
evidence, but is instead a product of whether or not that evidence falls within the 
`perceptual set' of the fact finder (King and May, 1985) or accords with narrative 
conventions as understood by the fact finder (Bennett and Feldman, 1981). A 
magistracy dominated by one social grouping may lead to shared world views 
that disregard alternative realities and affirm: 
the idea that knowledge held by duly accredited experts is the only rational and sensible 
way of interpreting the world (Bankowski and Mungham, 1976a: 222). 
If such a view is accepted, whatever model is seen as appropriate is 
inconsequential to the need to compose a bench that is representative of the 
community as a whole, regardless of any concern with the public image of the 
magistracy. 
3.4 The composition of the magistracy 
Numerous research studies have addressed the magistracy's composition either 
as a topic with intrinsic interest or as incidental to further research. Most of this 
work has been bypassed by the availability of annual statistics for the magistracy 
as a whole in Judicial Appointments Annual Reports (Department for 
85 See section 3.6.2. 
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Constitutional Affairs, 2003a; Lord Chancellor's Department, 2002; Lord 
Chancellor's Department, 2001; Lord Chancellor's Department, 2000a; Lord 
Chancellor's Department, 1999). 86 The availability of this somewhat historical 
research does, however, facilitate an examination of changes in the composition 
of the magistracy and an evaluation of the extent to which successive Lord 
Chancellors have achieved their stated aim of `balancing the bench'. Figures are 
available that examine the magistracy's composition utilising categories 
propagated by the Lord Chancellor and wider measures: politics, social class, 
age, ethnicity, gender, geographical spread and involvement in community 
activities. Additionally, some research reports have assessed the composition of 
Advisory Committees. 
3.4.1 Advisory Committees 
Members of Advisory Committees and Sub-Committees are appointed to oversee 
the recruitment of magistrates and recommend suitable candidates to the Lord 
Chancellor (or the Duchy of Lancaster) for appointment. As at June 2000, there 
were 92 Advisory Committees across England and Wales with a further 120 Sub- 
Committees (Lord Chancellor's Department, 2000b). Appointment to an 
Advisory Committee falls within the patronage of the Lord Chancellor after a 
recommendation from an appointments committee of the Advisory Committee. 
The Home Affairs Committee had recommended the election of Advisory 
Committee members (Home Affairs Committee, 1996), but this approach has 
86 It could be said that the figures are irrelevant as the magistracy functions as a system of 
"repressive and ideological domination" regardless of its composition (Pearson, 1980: 79). 
However, as argued earlier, the composition of the magistracy has important implications for its 
functioning. 
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been rejected on the grounds that the Lord Chancellor needs to ensure a cross 
section of the community sit on Advisory Committees (Lord Chancellor's 
Department, 1996). The current arrangements have the potential for Committees 
to self reproduce with like minded candidates being appointed. The Lord 
Chancellor aims for a similar social balance of gender, ethnicity, geographical 
spread and age as desired in the magistracy as a whole (Lord Chancellor's 
Department, 1998b). The Department for Constitutional Affairs87 does not 
produce statistics on the composition of Advisory Committees, although a 
number of different research studies have provided evidence of a significant 
social imbalance on Committees and Sub-Committees. 
3.4.1.1 Politics 
Political affiliation plays an important role in the composition of Advisory 
Committees; it is used as a surrogate measure of community representation to the 
extent that every Committee and Sub-Committee should have at least one 
representative from each political party (including Plaid Cymru in Wales) and 
one member who is not committed to any particular party (Lord Chancellor's 
Department, 1998b; Skyrme, 1983). The clear danger from this political 
influence on Advisory Committees is that appointments result from 
"sophisticated horsetrading" (Bartlett and Walker, 1978). Burney (1979) for 
instance, reported a heavy concentration of political figures on Committees and 
clearly warned against the dangers of trading off one political appointment for 
another. 
87 Or its predecessor, the Lord Chancellor's Department (LCD). 
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3.4.1.2 Age 
From the little evidence available it is probably safe to assume that "grey power" 
dominates Advisory Committees (Darbyshire, 1997a). In Burnev's (1979) study 
for instance, a substantial majority of magistrates (40 percent) were over 60. 
Given that Advisory Committee members are usually senior magistrates, it is 
unsurprising that the age profile of Advisory Committees was skewed towards 
late middle age. 
3.4.1.3 Gender 
One third of Advisory Committee members in Burney's sample were women, a 
ratio that reflected the gender composition of the bench at that time. As the bench 
has recently achieved a gender balance (Department for Constitutional Affairs, 
2003u), it could well be that a similar balance now exists on Advisory 
Committees. 
3.4.1.4 Ethnicity 
King and May (1985), in a study of 35 Advisory and Sub-Committees, found 2 
Asian and no Afro-Caribbean Committee members from a sample of 292. This 
finding paralleled that of Burney (1979). 
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3.4.1.5 Magistrates 
The Lord Chancellor requires that at least one-third of the members of Advisory 
Committees and Sub-Committees should consist of "non-magistrates" (Lord 
Chancellor's Department, 2000b). The evidence suggests magistrates 
numerically dominate Committees to a greater extent than envisaged by the Lord 
Chancellor. King and May (1985) noted that 91 percent of members in their 
sample were magistrates while Raine (1989) commented how in 1982, only 113 
out of a total of 1,900 members of Committees across England and Wales were 
neither magistrates nor ex-magistrates. The Home Affairs Committee report 
(1996) suggested that around 80 percent of Committee members were serving 
magistrates. This predominance of magistrates on Committees raises serious 
issues for their recruitment. Magistrates are not necessarily the most appropriate 
people for recruitment processes, as they are usually not well versed in 
recruitment practices and human resource management issues (King and May, 
1985). There is a danger that appointees will be selected from the usual sources, 
thereby giving credence to the allegation that the bench is self-perpetuating 
(Burney, 1979; Hood, 1972). King and May suggested that the preponderance of 
magistrates on Committees be removed to be replaced by members with either 
expertise in recruitment practices, or a knowledge of magistrates' courts, such as 
probation officers, solicitors and police officers (1985). 
88 Magistrates would 
retain a place on Committees although not to the same extent as is now the case. 
Although there is no guarantee that such wholesale reform would radically alter 
88 Since King and May reported, the Lord Chancellor requires all new appointments to Advisory 
and Sub-Committees to be trained in recruitment practices and equality and diversity issues (Lord 
Chancellor's Department, 2000b). 
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the composition of the bench, it would help counter suggestions that the bench is 
a `self-perpetuating oligarchy'. 
3.4.1.6 Combining the evidence 
An amalgamation of all these different attributes results in exceptionally 
unrepresentative Advisory Committees. The description of the Rochdale 
Advisory Committee by Bartlett and Walker succinctly elucidates the combined 
effect of the evidence: 
Norman Woolfenden, aged 69, a Liberal, a Rotarian and a mason, magistrate since 1950, 
chairman of the bench and also chairman of the hospital management committee; Albert 
Golland, aged 65, a Conservative, a Rotarian and a mason, magistrate since 1952 and a 
local accountant; Derrick Walker, aged 56, leader of the Labour group, magistrate since 
1963, self-employed (1978: 211). 
Advisory Committees that consist of the great and the good increase the danger 
of recruiting from the same remote and closed social circles; the Committee 
described above is teeming with public service commitment, with a risk that 
Committee members expect the same from applicants, thereby restricting the 
available pool of potential appointees (Home Affairs Committee, 1996). 
Although the evidence is relatively old and selective, a tentative conclusion could 
be that successive Lord Chancellors have failed in their aim of constructing 
representative Committees. 
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3.4.2 The magistracy 
Since the report of the first Royal Commission on the Selection of Justices of the 
Peace (1910), successive Lord Chancellors have declared an aim to achieve a 
social balance on the bench (Skyrme, 1983). The evidence suggests that previous 
Lord Chancellors failed in this aim and that current arrangements are far from 
satisfactory. 
3.4.2.1 Politics 
The stated aim of achieving a political balance on the bench is a controversial 
issue: the suggestion that Lord Chancellors aim for a political balance caused 
dissent in the Royal Commission on Justices of the Peace (1948) on the grounds 
that politics should have no part to play in the appointment of judicial positions. 
The use of political affiliation as a criteria for simulating community 
representation raises the possibility of political divisions on the bench (Burney, 
1979), in addition to a problematic public presentation engendered by a bench 
dominated by political figures. Although Skyrme (1983) thought political 
balance was an issue that received disproportionate attention to its role in the 
appointment process, the Lord Chancellor has accepted that politics remains an 
active consideration for appointment, however much he regrets this (Lord 
Chancellor's Department, 2000a). The Lord Chancellor has consulted on 
whether political affiliation should remain a consideration that reflects social 
balance (Lord Chancellor's Department, 1998b) but "no suitable alternative was 
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found" (Lord Chancellor's Department, 2000a). 89 At the time of writing, the 
Department for Constitutional Affairs is assessing the results of a pilot project 
that provided alternatives to political affiliation for measuring social balance, and 
work is continuing on the development of a viable scheme (Department for 
Constitutional Affairs, 2003a). 
The evidence on political affiliation suggests a predominance of Conservative 
magistrates. Care must be taken to distinguish between those who express a 
political affiliation and those who are either members of political parties or act in 
a political capacity, usually as councillors. It is the large numbers of politically 
active magistrates that provide the greatest cause for concern, as these 
magistrates not only express a political preference, but show the strength of these 
views by acting on this preference. 
A succession of different reports have noted a political imbalance in the 
magistracy and a preponderance of politically active magistrates. Hood (1972) 
and Henham (1990) commented on large numbers of party members sitting on 
the bench, while Hood (1972), Bond and Lemon (1979), Burney (1979), Skyrme 
(1983), Raine (1989), Henham (1990), Dignan and Wynne (1997) and the Home 
Affairs Select Committee (1996) have all reported a Conservative dominance on 
either individual benches or for the magistracy as a whole. 
As a result of the computerisation of LCD records, the Judicial Appointments 
Annual Report now provides information on the political composition of the 
89 The Magistrates' Association suggested political affiliation was a poor indicator of the social 
composition of the bench (Magistrates' Association, 1998). 
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magistracy in addition to information on recent appointments (Lord Chancellor's 
Department, 2001). On 1 April 2003 there were 24,419 serving magistrates in 
England and Wales, excluding the Duchy of Lancaster. Of these, 34.4 percent 
were noted as having an affiliation with the Conservative party, 25.5 percent with 
the Labour party, 13.1 percent with the Liberal Democrats, 0.5 percent with Plaid 
Cymru, 6.1 percent declared affiliations with `other political parties' and 20.4 
percent were described as either uncommitted or not known (Department for 
Constitutional Affairs, 2003a). For the Duchy of Lancaster there were 3,925 
magistrates in post and, of these, 26.1 percent supported the Conservative party, 
28.2 percent the Labour party, 11.4 percent the Liberal Democrats and 34.3 
percent were either uncommitted or their affiliation was not known (Lord 
Chancellor's Department, 2003a). 
The evidence from the LCD statistics suggests that Conservative supporters do 
enjoy a disproportionate representation on the bench compared to their support in 
the electorate at large, but that support in no way compares to the proportions 
reported in some of the earlier research studies. Either the areas selected for 
study in these earlier reports were not representative of the magistracy at large, or 
the Lord Chancellor has gained some degree of success in realigning the political 
balance on the bench. The consistent theme of over-representation of 
Conservative supporters reported in the earlier studies, leads to a conclusion that 
the Lord Chancellor has indeed been successful in reducing the Conservative 
domination of the bench, although there remains a Conservative majority. 
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3.4.2.2 Social class 
Historically, the magistracy was dominated by the landed gentry who vigorously 
defended their position against the "influx of commercial and industrial wealth" 
(Moir, 1969: 77). The abolition of the property qualification in 1906, and the 
reports of the two Royal Commissions in 1910 and 1948, evidenced an intention 
to widen the social base of the magistracy, yet it is doubtful to what extent these 
efforts have been successful. The evidence suggests that the magistracy has 
historically consisted of the privileged classes and efforts to reverse this have met 
with limited success. The reader should be aware of a number of problems with 
the evidence before it is examined. Evidence on the social composition of the 
magistracy has been available since the report of the Royal Commission on 
Justices of the Peace (1948) conducted a postal survey of all magistrates in 1947. 
In the history of research on magistrates, different classifications of social class 
and different methods of classifying the retired and women have been used. Even 
accounting for these problems of classification, the final figures produced may 
misrepresent the composition of the magistracy. Those with working class roots 
and "first hand knowledge of the conditions of life" of the working classes may, 
as a result of self-improvement, find themselves amongst the ranks of the 
professional and managerial classes (King and May, 1985: 106-7; Pearson, 
1980). Those working men who are trade-unionists or receive a salary may also 
be classified in a category that does not adequately reflect their social status and 
the experience that they may bring to the bench (Burney, 1979; Skyrme, 1983). 
Nevertheless, the evidence is sufficiently strong to justify a conclusion that the 
bench is dominated by professional and managerial classes. 
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Many studies have commented on a dominance of managerial and professional 
occupations on the bench with a shortage of working class magistrates. These 
include the Royal Commission on Justices of the Peace (1948), Hood, 1972, 
Bartlett and Walker (1978), Pearson (1980), Skyrme (1983), King and May 
(1985), Raine (1989), Henham (1990), the Home Affairs Committee (1996), 
Dignan and Wynne (1997), Seago et. al. (1995) and Morgan and Russell (2000). 
Additionally, Baldwin examined the social class of magistrates on appointment 
and concluded that appointment practices were unlikely to alter this imbalance 
(Baldwin, 1976). A synopsis of Morgan and Russell's conclusions will give an 
adequate flavour of all research findings. After a postal survey of a sample of 
magistrates they reported that 40 percent had retired, 69 percent stated a 
managerial or professional role as current or former occupation, 12 percent had 
clerical jobs, three percent described themselves as skilled manual workers while 
five percent were unemployed. These overall figures masked differences in 
individual areas; Morgan and Russell concluded that managerial staff and 
professionals were over-represented on the bench "between two and four times" 
(2000: 16). 
3.4.2.3 Age 
Most of the evidence suggests that magistrates are on average a generation older 
than the clients of the criminal justice process (Darbyshire, 1997a). The Royal 
Commission on the Justices of the Peace (1948), Hood (1972), Bartlett and 
Walker (1978), Baldwin (1976), Henham (1990), Raine (1989), Dignan and 
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Wynne (1997), Seago et. al. (1995), the Home Affairs Select Committee (1996) 
and Morgan and Russell (2000) all verify this conclusion. The latest LCD figures 
stated that nationally (excluding the Duchy of Lancaster) a mere 3.8 percent of 
magistrates were under 40,16.5 percent were between 40 and 49,45 percent 
were between 50 and 59, and 34.7 percent were over 60. Within the Duchy of 
Lancaster the corresponding percentages are 3.2,16,45 and 35.80 (Department 
for Constitutional Affairs, 2003a). 
If age is associated with wisdom and experience, then an ageing magistracy 
would be a valuable deposit of these skills. However, there is "no research which 
equates age with wisdom in the context of law-finding, judging character, 
understanding pre-sentence reports and sentencing" (Darbyshire, 1997a: 865). 
3.4.2.4 Ethnicity 
The historical data suggested a massive under-representation of ethnic minority 
communities on the magistracy, although the worst excesses have been 
somewhat reduced. By 1977 there had been 78 ethnic minority appointments to 
the bench, the first being a Mr. E. G. Irons in 1962 (Skyrme, 1983). Once again, 
all early studies reported an under-representation of ethnic minority magistrates 
(Bartlett and Walker, 1978; Raine, 1986; King and May, 1985). However, 
Dignan and Wynne (1997) reported a largely representative magistracy, as did 
Morgan and Russell (2000). Nevertheless, Morgan and Russell also noted that 
while some individual benches were balanced, other benches in areas with large 
ethnic minority populations suffered from an under-representation of ethnic 
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minority magistrates. As at. 1 April 2003,93.9 percent of all magistrates 
(excluding the Duchy of Lancaster) were white, 2.3 percent were black, 2.9 
percent Asian and 0.9 percent were classified as other. Within the Duchy of 
Lancaster, 92.2 percent of magistrates were white, 1.2 percent black, 3.8 percent 
Asian, 0.6 percent were classified as other and data was not available for 2.2 
percent of magistrates (Department for Constitutional Affairs, 2003a). Within 
England and Wales, 94 percent of the population is white, 2 percent is black, 3 
percent is of Asian origin and 1 percent is constituted from other ethnic 
groupings (Morgan and Russell, 2000). The most recent figures on the 
composition of the magistracy therefore reflect the ethnic composition of the 
population at large. What is more, the continued appointment of ethnic minority 
magistrates is likely to secure their proportionate representation on the bench. Of 
all magistrates appointed during 2001-2002 (1,786), 1,638 (91.7 percent) were 
white, 42 were black (2.4 percent), 80 were Asian (4.5 percent) and 26 were 
classified as other (1.5 percent). 
3.4.2.5 Gender 
Gender is another area where the efforts of Advisory Committees and the Lord 
Chancellor to make the bench more representative of the wider community have 
been successful. Earlier research reports noted a gender imbalance within the 
magistracy that has been slowly removed. Baldwin (1976), Skyrme (1983), King 
and May (1985), Raine (1989), Henham (1990) and Dignan and Wynne (1997) 
all reported a gender imbalance. However, the report of the Home Affairs 
Committee (1996) quoted figures from the LCD that stated that, as at 31 
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December 1994,47 percent of magistrates were women. Morgan and Russell 
(2000) reported similar findings. The latest figures from the Judicial 
Appointments Annual Report state that 49.5 percent of magistrates (excluding the 
Duchy of Lancaster) and 47.4 percent of magistrates within the Duchy are female 
(Department for Constitutional Affairs, 2003a). 
3.4.2.6 Geographical spread 
Dignan and Wynne (1997) are the only researchers to provide any information on 
the geographical spread of magistrates. In the North Midlands bench they 
examined, the 116 magistrates on the local bench were concentrated into a small 
number of local council wards. From a total of 70 council wards, 27 had no 
resident magistrate, while 33 magistrates lived in only five wards. 
3.4.2.7 Community and voluntary service 
The evidence suggests that magistrates are recruited from a narrow social elite; 
the main sources of recruitment being political parties, community organisations 
such as charities, voluntary bodies and trade unions. Indeed, evidence of wider 
community work has acted as an important criterion in the recruitment process 
(Burney, 1979; Raine, 1991). Hood (1972), Bartlett and Walker (1978), Burney 
(1979), King and May (1985), Henham (1990) and Dignan and Wynne (1997) all 
noted how magistrates are recruited from the same sources and participate in the 
same voluntary organisations. This evidence has been used to suggest that the 
magistracy is "a mysterious old-boy network" (Bartlett and Walker, 1978). "self- 
90 
perpetuating", and packed "with like minded people or groups" (Darbyshire. 
1997a): 
however it is played, the game of choosing magistrates, which is supposed to be aimed 
at diversity, ends up with a team of people more remarkable for their likeness to one 
another than for their differences. And by its stress on social involvement, it ensures that 
most magistrates will have experience of co-operating with other people and therefore 
able to fit smoothly into a system which depends on teamwork and consensus when 
decisions are made in court (Burney, 1979). 
The search by Advisory Committees for "common sense", a "judicial mind", 
"stability", a lack of "extreme views" and "a balanced mentality" all add to the 
propensity to recruit like minded people (Burney, 1979; King and May, 1985; 
Pearson, 1980). 
3.4.2.8 Widening the social base of the magistracy 
Depending upon when the research was conducted, successive reports have 
lamented the unrepresentative nature of the magistracy to varying degrees. 
Generally speaking, the older the research the more confident the conclusion. 
Baldwin for instanced noted that: 
It is no surprise to find that the magistracy is not representative in any real sense of the 
wider community, although it is disturbing to find that patterns of selection in the recent 
past have not succeeded in affecting this situation (Baldwin, 1976: 174). 
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The conclusions of the Home Affairs Committee report were much more 
equivocal: 
We did, however, receive evidence to suggest that in some areas the lay magistracy does 
not reflect the community it serves (Home Affairs Committee, 1996: para. 205). 90 
Some of the earlier imbalances have been successfully alleviated by the 
recruitment activities of Advisory Committees and the Lord Chancellor. The 
magistracy is now gender balanced. Overall, the ethnic composition of the 
magistracy reflects the composition of society as a whole, although there are 
problematic areas where minority populations remain under-represented on the 
bench. Although the magistracy still has a majority of Conservative supporting 
members, the position is no longer as serious as it once was. However, the bench 
is still predominantly middle aged and middle class. 
Numerous different reasons have been proposed for the social imbalance seen 
within the magistracy, and commentators and Government have frequently 
suggested that efforts to alter the composition are woefully inadequate (King and 
May, 1985; Darbyshire, 1997a; Lord Chancellor's Department, 2000b; Auld, 
2001; Sanders, 2001). 'Among the reasons advanced for low recruitment of 
under-represented groups is the inability of working class and young candidates 
to secure time from away from employment, the over-reliance on the same 
recruitment channels restricting the pool of available candidates, a perception 
that working class or ethnic minority candidates may be unsuitable or that they 
90 Emphasis added. 
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may attempt to `represent' narrow interest groups, and a lack of understanding of 
the role of magistrates in those under-represented groups. 
However, the pessimism encountered when examining research reports on the 
composition of the magistracy need not deter efforts to widen that composition. 
Many of the earlier criticisms have been addressed in one way or another. 
Advisory Committees no longer merely react to nominations for appointment 
that come from the usual sources (Burney, 1979), but instead actively attempt to 
recruit from wider social circles. While these attempts may not be adequate 
enough for some (Auld, 2001), they do evidence a cultural shift that can 
hopefully lead to more active measures to widen recruitment to the magistracy. 
Some of the measures taken so far include: general marketing of the magistracy; 
awareness-raising activities and specific recruitment campaigns (Auld, 2001; 
Home Affairs Committee, 1996), sometimes aimed at ethnic minority 
recruitment (Lord Chancellor's Department, 2000b), and including the use of 
local radio (Lord Chancellor's Department, 1996); the fostering of close working 
relationships between large employers and the Magistrates' Association or local 
bench (Auld, 2001; Lord Chancellor's Department, 1996); and providing public 
recognition to employers who support employees who sit on the bench (Auld, 
2001). Judicial Appointments Annual Reports have noted numerous strategies 
adopted to widen the range of appointments to the magistracy. The LCD has 
recently launched a National Recruitment Strategy for the appointment of 
magistrates, created a shadowing scheme in association with Operation Black 
Vote to raise awareness within minority communities and altered the advice 
given to Advisory Committees (Lord Chancellor's Department, 2002). Problems 
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with ethnic minority representation and political balance have been considered 
by the Lord Chancellor's Department (Lord Chancellor's Department. 1998b; 
Lord Chancellor's Department, 2000b), the restriction upon the visually impaired 
from sitting as magistrates has been removed after a pilot programme, and 
Advisory Committee members have received training in recruitment procedures 
(Lord Chancellor's Department, 2001). Finally, the LCD has computerised all its 
records on magistrates to facilitate effective monitoring of recruitment practices 
(Lord Chancellor's Department, 2000a). 
This work is necessary if, as suggested earlier, the composition of the magistracy 
has important implications for the legitimisation of summary justice and the 
effective functioning of magistrates' courts. At present, the evidence suggests 
that the composition of the magistracy is unsatisfactory on the basis of any of the 
models suggested by Dignan and Wynne (1997) and as a result, serous concerns 
about the effectiveness of summary justice could be raised. 
3.5 The rise of professional magistrates 
Professional magistrates, now known as District Judges (Magistrates' Courts), 91 
but previously referred to as stipendiary magistrates, have increased in 
importance over the last ten to twenty years. Paid stipendiary magistrates were 
first introduced into London in 1792 in response to the corruption of lay Justices' 
of the Peace (Milton, 1967; Skyrme, 1983). The first provincial magistrate was 
appointed in Manchester in 1813. Since their introduction, paid magistrates were 
91 Access to Justice Act 1999, section 78. 
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predominantly appointed in London and other large conurbations. However, the 
last ten years have seen a large increase in the numbers of paid magistrates; in 
1991 there were 18 provincial stipendiary magistrates, 50 metropolitan stipes and 
66 acting stipes. By 2000, there were 47 provincial stipes, 49 metropolitan 
stipendiary magistrates and 148 acting stipes (Seago et. al., 2000). However, 
their numbers pale into insignificance when compared to the numbers of lay 
magistrates; there were around 30,000 lay magistrates in 2002 (Lord 
Chancellor's Department, 2002). Nevertheless, commentators have still 
identified a number of reasons for examining the growth of the professional 
magistracy. 
Sanders (2001) identifies three reasons for examining the professional 
magistracy. He believes that their growth is likely to continue, magistrates' 
courts are growing in importance, because of the impetus to transfer more cases 
to their jurisdiction, 92 and because of a general lack of confidence with the lay 
magistracy. The existence of professional judges within magistrates' courts also 
raises a number of other issues that need addressing. In particular, the 
professional bench is said to potentially challenge local justice, increase the 
numbers of case hardened magistrates, while increasing the cost of summary 
justice (Sanders, 2001), to the extent that, when combined with other factors, 
Seago et. al. have questioned whether or not the growth of the professional bench 
impacts upon judicial independence (2000). Professional magistrates, by sitting 
alone, are also thought to potentially make inappropriate decisions because they 
lack the ability to consult with others and therefore account for alternative views 
92 See Chapter 2. 
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(Sanders, 2001 ). 93 Lay magistrates may also see professional magistrates as a 
threat to their roles, by monopolising the most interesting caseload (Seago et. al., 
1995). Nevertheless, it is also claimed that professional magistrates are more 
efficient and consistent, while the cost differential is not as large as initially 
thought (Morgan and Russell, 2000; Sanders, 2001). Sanders has investigated the 
quality of decision making in magistrates' courts by lay benches and professional 
magistrates by highlighting a number of different factors that help in such an 
assessment. He identified legal skills and social skills, the latter being separated 
into problems solving skills and fact-finding skills (Sanders, 2001). Social skills 
are said to depend upon a diversity of cultural experience while legal skills are 
developed through training. So, while professional magistrates will possess the 
necessary legal skills, lay benches, especially if they represent diverse 
experiences, will be better able to provide the desired social skills necessary for 
adjudication. For Sanders (2001) an effective system of summary justice should 
therefore make space for both roles. 
The research available goes some way to addressing some of these issues by 
addressing the profile of professional magistrates, how they perform their role, 
how much they cost and how they are appointed. While in some respects Sanders 
(2001) is correct in his claim that there is no firm evidence to compare the 
respective merits of lay and professional magistrates, a number of tentative 
conclusions can and have been made. However, it must be borne in mind that any 
comparison is difficult, as professional magistrates are said to possess certain 
skills that justify their use in a manner different to lay magistrates (Seago et. al., 
93 However, given the convergence of views on the lay bench, it is difficult to see how much 
better they fair by sitting in panels of two or three. 
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1995). Therefore, comparing the outcomes and processes of lay and professional 
benches may not be comparing like with like. 
Morgan and Russell (2000), when comparing professional and lay benches, made 
a number of conclusions as to the role of professional magistrates and how they 
performed their role. Professional magistrates were predominantly male (84 
percent) with 54 percent aged 45 to 54. They noted how only two professional 
magistrates were from an ethnic minority background. All professional 
magistrates must be drawn from the legal profession with 64 percent previously 
employed as solicitors. Additionally, of those barristers and solicitors recruited, 
26 percent also had experience as a magistrates' courts' legal advisor. Seago et. 
al. (1995) reported that 57 percent of professional magistrates were between the 
ages of 41-50 and 87 percent were male. Of the 134 magistrates for whom the 
information was available, 72 were previously employed as solicitors, 38 as 
barristers, 23 as legal advisors and one as a metropolitan stipendiary magistrate. 
As for the claim that professional magistrates "asset-strip court lists by having 
allocated to them the more serious and interesting cases" (Morgan and Russell, 
2000: 26), Morgan and Russell found that while there may have been a slight 
preponderance of "heavy business" in their workload (2000: 27), overall it was 
not too dissimilar to the workload of the lay bench. Seago et. al. drew similar 
conclusions from the evidence in their study (1995). 
Professional magistrates were accepted as being faster, largely due to having to 
retire less, needing fewer breaks and not having to consult with colleagues 
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(Seago et. al., 1995; Morgan and Russell, 2000). Nevertheless, this increased 
efficiency only held for certain types of hearing such as bail hearings, trials and 
cases previously adjourned for sentence. Only margin gains were recorded in 
mode of trial hearings and paper committals (Morgan and Russell, 2000). 
As for decision making, the evidence tentatively suggested that professional 
magistrates were more likely to remand in custody, refuse adjournments and 
sentence to custody than their lay counterparts (Morgan and Russell, 2000). 
However, there was no discernable difference in the rate at which they declined 
jurisdiction in mode of trial hearings. Morgan and Russell also reported that lay 
magistrates in courts with professional magistrates were more likely to turn to 
custodial sentences than their lay counterparts in courts without a professional 
magistrate. Flood-Page and Mackie (1998) reported that, controlling for other 
relevant case factors, professional magistrates were more likely to sentence to 
custody, although other case factors were far more important. They also found 
that lay benches in courts with a professional magistrate were more likely to 
impose custodial sentences than lay benches without a professional magistrate. 
Court users valued the input of professional magistrates. Morgan and Russell 
(2000) noted that professional magistrates commanded proceedings, were clear 
and concise in providing reasons and effectively managed proceedings. Indeed, 
courtroom professionals commented upon how they believed that they needed to 
be more prepared for an appearance before a professional magistrate. 
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Finally, professional magistrates were regarded as more expensive than lay 
magistrates, but given the benefits of sitting alone, their greater efficiency and 
the benefits that resulted through less courtrooms, fewer staff, lower overheads, 
and the release of other professional's time, the cost differential was not as large 
as first thought; Morgan and Russell suggested that the difference was merely 12 
percent (2000). 
Given their effectiveness, and the concern with courtroom delays (Home Office, 
1997b) the increase in professional magistrates can be expected to continue. 
Whilst Seago et. al. examined professional magistrates with a view to assessing 
judicial independence, they concluded that, for the most part, the concerns raised 
about professional magistrates are unfounded. They provide a degree of 
efficiency while being relatively cost effective. And while it is true to say that 
they do not represent the local population, neither do lay benches (2000). As 
shown in Morgan and Russell (2000), professional magistrates also gain the 
respect of other courtroom professionals. Nevertheless, more research needs to 
be conducted into their sentencing outcomes; the little evidence that is available 
suggests that they sentence more harshly, and that this influences their lay 
colleagues. Finally, Seago et. al. noted that the growth in the professional 
magistracy has taken place against a backdrop of arguments about economy and 
efficiency, with little discussion as to the problems of principle raised by their 
position (2000). Indeed, the criterion for appointment of a professional 
magistrate - excessive courtroom delays, excessive reliance upon two-member 
courts or excessive burdens on individual magistrates and large bench sizes - all 
point to administrative concerns (Seago et al., 1995). If the numbers of 
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professional magistrates are to increase further, then the calls of Seago et. al. 
need to be addressed. 
3.6 The quality of justice in magistrates' courts 
The quality of summary justice can be, and has been, assessed and measured 
utilising different criteria. This section will evaluate the essential differences in 
legal procedures between the magistrates' and Crown Court, how the 
composition of the bench impacts upon decisions, and the staging of summary 
justice. These three problems, when combined, seriously question the wisdom of 
the wholesale transfer of cases from the Crown to magistrates' court. 
3.6.1 Legal differences 
The first major difference between summary and Crown Court proceedings 
relates to the disclosure of prosecution evidence. The Magistrates' Courts 
(Advance Information) Rules 1985 oblige the prosecution in either way cases to 
provide the defence either with a summary of the case or with copies of 
prosecution witness statements. 94 Presently, any either way offence in the Crown 
Court must have been subjected to committal proceedings, resulting in the 
defence receiving full copies of any witness statements and information on any 
unused material. Although it is possible for the CPS to supply this information to 
the defence in either way cases subject to summary trial, the prosecution need 
94 SI 1985 No. 601. 
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only provide a case summary and the practice of CPS branches differs 
considerably (Sprack, 2002). 
Another procedural difference between the magistrates' and Crown Court 
concerns the admissibility of evidence. Whenever the defence wish to challenge 
the admissibility of evidence within the Crown Court, the jury retire and the 
judge then rules on the admissibility of evidence in the absence of the jury. This 
procedure thereby ensures that any material that has been ruled inadmissible will 
not prejudice the jury. However, in the magistrates' court, the magistrates who 
hear the case determine the admissibility of evidence. Having heard the evidence 
when deciding admissibility, it may be inevitable that the bench will be 
influenced by evidence that has been ruled inadmissible (Sprack, 2002). 
3.6.2 Shared world views 
The effect of the recruitment process examined above is said to produce a 
magistracy that is remarkable for its shared outlook (Burney, 1979; Pearson, 
1980). The emphasis in the appointment process upon `common sense', the 
ability to cooperate with colleagues and a public service ethos promotes 
conformity within the magistracy. This stress upon `common sense' hides 
ideological and political assumptions, takes for granted the consensual nature of 
legal discourse and therefore perpetuates the status quo (Worrall, 1987). 
Furthermore, on the evidence available the training experience fails to challenge 
these dominant attitudes. Bond and Lemon (1979) have suggested that training 
may impact upon the procedural activities of magistrates but does little to affect 
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"deep seated views on penal philosophy and policy" (Bond and Lemon, 1979: 
139). This is not to say that decisions are pre-determined beforehand, but rather 
that the range of possible responses is constrained by this shared culture and 
outlook. There is a wealth of research literature that ascribes importance to local 
bench cultures in a whole host of decision making areas. Bench culture is said to 
play a part in the determination of venue (Bottoms and McClean, 1976; 
Hedderman and Moxon, 1992), remand decisions (Jones, 1985; Hucklesby, 
1997) and sentencing (Flood-Page and Mackie, 1998; Henham, 1990; Hood, 
1962 and 1972; Rumgay, 1995; Tarling, 1979; Tarling et. al., 1985). Raine 
claimed the result of shared decision making is that: 
the magisterial decision making process is, of course, inevitably influenced by other 
knowledge, attitudes and values which bench membership happens to hold. In this 
respect the administration of justice in the magistrates' courts cannot be seen as other 
than a value laden process, an understanding of which clearly relates to the dominance 
of middle class representation on the bench (Raine, 1989: 80). 
The importance of values in the decision making process has been documented to 
varying degrees by other research studies. While Henham failed to find a link 
between magistrates' philosophies and sentencing behaviour he did comment 
upon the importance of local cultures (1990). Hood drew attention to the 
treatment of working class offenders by a middle class bench and suggested that 
evidence existed to show how a middle class bench may be "relatively severe" 
when dealing with working class defendants but only in "relatively small and 
stable middle-class communities" (Hood, 1962: 120). Other writers have been 
less equivocal; Worral claimed that the attachment to common sense by 
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magistrates led to a number of consequences for a female defendant. Women 
were said to have to conform to stereotypes on sexuality and domesticity, while 
offending behaviour was more likely to be explained utilising a pathological 
framework (Worrall, 1987). Eaton drew similar conclusions: 
The dominant model of the family is one which is reflected in, and reinforced by, 
courtroom discourse. It was implicit in pronouncements from the bench, pleas of 
mitigation, and probation officers' reports. The family context of the defendant formed 
the basis of much courtroom discussion. In discussing these contexts the court officials 
did more than describe a variety of domestic arrangements, they revealed their 
assumptions concerning the appropriate ways in which families should be organised, and 
their expectations concerning the result of such organisations (Eaton, 1986: 93). 
Pearson (1980) saved her criticism for the housewife with limited experience 
who serves on the bench. The lack of any regular contact with alternative 
realities was said to result in the "expression of antagonistic sentiments about 
working mothers" and "bigoted attitudes towards immigrant families" (Pearson, 
1980: 86). Pearson also quoted a magistrate who displayed a lack of appreciation 
for working class defendants who needed to take time off work to attend court 
and therefore attended in working clothes. 
Parker et. al. (1989) also examined common sense within the courtroom, as well 
as the individualisation of cases (every case is different), and concluded that 
these positions allowed reliance upon irrelevant criteria in the decision making 
process. This includes the making of inappropriate moral judgments: 
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Magistrates' moral judgments of the defendant's character not only appear explicitly, 
but also pervade their interpretations of other considerations, such as the defendant's 
family circumstances or the significance of information given in school and social 
enquiry reports (Parker et. al., 1989: 117). 
The shared outlook has been said to predispose magistrates to readily accepting 
police evidence (Blythe, 1972; Burney, 1979; McConville, et. al., 1994; Vennard 
1982), a position reinforced by the structural position of the police in the 
courtroom. The police's structural advantage results from their experience in the 
courtroom, the authentication of evidence from notes and mutual support 
deriving from the evidence of other police officers (McConville, et. al., 1994). 95 
3.6.3 The staging of magistrates' justice 
Studies have examined the processes of summary justice from a more 
sociological perspective in terms of "the staging of magistrates' justice" (Carlen, 
1976a) and show a concern with the place of the defendant within the courtroom. 
-Not only is the defendant said to be bewildered by a number of devices that have 
placed her within the courtroom, but the proceedings themselves are said to be 
defined in such a way as to deflect any searching gaze through a minimisation of 
importance of the proceedings. This also helps create a climate whereby legal 
argument is seen as inappropriate. 
95 Bankowski et. al. (1987) described a more complex situation in the District Courts in Scotland 
where only the most senior magistrates routinely accepted police evidence while younger 
magistrates displayed a more sceptical outlook. However, this scepticism may not 
have resulted 
in changes to routines in the courtroom as it was felt to be difficult to identify false police 
evidence. Therefore, the result may well 
have been a general acceptance of police evidence 
tempered with scepticism (Pearson, 1980). 
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3.6.3.1 Spatial dynamics and courtroom workgroups 
The spatial dynamics within the courtroom and the timetable of action are said to 
operate so as to disadvantage the defendant. Spacing determines who can be 
heard and by whom, while the acoustics are such that defendants are unable to 
follow courtroom proceedings (Carlen, 1976a). The need to project to the whole 
courtroom is not conductive to the disclosure of confidential information, 
defendants and witnesses are expected to answer the advocate's questions while 
addressing the bench -a difficult presentational modification of everyday 
interaction - and long waiting periods are said to increase anxiety (Carlen, 
1976a). Defendants view the courtroom as a mystery, while the court personnel 
are all repeat players who understand the rules of the game and conform 
accordingly (Bottoms and McClean, 1976; Carlen, 1976b). 
Combining these features together leads Carlen to claim that the defendant is a 
"dummy player" (1976b). 96 At the time that Carlen was writing, legal 
representation was the exception within magistrates' courts (Dell, 1971) but this 
is no longer true. 97 So while the defendant may now be a dummy player with a 
lawyer, legal representation may not necessarily be the answer. Defence lawyers 
need to keep their credibility in the eyes of other courtroom users, resulting in a 
conflict between the interests of their client and the necessity for conformity: if a 
defence solicitor, "made an assessment that a defendant was adamant about 
Other courtroom workers praise the manner in which magistrates use simple language (Morgan 
and Russell, 2000). However, the views of courtroom regulars, well versed in courtroom 
procedures and language are not the most relevant when judging the appropriateness of 
courtroom language. 
97 As early as 1982 Vennard reported that 92 percent of defendants in her sample were legally 
represented (Vennard, 1982). McConville et. al. (1994) noted how the spread of legal aid 
increased legal representation in magistrates courts. 
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making a bail application, they made it clear to the court that they did not agree" 
(Hucklesby, 1997: 139). The most frequent linguistic device employed by 
advocates is the phrase, "I am instructed by the defendant", used to distance the 
lawyer from the submission (McConville et. al., 1994; Parker et. al., 1981). 
Alternatively, relevant issues, such as evidential challenges, are not raised at trial 
as it may be thought to be "obstructive or counterproductive" (Wasik, 1996: 
859). The logical extension of these informal norms is the courtroom workgroup: 
as courtroom workers begin to translate duties and regulations into everyday routines 
something happens. Justice concerns are submerged as interest focuses on managing 
caseloads and getting work done. Legislative guidelines become secondary to 
typifications and different categories of offenses are developed in courts according to the 
social worth of each offence in relation to others. Organizational policies and guidelines 
are modified as specific employees find ways to accommodate co-workers (Lipetz, 
1980: 58). 
The increase in legal representation also has the effect of supporting the 
courtroom workgroup, as the potentially disruptive defendant can now be 
controlled by their legal representative (Parker et. al., 1981). Conformity with 
workgroup norms 'also aids the creation of feedback loops as courtroom regulars 
make submissions that fit with the perceived culture, thereby supporting and 
reproducing that culture (Hedderman and Moxon, 1992; Parker et. al., 1981). 
Courtroom practice therefore takes the form of cultural production and 
reproduction. 
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3.6.3.2 Triviality 
To read law books for information on the magistrates' courts is to come away with the 
clear impression that what goes on in them is overwhelmingly trivial. They deal with 
`minor offences', `everyday offences', `the most ordinary cases', `humdrum events' 
(McBarnet, 1981: 143). 
The ideology of triviality is sustained by law books, media reporting of summary 
proceedings and the penalties dispensed by magistrates (McBarnet, 1981). The 
ideology is so pervasive that it is shared by magistrates themselves; magistrates 
wonder at members of the public who spend any time in magistrates' courts and 
are even more amazed at requests that make them the subjects of research. The 
ideology is said to have many derogative effects mostly concerning the 
procedures adopted in the courtroom (ibid. ). As cases are not seen as serious or 
worthy of detailed attention lawyers do not prepare adequately, 98 points of law 
are seen as inappropriate (ibid. ) and "points of evidence are overlooked" (Wasik, 
1996). Darbyshire quoted an "experienced defence solicitor" on the appropriate 
use of legal argument: 
`As soon as you start citing the law of evidence you've lost the magistrates' so he rarely 
bothers (Darbyshire, 1997c: 112). 
There is, however, nothing inherent in the offences and cases, that are the staple 
diet of magistrates, that necessitates such an approach. Triviality is a "legal 
98 Interestingly, lawyers are said to prepare more for District Judges (Magistrates' Courts) 
(Morgan and Russell, 2000). 
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construct" created by the working norms of the repeat players (Bankowti ski et. al., 
1987; McBarnet, 1981: 148). 
3.6.4 The burden of proof 
The perception that the magistracy is pro-police has already been alluded to 
above. 99 The best description of the magistracy's view of the police is from an 
East Anglian village magistrate: 
I think that the relationship between the police and the Bench is very good. The police, 
are, on the whole, straightforward and trying to do their best. Now and then you get a 
type who must go too far. But when you consider how they are provoked, they are 
marvellous people (Blythe, 1972: 289). 
The disadvantaged position of the defendant does not just extend to police 
witnesses. In a study examining the effects of removing the right to silence, a 
defence solicitor who questions the burden of proof in magistrates' courts is 
quoted as saying: 
We sometimes wonder [at magistrates' courts] who has to prove guilt or innocence. 
Certainly, sometimes I've felt that I'm the one who's having to do all the work - 
whereas really it should be the prosecution who are proving all the elements, rather than 
the defence having to disprove the elements of the offence (Bucke et. al., 2000). 
CPS prosecutors also expressed the belief that the defence needed to do more 
than ask the prosecution to prove the case against the defendant. In particular, 
" See section 3.6.2. 
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many practitioners believed that the modification of the right to silence, enabling 
the drawing of adverse inferences from silence, had no effect as magistrates were 
already drawing those inferences before the law was amended (ibid. ). 
3.7 Conclusions 
The evidence raised in this Chapter must raise some serious concerns for the shift 
in criminal cases to the magistrates' court described in Chapter 2. Not only does 
it raise problems with the propensity of magistrates to convict, but it also 
suggests that magistrates' courts may encounter a crisis of legitimacy if this shift 
continues and little is done to address the concerns that have been raised on the 
composition of the magistracy (Pearson, 1980). Two of the models of summary 
jurisdiction examined above justify the widespread use of lay persons within the 
criminal justice process on the basis of their representative function. They 
provide a "community face" to the legal system (Bankowski et. al., 1987). The 
third model privileges the fact finding role of the magistracy and the evidence 
also suggests that a balanced bench is important for this function if magistrates 
are to understand fully the contested nature of evidence and the viability of 
alternative explanations suggested by defendants. In addition to these concerns 
relating to the composition of the magistracy, this Chapter has also raised 
problems with the staging of magistrates' justice. Although some of the concerns 
raised may well equally be applicable to the Crown Court as part of the 
disorientating experience of legal processes, the triviality of the magistrates' 
courts and the widespread belief that summary jurisdiction is simple and 
unimportant alter the nature of this concern. The lack of safeguards within the 
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magistrates' court combine with the alienating aspect to leave the defendant 
isolated and exposed, but as the magistrates' courts are perceived to deal with 
nothing more than trivia, sceptical gazes are diverted elsewhere to the real 
business in the Crown Court. This desire to define deviance down, has parallels 
across the criminal justice process and is part of the state's response to the 
problems of burgeoning criminal justice budgets (Garland, 1996). 100 It is 
questionable whether the Government is able or willing to either reverse the slide 
towards summary justice or tackle the problems identified with magistrates' 
courts. 
100 Evidence suggests that prosecutions for offences against the person (Clarkson et. al., 1994) 
and sexual offences (Gregory and Lees, 
1996) are being managed in such a way as to charge less 
serious alternative offences that minimise the symbolic 
impact of a prosecution. 
110 
CHAPTER FOUR 
TOWARDS A MODEL OF COURTROOM INTERACTION 
4.1 Introduction: The story so far 
Chapters 2 and 3 introduced issues that are central to the research but have only 
taken the discussion so far. Chapter 2 outlined the mode of trial decision and 
placed the research within the historical context of a drift towards summary trial. 
Chapter 3 addressed some of the concerns about magistrates expressed in the 
debates examined in Chapter 2. However, Chapter 3 also introduced themes 
important to the overall thrust of the thesis; Chapter 3 implied that the decision 
making practices of magistrates cannot be examined solely on the analysis of 
legal procedures, rules and guidelines. The Mode of Trial Guidelines may give a 
framework to the decision that magistrates have to make, but they contain 
insufficient detail to provide an overarching coherence to magistrates' practices. 
The discussion about a possible link between the composition of the magistracy 
and the decision making processes of a particular bench, suggests alternative 
sociological explanations for magistrates' behaviour. These explanations fill in 
the gaps that are found within the Mode of Trial Guidelines and provide a more 
comprehensive explanation of decision making behaviour. 
However, the research examined in Chapter 3 on the decision making practices 
of magistrates only serves as an introduction to the issues that need to be tackled 
in this Chapter. There are two fundamental problems with the research on the 
magistrates' decision making practices examined in Chapter 3. Firstly. although 
the social class, gender, race or age of magistrates, or the staging of magistrates' 
justice, may influence to a greater or lesser extent the decisions that are made, 
these are not the only influences upon behaviour. Secondly, the research 
examined on the composition of the bench and decision making practices suggest 
a rather simplistic black box model of behaviour, the black box being a 
homogenised magistracy. While the evidence suggests that overall the 
magistracy looks very similar, different benches behave in different fashions and 
this difference is usually attributed to a local bench culture. Something other than 
the universal staging of magistrates' justice or the composition of benches must 
help explain such differences of approach. Decision making practices cannot be 
simply explored by opening up the black box and seeing what is inside; for a 
fuller understanding of magistrates' behaviour, a range of different approaches is 
needed that examine the multifaceted aspects of courtroom interaction. This 
Chapter therefore aims to move beyond an understanding of magistrates' justice 
that is blinkered by legal frameworks and debates on the composition of benches. 
While the legal framework, the composition of benches and the staging of 
magistrates' justice are important, any strides towards a complete understanding 
of the operations of magistrates' courts necessitate a deeper examination of the 
interactions that take place there. This Chapter therefore aims to move towards 
such a model of courtroom interaction. The theory developed will provide a 
theoretical lens for viewing the working of magistrates' courts and will focus 
upon four different aspects of courtroom interaction: the personality and attitudes 
of actors within the courtroom; the interaction itself; the dynamics of the 
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courtroom setting; and the resources drawn upon by the actors within the 
courtroom. 
4.2 The theory of social domains 
In Modern Social Theory, Layder (1997) described a theoretical framework for 
analysing everyday face-to-face interactions that synthesised a number of 
different approaches. Central to the theory is Layder's description of the four 
domains of social activity: psychobiography; situated activity; settings; and 
contextual resources. For Layder, any attempt at explaining everyday social 
encounters must acknowledge the influence of these four domains. 
4.2.1 Psychobiography 
This domain relates to the identity of any individual concerned in social 
encounters. Conceptions of self-identity, emotional attachment, attitudes to 
others, personal goals and life history are all said to influence an interaction. 
More specifically, in calling for the personality of actors to be taken into account, 
Layder requested a re-evaluation of the importance of agency. For Layder, 
theories that devalue the role of human agency necessarily fail adequately to 
describe the social world. For example, Layder criticised the early work of 
Foucault for privileging the concept of discourse. In Madness and Civilisation, 
Foucault (1967) described the history of the concept of insanity and how the 
discourses surrounding madness shaped our conceptions of insanity. However, 
our conceptions were not the result of choices made after full consideration was 
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given to all the arguments; they were a product of the time-specific social and 
political needs and the growth of institutional discourses. Within this re- 
conceptualisation of history, the role of the individual practitioners and scientists 
is secondary to social organisation and the discourses of society. Insanity and 
madness were not therefore discovered by scientists pushing back the boundaries 
of knowledge, but were rather functional creations of a specific time that served 
the interests of dominant social groups and the scientists themselves, whose 
expert knowledge advanced their social situation. 
While Layder accepted that social constraints (whether these be structural in 
nature or a result of discourses - i. e. what passes as acceptable knowledge) do 
impact upon the social world, any analysis of face-to-face interaction should take 
account of inner-subjectivities in shaping interactions: 
Typically this kind of Foucauldian analysis is coupled with a rejection of the subject (or 
the individual) and hence cannot easily register the identity and personality-forming 
influences of human agency in the arena of face-to-face interaction (Layder, 1997: 46). 
This is a call to re-energise the agency-structure dialectic with a claim that the 
social world cannot be reduced to structural constraints at the expense of human 
struggle. However, the objective reality of the social world for social actors and 
its impact upon social interaction cannot be ignored. For instance, Layder 
accepted that the psychobiographical domain could not be examined in isolation 
from other social domains; personality is necessarily influenced by other 
domains of social activity. 
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4.2.2 Situated activity 
The theory of social domains requests a consideration of how activity is 
influenced by the "interaction order" (Goffman, 1983) and necessitates an 
appraisal of how the specific interaction takes shape. Social interactions take 
place between social actors who interpret the world around them and then act 
upon these interpretations. For instance, conversation analysts will examine 
practices whereby actors jointly construct their interaction, focusing specifically 
upon how the use of conversational norms both bound and facilitate the 
interaction. This social domain carries importance for how it helps contribute to 
the process of interaction: 
the coalescence of a number of different personalities and their behavioural inputs 
creates a social effect that is more than the sum of its constituent parts. Collective 
arrangements and shared understandings are created during the encounter that influence 
the subsequent proceedings (Layder, 1997: 85). 
While this approach rightly emphasises the shared nature of social interactions 
and the achievements of actors in creating a shared social world, it does lose 
sight of the moral content of interactions (Silverman, 1985). Conversational 
analysis, with its focus upon activities, speaks little on the structures of the social 
world or about how these are evidenced within conversational practices. This is 
not to belittle the influence of situated activity, merely to place this social domain 
in the context of the other three social domains. While any interaction may have 
a dynamic peculiar to that interaction, it should not be forgotten that this dynamic 
is influenced by wider questions of social structure and the individual 
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personalities of the actors. In other words, while each domain has an independent 
existence, no social domain is wholly independent of another. 
4.2.3 The setting 
The setting of any interaction, and the roles that actors have to play within the 
setting, also influence the course of interaction. For instance, if an interaction 
takes place within the setting of an undergraduate seminar, the roles of the 
participants, along with the expectations of the setting, help to explain what 
occurs. Seminar participants are expected to conform to a number of different 
expectations vis-a-vis the other participants and the seminar leader. There is an 
expectation regarding the types of topics that are deemed relevant as well as an 
appropriate expectation as to the style of the interaction. Quite simply, the 
interaction that takes place within an undergraduate seminar is not a free for all 
but is a focused interaction where the participants bring a number of expectations 
and beliefs, shaped by the setting, on how the interaction should progress. 
Different settings will engender different expectations for the roles of 
participants. Novel settings for instance may stimulate fewer expectations than 
settings with rich cultural histories. Some settings demand formality while others 
suggest a more informal style. A university lecture, for instance, will create 
different norms than the more informal seminar, which will again differ from a 
friendly chat between lecturer and student. 
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4.2.4 Contextual resources 
Any study of focused interactions should account for the contextual resources 
that the participants take to the interaction. The domain of contextual resources 
includes the discourses that participants are able to draw upon, the social position 
of actors and the power that they possess. In short, the domain is focused upon 
wider social structures, the part they play within interactions and an individual's 
place within society. Concepts such as gender, race and class are all implicit in 
contextual resources. For instance, interactions within a doctor's surgery will be 
influenced by the contextual resources that each bring to the interaction. The 
doctor will be able to draw upon reserves of social power implied by the 
knowledgeable position of the professional and as someone who knows best. The 
doctor may well expect some degree of deference and will utilise professional 
knowledge to manage the situation and elicit information from the patient that 
the doctor feels is relevant to a diagnosis. How much a patient is able to resist 
this process and exert control (assuming that they wish to take control) will 
depend upon the contextual resources of the patient. A patient may draw upon 
medical knowledge or assert power in other ways, such as utilising social status, 
but such an attempt will only be successful if the patient actually possesses such 
resources to draw upon. 
4.2.5 The interaction as the link 
All four social domains are implicated within any interaction. The specific 
interaction within a social setting is the link between the individual psychology 
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of the participants and the contextual resources that are brought to the 
interaction. Figure 1 explains this relationship. 
Figure 1: The interaction as the link 
Individual 
(Predisposition) 
Interaction 
(Selective uptake) 
Distributive pattern 
(System availability) 
Source: Layder, 1997: 123. 
Within any specific interaction, in a particular setting, the availability of 
resources and the predisposition of participants meet to influence the course that 
an interaction may take. The interaction cannot therefore be reduced to any of the 
specific domains, but is instead a complex relationship between all four. Now 
that a brief explanation of the theory has been outlined, it is time to see how the 
model can be used to assist in an understanding of courtroom interactions. 
4.3 Psychobiography: The composition of the magistracy and the judicial 
attitudes of magistrates 
Chapter 3 introduced the idea that judicial attitudes influenced behaviour and that 
bench attitudes were shaped by recruitment processes and exposure to bench 
culture. Attitudes here refer to a "framework of meaning" possessed by 
magistrates (Brown, 1991: 6) and "how a magistrate defines `self in relation to 
the persons, problems and ideas he confronts in his daily work" (Hogarth, 1971: 
24). Evidence has already been examined that suggests that magistrates are 
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recruited for their ability to work with other magistrates and how this assists in 
the creation of a shared culture. '°' 
Two research studies utilised the attitudes of magistrates as central to an 
explanation of decision making practices. ' 02 Hogarth (1971) examined the 
sentencing practices of Canadian magistrates, while Brown (1991) examined the 
manner in which magistrates used information in the youth court to assist 
sentencing. Both concluded that the attitudes of magistrates were influential in 
the sentencing process. To understand the approach of magistrates, both studies 
placed their attitudes within a larger framework which acknowledged that 
attitudes are not formed within a vacuum. In other words, while not explicitly 
appropriating the terminology of Layder, both acknowledged the influence of 
other social domains in the sentencing process. Hogarth, for instance, noted how 
other constraints such as law, the social system and "other features of the 
external world" are used within the sentencing process, but only in a way that 
resonates with the pre-existing attitudes of magistrates (Hogarth, 1971: 343). 
Information presented within the courtroom was selectively used in a manner 
that confirmed these attitudes. For Hogarth therefore, although other social 
domains influence the sentencing process, it is necessary to understand that 
magistrates will internalise some of these constraints rather than others. It is the 
process of internalisation that determines the "degree to which these constraints 
actually influence sentencing" (Hogarth, 1971: 200). However, the 
internalisation process is dependant upon the pre-existing attitudes of 
magistrates; magistrates interpret these external constraints "in a way which 
101 See section 3.6.2. 
102 Additionally, Rutherford (1993) has examined the role of penal philosophy in the working 
ideologies of criminal justice practitioners. 
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maximises concordance with their personal attitudes" (Hogarth, 1971: 209). 
Therefore, Hogarth implicitly noted the importance of other social domains: the 
contextual resources of the magistrate influenced the internalisation of external 
social restraints and the restraints of law; ' 03 the expectations of the setting acted 
as constraints; and interaction resulted in the presentation of information that 
needed to be assessed by the magistrate. However, for Hogarth, the attitudes of 
the magistrate were of prime importance as these determined which constraints 
were accepted as relevant to any interaction. 
Brown also focused upon the importance of attitudes in the sentencing of young 
offenders. She theorised that magistrates shared a common culture and 
philosophy on crime causation and sentencing. In particular, magistrates worked 
within an informal `control theory' (Williams, 2001) that emphasised the role of 
the family in controlling delinquent behaviour. Offenders who were therefore 
able to show that offending behaviour was a one-off, with others usually 
exercising adequate care and control, often escaped with a low tariff disposal, 
whereas offenders perceived to have no or little attachment to the family or the 
community, would be subjected to higher tariff disposals. This philosophy also 
contained implications for the way that magistrates viewed the world and masked 
values that interpreted the world through the lens of a "patriarchal family 
structure conforming to the closed and narrow world of suburban middle class 
values" (Brown, 1991: 41). The information that was placed before the bench 
was usually interpreted within the confines of this framework. Regardless of the 
aims of the author of a report on a young person, be they social workers, 
103 In particular, Hogarth acknowledged social class as being important in the attitudes of 
magistrates for the "collective sentiments and values" of a class (Hogarth, 1971: 54). 
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headmasters or probation officers, magistrates would selectively choose 
information from the report that resonated with their theories on crime control. 
4.4 Situated activity: The magistrates' court as a theatre of the absurd 
[B]oth the American theorists and the English investigators have tended either to ignore 
or take for granted other, equally consequential, dimensions of socio-legal control: the 
coercive structures of dread, awe and uncertainty depicted by Camus and Kafka: the 
coercive structures of resentment, frustration and absurdity depicted by Lewis Carroll 
and N. F. Simpson. The idea, however, that such surrealism and psychic coercion 
properly belong to the world of the French novel, rather than to the local magistrates' 
court in the High Street, is erroneous (Carlen, 1976a: 48). 
Carlen, in this plea to French literature, asked the reader to contemplate the 
interaction within the magistrates' court, and how the "furniture, state-props, 
scenic devices, tacit scheduling programmes, etiquettes of ritual address and 
reference" bring meaning to interactions (Carlen, 1976a: 48). In short, Carlen 
asked for a realisation that the interaction in magistrates' courts is unequal and 
unbalanced. 104 The ideas expressed by Carlen, although drawing attention to the 
difficulties that defendants face in the legal process and reminding academic 
researchers of the brilliance of Kafka (1935) and others in highlighting the 
bewildering experience the legal system generates, neglects the extent to which 
courtroom interaction necessarily relies upon procedures that the defendant and 
others will find strange. Atkinson and Drew, in Order in Court (1979), described 
how the multi-member interaction within the courtroom necessitates procedures 
that differ from the normal conventions of everyday life. They use the 
104Carlen's thesis was outlined in section 3.6.3.1. 
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ethnomethodological approach of conversation analysis to praise the 
achievement of members in constructing conversations and a shared social 
world. The emphasis is upon the interaction and the informal rules that are relied 
upon in achieving a shared understanding. While Carlen sees the informal rules 
that structure interaction within a magistrates' court as bewildering, conversation 
analysts marvel at the turn taking conventions, the use of adjacency pairs to 
structure conversations and the means of displaying attentiveness by members of 
an interaction. The turn taking rules concern the selection of speakers while 
adjacency pairs, such as question - answer or summons - response, structure 
interactions. Members display attentiveness by observing turn taking rules or 
providing the correct response to an adjacency pair, and when a member fails to 
provide a correct response, remedial action is taken. What Atkinson and Drew 
(1979) achieve is to show how the aims and form of courtroom interaction result 
in a modification of usual conversational rules. As is the case in some multi- 
member settings, participants need to focus upon one conversation and refrain 
from participating in competing interactions. So as to avoid the problem of 
displaying shared attentiveness in such a situation105 and to avoid the breakdown 
of the conversation into a plurality of interactions, informal and formal rules 
operate that allow participants to monitor proceedings. The layout of the 
courtroom enables the identification of participants for the uninitiated. While the 
raised position of the bench may suggest imagery of control and oppression, it 
also assists the uninformed observer in identifying who legitimately controls the 
proceedings. Each feature of the interaction criticised by Carlen could be said to 
serve a legitimate purpose in structuring the interaction. For instance, the 
105 For instance, not every actor in the courtroom is able to answer a question to show that they 
have understood the interaction. 
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physical distance between the parties may force the witness to converse at an 
unnaturally high volume, but it does result in everyone else in the courtroom 
being able to hear the witness. This is also the case for poor courtroom acoustics. 
Reducing the physical distance between witness and inquisitor, while being 
sensitive to the listener, would be "totally insensitive to the minimal listening 
requirements of everyone else in the courtroom" (Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 
224). Furthermore, exploring other avenues to solve this problem, such as 
introducing microphones or earphones or placing everyone really close together 
may be equally "`unfamiliar' or `unpleasant"' (Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 225). 
The claim that these "manifestations of `oppression' at the `micro-level"' reflect 
"the more `generalised oppression' associated with the `macro-structure"' misses 
the point that these informal rules are necessary to achieve a shared 
understanding (Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 226). 
4.5 The setting: The courtroom workgroup and trivial interactions 
Most of the work on the setting of magistrates' courts has already been 
considered in Chapter 3. The ideology of triviality and the existence of 
courtroom workgroups are both specific examples of how particular features of 
the setting for an interaction can influence behaviour. For instance, the 
courtroom workgroup is said to help in the maintenance of consensus to the 
extent that professionals serve the workgroup rather than their client. However, 
the workgroup can be open to outside influences: Feely emphasised the "open 
nature" of courtroom interactions and the possibility of external influences 
impacting upon procedures (Feely, 1992: 21), while Lipetz acknowledged that 
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the strength of any workgroup was subject to different considerations. 
Workgroups may not work if a new member does not accept or understand the 
informal norms, when a member asserts self interest or legal constraints over and 
above the informal laws or when new outside constraints originating from 
"supervisory agencies" force changes in the organisation of the workgroup 
(Lipetz, 1980: 53). 
4.6 Contextual resources: Discourse, power, the legal system and narratives 
The social domain of contextual resources involves the structural position of the 
participants within any interaction and how this position influences interactions. 
For instance, members of the public very rarely use technical legal discourse 
when framing claims within the courtroom - lawyers will translate these claims 
into legal claims - although they may rely upon quasi-legal concepts such as 
justice, or use other concepts such as "assault" that have gained an extended 
meaning to the narrow technical definition ascribed to the concept by the law. 
While this thesis acknowledges the importance of all four social domains, the 
later data analysis concentrates on the contextual resources that framed the mode 
of trial hearing. As a result, this section is more developed than those previously 
and will examine the discourses that are used in the courtroom, the play of power 
in the interaction, how law structures knowledge and how legal narratives are 
constructed. Together, these might very loosely be defined as structural 
influences on courtroom interaction and are crucial in framing these interactions. 
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4.6.1 An introduction to courtroom discourse 
Standard courtroom mythology conjures up images of conflict and adversarial 
battle. While the reality may differ from the rhetoric (Baldwin and McConville, 
1977), there are times when a courtroom is a site of struggle and challenge. 
However, courtroom struggles are not limited to ascertaining the facts but extend 
to giving meaning to agreed facts; that is, the participants struggle to have their 
view and interpretation of events accepted by the court. This struggle can lead to 
the mobilisation of different interpretations based upon alternative discourses. 
Discourse in this sense can be taken to refer to "a specialised language, a 
particular jargon"; "a more or less coherent set of categories and theories of 
action" (Merry, 1990: 110); a body of knowledge on a particular subject - such 
as criminology - or sequences of statements that form conversations and 
narratives (Conley and O'Barr, 1990); a system of communication that utilises 
"common reductive terms" (Nobles and Schiff, 2001: 201); or "a regularity" 
"between a number of statements" (Foucault, 1972: 38). Whatever the 
terminology used, what is important to grasp is that, either implicitly or 
explicitly, courtroom actors may draw upon different discourses at different 
points in the proceedings when defining action. 
The choice of discourse used to describe events affects the manner in which an 
event can be seen or categorised. While different discourses can be mobilised in 
support of pre-existing orientations to problems, some actors are pre-disposed to 
utilise favoured discourses. Lawyers are trained to fashion conflicts and 
problems within the discourse of law, while a social worker may perceive an 
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event through the lens of an alternative or competing discourse. A brief fictional 
example will suffice in explaining the importance of discourse in interpreting 
events. A neighbour calls out the police to a late night disturbance in a block of 
flats. Upon arrival, the police find a husband and wife in the middle of a heated 
exchange and both parties have resorted to violence. Different observers of (or 
participants in) this event will define it in different ways. The neighbour may see 
this as a disturbance that has shattered the peace and tranquillity she expects in 
her living space. She wants this disturbance to end so that she can continue to 
read her book, so she calls the police because they possess the powers to end the 
disturbance. The police, however, may define the situation in numerous ways and 
each suggests possible solutions. The incident may be seen as a domestic with 
public order implications (the disturbance to the neighbour) but no other reason 
for action. The police will therefore act to end the disturbance as soon as possible 
with no perceived need to initiate further action. Alternatively, the police may 
view the problem as a situation where a criminal offence has been perpetrated 
and the offender may well be arrested and criminal proceedings initiated. The 
participants may view these activities as symptomatic of marital breakdown and 
either seek guidance and counselling or decide to end the marriage. One partner 
may view the actions as resulting from the drinking activities of the other and 
request that help be sought to treat the addiction. The local authority may view 
this disturbance as part of a sequence of anti-social behaviour and may evict 
them from the flat, or initiate civil proceedings such as an injunction or an anti- 
social behaviour order to address the problem. Social services, relatives, medical 
professionals and others may all interpret these events in differing fashions. The 
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main feature, however, is that each position acknowledges a discourse that names 
the problem, interprets its meaning and "points to a solution" (Merry, 1990: 111). 
Relating this to the incident in the block of flats, each explanation draws its 
explanatory power from the discourse that frames the interpretation and points to 
a solution. If the incident is interpreted as an assault, the discourse of the criminal 
law is invoked with prosecution being the solution. If the event is seen in the 
context of alcoholism, a medical discourse would underpin any analysis; the 
actions of the patient are a consequence of disease and a diagnosis points to a 
treatment solution. A social-work discourse may view the incident as 
symptomatic of marital breakdown. Each of these discourses implicitly 
acknowledges differing world views. Orthodox criminal law interprets action as 
being the consequence of individual choices (Norrie, 2001), whereas the medical 
example denies individual culpability as alcoholism is a disease that caused the 
behaviour. A social work discipline would view the marital breakdown as a 
contributing cause. Each approach offers different solutions: the criminal law 
demands punishment to either reinforce disciplinary rules or reflect the conscious 
wrongdoing of the offender; the medical approach denies individual culpability 
and finds the cause of action to be disease, thereby reinforcing the need for 
treatment; while the social work approach suggests marriage guidance as a 
solution to the problem. What is interesting is that no approach has any overall 
claim as truth. The claims that the protagonists make as viable solutions make 
sense within each discourse and, furthermore, no discourse makes a more 
appropriate validity claim than another. Indeed, the claims made really only 
make sense when examined from the perspective of the implied discourse 
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utilised. If the police officer were to say to an addiction worker that `'this person 
has committed an offence and needs to be placed before a court", the reply would 
presumably comment that the police officer has "missed the point", that the 
behaviour is conditioned by a disease that needs to be treated. Each protagonist is 
correct on their own terms, but communication between the disciplines is 
difficult, as the statements within each discourse make sense within their own 
realms. Legal discourse, however, holds a privileged position as it is supported 
by the power of the state, meaning that legal truth claims have a special status, 
increasing the likelihood of colonisation of other discourses (Balkin, 2003). 
4.6.2 Ideal types of courtroom discourse 
Merry (1990), in an ethnographic study of a `lower courtroom' in Eastern 
Massachusetts, identified three discourses implicated in courtroom interactions: 
legal, moral and therapeutic. These can be viewed as overarching categories or 
ideal types or models used to categorise courtroom discourse. Legal discourse is 
"a discourse of property, of rights" and "of entitlement" where actors attach 
labels to behaviour such as "harassment", "trespass" and "assault" (Merry, 
1990: 112). Moral discourse is "a discourse of relationships" and the "language is 
of responsibilities" rather than rights (Merry, 1990: 113). Finally, therapeutic 
discourse implies environmental causes of behaviour and is "drawn from the 
helping professions" (Merry, 1990: 114). As typologies or models they do not 
describe the behaviour of courtroom participants in a once and for all manner, 
whereby actors slavishly follow the same path. Rather, each participant in the 
courtroom can tactically make statements that imply a discourse and change their 
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approach depending upon the outcome. Merry (1990) noted, for instance, how 
judges usually determined cases on legal principles and identified deviations 
from legal discourse as contributions that inhibited the smooth functioning of the 
courtroom. However, Merry (1990) noted how sometimes judges would restrict 
the use of legal discourse for tactical reasons; if a judge believed a complaint did 
not merit legal adjudication, reliance would be placed upon moral or therapeutic 
discourse. 
As an alternative to the approach of Merry, Conley and O' Barr (1990) identified 
two courtroom discourses interwoven with the cultural background of litigants; 
rule and relational discourses. These are represented as two end points on a 
spectrum; as ideal types appropriate for modelling courtroom discourse. Most 
courtroom claims were of these types and their usage was not consistent with 
some litigants strategically switching between discourses. However, Conley and 
O'Barr (1990) noted how some litigants displayed a preference for one type over 
another that was consistent with their overall worldview. Relational litigants 
focused "on status and social relationships" and viewed law as "empowered to 
assign rewards and punishments according to broad notions of social need and 
entitlement" (Conley and O'Barr, 1990: 58). Rule orientation, however, 
disavows status and prioritises specific rules and a belief that "society is a 
network not of relationships, but of contractual opportunities" that can be 
accepted or rejected (Conley and O'Barr, 1990: 59). 
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4.6.3 Discourses, the law and adjudication 
Conley and O'Barr outlined differing judicial approaches utilised at different 
times. These were: "the strict adherent", "the lawmaker", "the authoritative 
judge", "the mediator" and "the proceduralist" (Conley and O'Barr, 1990: 82). 
Strict adherents to the law search for abstract legal rules and principles and then 
apply these to the facts of the case. In contrast to the strict adherent is the law 
maker who, rather than viewing the law as an external constraint that is binding, 
sees the law as a resource to be utilised in the search for a fair and just outcome 
to proceedings. The mediator prefers to avoid the imposition of legal solutions 
and instead strives to create solutions by agreement of the parties. However, if 
mediation fails, an authoritative judgment will be entered. Authoritative decision 
makers also make decisions on the basis of a strict application of law to the facts 
but are less clear in explaining the source of decisions. As a result, judgments 
appear to be the result of "personal opinions" rather than from "legal authority" 
(Conley and O' Barr, 1990: 96). Finally, as the name suggests, proceduralists 
attach less importance to substantive theories of law or justice (as seen in the 
actions of the strict adherent or law maker) but rather privilege legal procedure. 
4.6.4 The distribution of discourses 
The approaches utilised by judges appear to be a reflection of the contextual 
resources that are brought to bear upon the performance of their duties. Conley 
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and O'Barr (1990) cautiously106 suggested that the differing approaches were 
influenced by social status. Most mediation was said to be initiated by women 
judges with rule orientation utilised as a last resort, while "proceduralist 
tendencies" in the judges were to be found "exclusively among legally trained 
men" (Conley and O'Barr, 1990: 111). A similar process was noted with 
litigants: women tended towards a relational orientation; men were more likely to 
be rule orientated; and rule orientation was also a feature of those who operated 
in business or public service. What is more, the distribution was not value free: 
The discourse of relationships is the discourse of those who have not been socialised 
into the centres of power in our society. Gender, class, and race are deeply entangled 
with the knowledge of and ability to use the rule-orientated discourse that is the official 
approach of the law. Thus, it is no surprise that the agenda of relational speakers is often 
at variance with the agenda of the law (Conley and O'Barr, 1990: 173). 
4.6.5 Communication breakdown 
Although Conley and O'Barr researched informal civil justice in a US small 
claims court, their work does provide some valuable insights into the workings of 
magistrates' courts. Conley and O'Barr questioned how litigant's claims are 
managed by the legal process and how their concerns are translated into the 
language of law. While rules of evidence may impact upon the way that 
testimony is structured within the courtroom, more fundamentally the discourse 
of law either transforms or ignores "the discourse of the disputants whose 
problems are the law's very reason for being" (Conley and O' Barr, 1990: 9). If 
'"6 They noted the difficulty of drawing such conclusions from a spread of five approaches across 
a sample of 15 judges. 
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such a process operates in an informal court organised so as to facilitate 
contributions from one-shot players, it could be expected that the critique applies 
writ large to the more formal criminal court. 
Conley and O'Barr suggested the root of the discord lies in an understanding of 
the differences between rule and relational orientation; here lies the breakdown 
in communication either between applicants, or between the court and an 
applicant. Rule orientation looks for an application of specific rules and norms to 
the specific situations, whereas relational approaches seek an application of 
"justice" broadly conceived to the situation. Conley and O'Barr explain the 
dissonance through a narrative described as "a composite drawn from the 
experience of hundreds of litigants whose cases we studied" (Conley and O'Barr, 
1990: 23). It is worthwhile pausing to consider extracts from the narrative and 
part of their analysis. Firstly, the narrative: 
You bought a new car four months ago. It has 4,500 miles on the odometer. It will not 
start on rainy days. You go back to the dealer, brandishing your 3-year/50,000 mile 
bumper-to-bumper warranty. The dealer refuses to fix it under the warranty, claiming 
that the car needs "ordinary road adjustments. " This will cost an estimated $75-$100. 
You have had enough. You know that there is a court where ordinary people can bring 
suits without lawyers, technical legal knowledge, or great expense and delay. In your 
state, this institution is called a small claims court. You decide to sue the dealer for 
failure to live up to the terms of the warranty. 
You take an hour off from your job to go to the courthouse to do the necessary 
paperwork. The third office you go to is that of the small claims clerk. She hands you a 
"complaint form" to fill out in triplicate. Under the "Defendant" heading, you are asked 
to indicate whether the business you are suing is a sole proprietorship, a partnership, or a 
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corporation. You do not know, and ask the clerk for advice. She responds that she is not 
allowed to give legal advice, and walks away. Guessing, you check the "corporation" 
box. Under the heading "Basis of Claim, " you write two sentences explaining why you 
are suing: "My new car is still under warranty. It won't start on rainy days, and they 
want to charge me $150 to fix it. " 
You return to the clerk's desk and hand her the completed form. She collects $19 from 
you. She assigns you a trial date three weeks hence, returns two copies of the complaint 
form, and says, "Keep one of these for yourself and have the other one served. " You 
respond, "What does that mean? " The clerk says, "You have to serve the complaint on 
the defendant. You can have it done by any disinterested person over eighteen, or the 
sheriffs office will do it for $12. Fourth floor, third door on the left off the elevator. " 
Being unfamiliar with the niceties of service process, you take the elevator to the fourth 
floor. You give the papers to the sheriffs deputy at the desk. She looks at them and says, 
"Who's the registered agent of this corporation that we should serve? " You stare at her 
incredulously, and finally say, "How about if you give the papers to the service 
manager? " The deputy collects the $12 from you. 
The trial date arrives. Your case is scheduled for 9: 30 in the morning, so you have 
arranged to take your last half-day of personal leave time. You arrive in the courthouse 
at 9: 15 and find the small claims hearing room. 
The judge enters the room at 9: 40. She is a middle-aged woman in a business suit. She 
places a name plate in front of her saying that she is a judge. You are struck by the 
absence of a robe. She begins by calling the names of all the plaintiffs and defendants 
whose cases are scheduled for this morning's session. Answering for the car dealer is a 
young man in a coat and tie. He identifies himself as the financial controller for the 
dealership. 
Your case is fifth on the list. [The Judge] calls your case at 11: 20. With a mixture of 
confidence and trepidation, you walk up and stand at one of two small tables in front of 
the judge's desk. She is absorbed in reading papers and does not acknowledge you. 
After what seems like several minutes, the judge stops reading and looks directly at you. 
"May I see the warranty, the bill of sale, the instalment sales contract, and the service 
133 
records for the car? " Dumfounded, you stare back at the judge with your mouth slightly 
open. You finally regain your composure and mutter that you have the warranty, but not 
the other documents. In fact, you are not really sure what the judge means. The judge 
says, "Well, this is a contract case, after all, and I can't try it without all the relevant 
contract documents. " You respond, "But I thought this was supposed to be informal. " 
She says, "It is, but it's still a court, and we have to do things according to the law. " 
Ultimately, the judge writes out a list of the necessary documents and explains what she 
has in mind. She reschedules the case for a week later. The dealer's representative has 
not said a word. 
A week later, you return to court at 9: 30, your case is called at 10: 40. You have brought 
all the documents the judge requested. You hand them to her and remain standing, eager 
to tell your story. However, after reading through the documents the judge turns to the 
man from the dealership and says, "What do you have to say about this? " He responds, 
"Well, Your Honour, I hate to bring this up now, but dealers don't give warranties, 
manufacturers do. The suit should've been brought against the manufacturer. You have 
to dismiss the case against us. " As you look on anxiously, the judge stares down at her 
desk and shakes her head. Finally she looks up at the dealer's representative and says, 
"Technically, you might have a point, but you should've said something last week. I'm 
not gonna let you bring this plaintiff in here twice and then raise a technical defence. 
We'll try it. If you don't like the result you can appeal and tell them about it in district 
Court". 
Before you can say a word, the defendant hands the judge a written report from the 
dealer's service manager. It says that your car has simply gotten out of tune. It 
concludes, "There is no defect covered by the warranty. The car needs timing and 
tuning, which is normal maintenance that the customer is required to pay for. " The judge 
turns back to you and says, "Do you have a report from a mechanic, or did you bring a 
mechanic to testify on your behalf? " 
You are getting angry and struggle to control yourself. You say, "Look, Judge, this is 
ridiculous. I paid $12,000 for this car four months ago and it won't go in the rain. Fm 
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not a mechanic and I don't need one. Common sense tells you that there's something 
wrong with the car, and the only fair thing is to make them fix it. " You sit down. 
The judge stares at her desk for another several seconds. Finally she looks up at you. 
"You have a tough case here without any expert evidence to contradict theirs. " Then she 
looks at the defendant. "But it seems to me that it would be in everyone's interest to get 
this problem resolved without any further aggravation or bad blood. If I refrain from 
entering a judgment against your company, would you be willing to try to fix this 
problem voluntarily? " The dealer's representative responds, "Well, we don't see that 
we're responsible here, Your Honour, but if that's what you want, we won't go against 
YOU. " 
The judge turns back to you. "I'm going to continue this case for two weeks so you can 
make an appointment with the dealer and let them try to fix it. If they don't, come back 
two weeks from today and we'll talk about a judgment. If I don't see you, I'll assume 
everything is okay and dismiss the case". 
A week later, the dealer repairs the car, albeit grudgingly. Finally, after investing $31 
and substantial parts of three working days, you have gotten what you were certain you 
were entitled to in the first place (Conley and O'Barr 1990: 20-23). 
Although this narrative resonates with the a view of law examined earlier'07 as 
inducing the sense of disorientation so clearly exemplified in the novels of 
Kafka, it does display the problems that the citizenry face when coming to the 
law. The claimant here is "eager to tell [her] story", and hopes that "common 
sense" will prevail and the dealership will repair the car. The plaintiff sees the 
problem not as the non-performance of a contractual obligation, but as a 
breakdown in social obligations and relations; this is a new car that does not 
adequately perform its task. She assumes that the law must have the power to 
address the obvious refusal of the dealership to perform their social obligation to 
107 See section 4.4. 
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repair the faltering car. In contrast, the dealership conceptualise the dispute as 
based on contractual obligations freely settled upon by the relevant parties. 
Initially the dealership complain that any relevant obligation is owed by the 
manufacturers and secondly, that the terms of the contract have yet to be 
breached as the problem appears to be one of "normal maintenance" that is not 
covered by the contract. The judge in this fictional example utilises four of the 
differing approaches noted by Conley and O'Barr. Initially she displays a 
procedural approach by demanding the relevant documents and questioning the 
plaintiff on the submission of expert evidence. In operating in this manner, the 
judge is emphasising the procedural regularities that assist the court in its task. 
This approach is most clearly seen in the comment to the plaintiff that accepts the 
informal nature of the proceedings but that, "it's still a court, and we have to do 
things according to the law". The judge also evidences a strict adherent approach 
when identifying the problem for consideration. Although the complainant 
expresses her complaint in relational terms, the judge explains that this is a 
contractual dispute that necessitates a determination of the facts (the precise 
nature of any mechanical problem) and of the terms of the contract (warranty). 
The judge therefore requests a copy of the contracts and is eager to receive expert 
evidence from both parties on the nature of the mechanical problem. In 
addressing the claim that the parties to the contract are the plaintiff and the 
manufacturers, and not the dealership, the judge expresses law-making 
tendencies. In order to do justice in this particular case she discards the 
"technical" submission of the dealer's representative; she makes it clear that it 
would be unfair to this plaintiff to halt proceedings and ask her to reinstate 
proceedings against the manufacturer because this technical argument was not 
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raised at the previous hearing. The judge displays awareness that her actions 
disregard legal principle; in stating that the defendant is free to appeal this 
decision, she implicitly acknowledges that the technical rules are being 
circumvented in the interests of justice. Finally, the judge disposes of the case 
through mediation; she suggests a compromise that leads to a solution without 
having to enter judgment. 
The schism evidenced in the fictional example is between plaintiff and 
defendant, but Conley and O'Barr noted the possibility of discord between judge 
and litigant. Both judges and litigants could be placed anywhere on the rules- 
relationships continuum, leading to a number of possible judge-litigant categories 
of concordance or conflict. Conley and O'Barr reported that the clearest case of 
concordant orientations occurred when a rule orientated litigant, with a clear 
legal case, appeared before a rule orientated judge. However, the usual state of 
affairs was conflict and this frequently took the form of a rule orientated judge 
and relational plaintiff. This is because litigants, not being trained in the law, do 
not "learn the law's conventions" in "law school" or via "observations of other 
legal professionals" (Conley and O'Barr, 1990: 33). 108 Conley and O'Barr 
pessimistically concluded that, while litigants have their voices heard by the 
court, the process of transformation silences these voices: 
through a process that is remarkable as well as largely unremarked upon, the law selects 
among these voices, silencing some and transforming others to conform to legal 
categories and conventions. The more abstract discourse of jurisprudence has only 
recently begun to recognise the potential relevance of everyday discourse to its 
pox Conley and O'Barr outlined a number of examples that explain this discord further; Mottley's 
case is a good example (1990 : 132-140). 
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concerns. But this increased attention to voices that historically have been suppressed or 
ignored has created a new, practical problem: that of finding and hearing them (Conley 
and O'Barr, 1990: 168). 
4.6.6 Legal autopoiesis 
One strain of jurisprudence, autopoiesis or systems theory, has attempted to 
address the issues raised by Conley and O'Barr. Autopoiesis is concerned with 
how law, as a system of communication, makes legal communications and 
interprets the communications of other systems. At its basis, autopoietic theory 
sees law as a system of communication in a society "made up of multiple 
systems of communication", where "[c]o-ordination is made possible by the use 
of common reductive terms, self-referential communication, and (at the level of 
discourse) widely shared values" (Nobles and Shiff, 2001: 200-201). The legal 
system is described as a "normatively closed" yet "cognitively open" system 
(Luhmann, 1988: 113). Law is cognitively open in that it is receptive to outside 
influences; law as a system addresses issues and debates originating from other 
disciplines and discourses. Law will (and perhaps inevitably) consider(s) 
problems that are more appropriately addressed by other discourses. For instance, 
antitrust legal regimes consider economic theories of competition when 
addressing the problems of anti-competitive behaviour and the market 
inefficiencies thereby created. In a similar manner, the judges in Conley and 
O'Barr's research were required, in some instances, to address the wider social 
issues that litigants brought to the courtroom. However, because the legal system 
is normatively closed, the engagement with alternative discourses operates in a 
manner that transforms these other discourses. Alternative discourses are not 
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merely transplanted into law; rather they are translated into the discourse of law. 
This is explained as a consequence of the legal system "reproducing itself by 
legal events and only by legal events" (Luhmann, 1988: 113). The inputs from 
other systems into the legal system have to be translated into the legal code. 
Brown (1990) noted how information from social inquiry reports was translated 
by magistrates into a language that they understood; "the welfare component of 
reports was translated into control indicators and thus rendered congruent with 
the disciplinary conventions of the juvenile court" (Brown, 1990: 97). This 
translation process is not confined to law, but is rather a feature of social 
systems; "within each system of communication, one can only judge the validity 
of cognitions - statements about the world - by referring back to the internal 
procedures of that system which determine the validity of a particular piece of 
knowledge" (King and Piper, 1990: 22). The law in utilising this abstraction 
process inevitably reproduces events into a legal/illegal binary structure 
(Luhmann, 1988). The narratives presented to the law by witnesses, defendants 
or complainants must be either presented in this form or translated to this form. 
The legal system, qua a system of legal communications, must translate other 
discourses into legal communications: 
For to be clients of the legal system, people have to operate within the system. They 
have to be aware of a legal problem; have to define their situation accordingly and have 
to conunit themselves to advance legal claims or at least to communicate them. They 
participate in the legal system using its system-reference to give meaning to their 
activities (Luhmann, 1988: 111). 
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Although utilising different language, Conley and O'Barr drew similar 
conclusions about the translation of narratives by the legal process through the 
production of a "case" (Conley and O'Barr, 1990: 168). They noted how the 
translation process leads to a recounting of events that selects legally relevant 
facts from these narratives in the construction of cases (Conley and O' Barr, 
1990). This process is problematic, because when restructuring "life-world" 
relations in this manner (Habermas, 1988), legal translations will inevitably 
involve the imposition of violence upon the participants narratives; Merry (1990) 
particularly commented upon the "paradox of legal entitlement" and noted that 
while courts may offer remedies to problems that citizens face, to come to the 
law involves subservience to the categories and categorisations of law. 
Translation also suggests an ideology in law that constructs individuals as free 
autonomous agents able to participate fully in social relations. The law creates 
the binary legal/illegal opposition in a manner that abstracts legal cases from a 
wider social context while hiding the ideological basis of the case as a construct: 
these conceptions of legal subjectivity express a dogmatic articulation of the image and 
nature of man and their function in law. In law, human rationality and the concept of a 
free and autonomous will are the basic repositories of the nature of man (Broekman, 
1988: 95). 
This process not only operates at an abstract level, where we can glean 
assumptions on social relations in the operations of law, but also works for the 
subjects of law - defendants, witnesses, plaintiffs and complainants - who are all 
legal constructs for the purposes of legal operations. The process of abstraction, 
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and the imposition of the binary code upon action, necessarily leads to a partial 
and incomplete framing of subjects before the law. Victims are just that: victims. 
The person has been reduced to an "artefact" whereby the law deems the 
relationship of subjugation to the defendant, and the harm caused, as the only 
relevant details. Legal subjects are: 
not real flesh-and-blood people, are not human beings with brains and minds... they are 
mere constructs, semantic artefacts produced by the legal discourse itself (Teubner, 
1989: 741). 
For instance, returning to our earlier example, 109 to view the domestic incident as 
a crime prioritises the legal explanation over alternative explanations and, at the 
very least, pushes these alternatives to the background if not obliterating them 
completely. The criminal law, in determining criminal liability for action, is 
purely concerned with ascertaining whether the defendant committed the 
prohibited act (actus reus), with a blameworthy state of mind (mens rea) and is 
unable to rely upon a legal defence. 
4.6.7 Discourse and power 
So far, the discussion has concentrated upon the discourses that courtroom 
participants utilise as contextual resources when performing speech acts within 
the courtroom. We have seen how Merry (1990) suggested that the act of naming 
suggests solutions and so therefore operates as an act of power. Similarly, Conley 
and O'Barr (1990) commented on how judges encounter different discourses 
109 See section 4.6.1. 
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from litigants and the possibility of discord between the discourse of the judge 
and litigant. In short, courtroom discourse is interwoven with courtroom power. 
4.6.7.1 Foucault and power 
The early works of Foucault offer a means of better understanding this 
interaction between discourse/knowledge and power. It is firstly necessary to 
understand how Foucault conceptualised power; for him, power does not lie 
exclusively in the hands of a sovereign body, but is rather all pervasive, inherent 
in social relations and is bottom up, rather than top down. Power is the 
"multiplicity of force relations" that form a "chain or system" and are 
represented in "the strategies in which [force relations] take effect", "embodied 
in the state apparatus, in the formation of the law, in the various social 
hegemonies" (Foucault, 1979: 92-93). This all pervasive power, however, is not 
something outside of the social world, but instead is interior to that world and 
helps to constitute social relations and give them meaning. Power is inherent in 
"economic processes, knowledge relationships, sexual relations" and is the effect 
"of the divisions, inequalities, and disequilibriums which occur" in these 
relations and have "a directly productive role" (Foucault, 1979: 94). Power, 
therefore, helps to produce the social world as well as being a product or an 
effect of already existing relations. More specifically, there is a link between 
power and knowledge in the construction of the social world and it "is not 
possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, it is impossible for 
knowledge not to engender power" (Foucault, 1980: 52). Foucault elaborates on 
the interplay between power and knowledge many times in his work. For 
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instance, he has noted on the "manifold relations of power" that "cannot 
themselves be established nor implemented without the production of a 
discourse" (Foucault, 1980: 93). Similarly, the relations between power and 
knowledge are expressed more completely in Discipline and Punish: 
Taken one by one, most of these techniques [of discipline] have a long history behind 
them. But what was new, in the eighteenth century, was that, by being combined and 
generalised, they attained a level at which the formation of knowledge and the increase 
of power regularly reinforce one another in a circular process. At this point, the 
disciplines crossed the `technological' threshold. First the hospital, then the school, then, 
later, the workshop were not simply `reordered' by the disciplines; they became, thanks 
to them, apparatuses such that any mechanism of objectification could be used in them 
as an instrument of subjection, and any growth of power could give rise in them to 
possible branches of knowledge; it was this link, proper to the technological systems, 
that made possible within the disciplinary element the formation of clinical medicine, 
psychiatry, child psychology, educational psychology, the rationalisation of labour 
(Foucault, 1977: 224). 
Foucault, therefore, sees the creation of knowledge not as a scientific value- 
neutral process, but rather as a specific product of space and time. However, this 
is not to denigrate the positive effects of knowledge production, although there 
remains scepticism surrounding truth claims. Foucault has specifically 
commented that power produces knowledge; "[i]t was on the basis of power over 
the body that a physiological, organic knowledge of it became possible" 
(Foucault, 1980: 59). The power/knowledge axis has also led to the construction 
of subjectivity and individuality. Through the scientific and medical gaze and the 
recording of information, an accumulation of documentation takes place that 
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constitutes knowledge and the creation of the individual. The examination 
through the gaze once again leads to the creation of a case that helps to document 
the person. Each disciplinary gaze operates within a field, and within these fields 
power/knowledge produces the subject. "The individual, with his identity and 
characteristics, is the product of a relation of power exercised over bodies, 
multiplicities, movements, desires, forces" (Foucault, 1980: 74). The individual 
is one of the "prime effects" of power, "the element of its articulation" (Foucault. 
1980: 98). The constitution of the individual is achieved through the examination 
(Foucault, 1977), and in a legal context, such an examination could take place in 
the police station, the solicitor's office or the courtroom. 
In these venues, individuals are constituted as defendants; a body of knowledge 
is deployed to name the individual and their actions. The documents produced 
assume the position of truth, of a verifiable body of knowledge that demonstrates 
what happened and what needs to be done. The individual is thus constituted as a 
defendant through the utilisation of a body of knowledge by the operation of a 
gaze within a specific field. The individual is constituted as a "case" that 
"constitutes an object for a branch of knowledge and a hold for a branch of 
power" (Foucault, 1977: 191). The use of the case legitimises the process of 
adjudication and reduces the complexity of the social world. The case facilitates 
the reduction of "messy individuals" to "manipulable elements amendable to 
bureaucratic processing' while acting as an "ideological function" because "all 
cases will receive equality of consideration" (Brown, 1991: 106). 
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4.6.7.2 Discourse and power within the courtroom 
Some of the research studies on magistrates' courts have commented, usually 
indirectly, on the operation of power/knowledge within the courtroom. For 
instance, Brown (1991) noted how participants struggled to have their version of 
events accepted as authoritative. The discourses of some players were less likely 
to be accepted: social workers lacked expertise and their reports were seen as too 
theoretical, idealistic and "jargon bound" to be of any interest (Brown, 1991); 
probation officers, on the other hand, were described as more realistic with their 
reports and recommendations grounded in "common sense" (ibid. ). 
Brown also noted how the recording of information fixed and captured the 
defendant. The social inquiry report, in describing the defendant, fixed, captured 
and constituted the defendant as a construct within the courtroom. The social 
enquiry report was described as "a set of representations about the defendant 
which seeks to promote a particular picture of that defendant for a particular 
purpose" (Brown, 1991: 9). This is not, however, simply a product of the social 
inquiry report, but rather a result of legal discourse: 
From the moment the individual enters the justice system she or he ceases to be a full 
individual and begins to become something less, a category of person about whom only 
certain `facts' will be perceived as relevant. Hence the social inquiry report, far from 
being a description of a real person, necessarily displaces him or her through the 
processes of selectivity (Brown, 1991: 18). 
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4.6.8 Narrative reproduction within the courtroom 
As has been explained, the courtroom is a site of specific discourses and 
languages where the regular participants feel at ease with these discourses. Law, 
as a system of rules, as an institution or as a cultural practice, necessarily 
concerns the manipulation of language: "language penetrates the legal system, 
and the law perhaps more than any other is a profession of words, ultimately and 
utterly dependent on some form of linguistic negotiation" (Harris, 1994: 156). 
On a very basic level, site specific languages can create problems for those not 
versed in the language, in addition to problems associated with not understanding 
the rules of procedure, evidence and the informal assumptions concerning 
courtroom interaction. For instance, when examining the testimony of child 
witnesses, Brennan noted how children are frequently confused by particular 
lines of questioning and how their responses - typically `I don't know' or `I can't 
remember' - are misinterpreted so as to question the reliability of the evidence 
(Brennan, 1994). One participant in the research summarised the confusion 
encountered in the legal process: 
When do you get a chance to say something. I'm only 15 and it's hard for me to try and 
match their level of talking when you want to put something across. Some of the words 
they use, the long words that they might use and they (other children) might not even 
know the meaning of. And yet they sit there and they don't tell you and they expect you 
to answer (Brennan, 1994: 210). 
The importance of language in the courtroom is not only to be found in the 
confusion created when participants are not familiar with the implicit courtroom 
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conventions; it is also a valuable window into the cultural world of the 
participants. When courtroom participants perform speech acts they are engaged 
in a process of production that reflects cultural positioning. For instance, Harris 
commented on how magistrates' language offers valuable insights into the 
ideological basis of the legal system and the particular interaction. The 
courtroom interaction is said to offer a "tangible connection with more abstract 
concepts inherent in the legal process" (Harris, 1994: 157). This is a proposition 
that suggests that an examination of courtroom discourse illuminates the 
ideological assumptions that support and legitimise law. 
4.6.8.1 The importance of stories 
One method of inspecting courtroom utterances is through an inspection of 
courtroom narratives. Narrative is a specific language form that carries universal 
significance in addition to carrying specific value in the legal process. 
Storytelling is a pervasive cultural activity (Riessman, 1993) whereby we make 
sense of the world: 
Our very definition as human beings is very much bound up in the stories that we tell 
about our own lives and the world in which we live. We cannot, in our dreams, our 
daydreams, our ambitious fantasies, avoid the imaginative imposition of form on life 
(Brooks, 1996: 19). 
Narrative is important in the legal context as people come to the law with 
problems. These problems can be presented as a narrative, with the presenter as 
the central character; as someone who has been harmed or suffered a violation of 
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personal interests. A legal audience must listen to these narratives and then sift 
through them for legally relevant facts while applying the law to these facts. This 
is the nature of the construction of legal cases. The lawyer must then reconstitute 
the narrative in the courtroom in a manner appropriate to that particular setting, 
all the while being aware that an opposing lawyer may be constructing a counter 
narrative, either on the basis of a different version of events or by interpreting the 
agreed events in a different manner (Bennett and Feldman, 1981). The courtroom 
lawyer, in constructing a narrative, has to deal with the contradictions and gaps 
that appear in our narratives in addition to attributing legal relevance to these 
events. The courtroom lawyer therefore, "must at once elicit and construct a 
story, and the distinction between the elicited and construction is by no means 
clear" (Brooks, 1996: 17). There can be little doubt that courtroom participants 
are engaged in the process of either constructing or interpreting narratives. This 
leads to a question of how courtroom participants construct or hear stories. 
4.6.8.2 Narrative construction in the courtroom 
On a very basic level, stories or narratives recount a series of events with a 
beginning, middle and an end, and these events are organised into a coherent 
whole that makes sense and gives events meaning. When we tell stories, we do 
so to make a point; narratives carry an interpretative force that allow the 
audience to make sense of the story (Labov, 1977). Narratives are means of 
recounting events in a meaningful way: a "primary way individuals make sense 
of experience is by casting it in a narrative form" (Riessman, 1993: 4). For 
Bennett and Feldman (1981), the story is the means by which lawyers in the 
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courtroom organise events in a meaningful manner resulting in the story being an 
almost universal feature of courtroom interaction. Lawyers need to grasp 
disparate events, illuminate a sense of purpose and motivation within human 
actions, and gather all these disparate events and motives into an understandable, 
believable and plausible whole. This is achieved through the narrative (Bennett 
and Feldman, 1981). For Bennett and Feldman (1981), the success or otherwise 
of a line of reasoning depends upon how it fits within the overarching narrative 
that has been constructed and whether or not this narrative is plausible. 
4.6.8.3 Narrative (re)construction 
We are beginning to see that narrative construction is arguably a universal 
activity and one that is crucial within the courtroom. However, the act of 
narrative (re)production is not simply the recounting of experience; narrative 
performance involves the (re)construction of events and that inevitably invokes a 
creative process. This involves omitting irrelevant details ("flattening"), 
exaggerating important points ("sharpening") and polishing other features of the 
narrative so as to remove unsuitable material ("rationalisation") (Cortazzi, 1993: 
61). Whenever we tell stories, we do so at different times, to a different audience, 
to make different points. At each of these different times, the focus of the 
narrative will change leading to a different emphasis and the removal and 
addition of details. This process is not merely a reaction to the audience; it is 
creative whereby reality is readdressed on each telling. Riessman, for instance, 
noted how some narrative theorists see speech acts (and therefore narrative 
(re)production) as constituting the world: 
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Skeptical about a correspondence theory of truth, language is understood as deeply 
constitutive of reality, not simply a technical device for establishing meaning. 
Informants' stories do not mirror a world "out there". They are constructed, creatively 
authored, rhetorical, replete with assumptions, and interpretive (Riessman, 1993: 4-5). 
Narratives are created with the assistance of "schemata": "an active organisation 
of past reactions and past experiences which organises elements of recall into 
structured wholes" (Cortazzi, 1993: 61). Narratives are organised around a 
simple structure, that we all implicitly use and acknowledge as a framework 
when we tell stories. The schemata performs a number of functions that allow for 
the organisation and recall of information: they represent a "prototypical 
abstraction" of a concept; they help to organise information through the use of 
"variables or slots that can be filled" whenever we receive information; they 
guide "the interpretation of incoming information" so as to help us make sense of 
the world; and we can fill in the gaps when the "expected information does not 
appear" (Cortazzi, 1993: 62). In short, "[m]emory load is minimised by stripping 
away inessential details" and "[o]nly sufficient detail of the original event or 
story is kept to allow a reconstruction on recall" (Cortazzi, 1993: 62). The use of 
schemata, therefore, help storytellers to fill in the gaps, they assist in unfolding 
plots and allow characters to be understood in already existing roles. Complex 
reality can be flattened into schemata so as to aid memory, the recall of events 
and the organisation of narratives. 
Schemata, in addition to being important in the (re)production of narratives, also 
assist in the understanding of narratives by audiences. When we hear stories, we 
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subconsciously attempt to fit characters, their actions and motivations into 
already existing categories within schemata. When we watch a film, a television 
programme or read a book, we are tuned to the signals that allow us to assign 
moral meaning to actions that help us to identify "the good, the bad and the ugly" 
(Crotazzi, 1993). h 10 Barthes (1972), for instance, shows how "The World of 
Wrestling" is not simply a sport, but is akin to "ancient theatre"; the characters 
are organised around themes that support moral messages within the spectacle. 
The "excessive gestures" of the participants help the audience identify the 
characters and their roles: 
Each sign in wrestling is therefore endowed with an absolute clarity, since one must 
always understand everything on the spot. As soon as the adversaries are in the ring, the 
public is overwhelmed with the obviousness of the roles. As in the theatre, each physical 
type expresses to excess the part which has been assigned to the contestant (Barthes, 
1972: 16-17). 
The audience, through the use of such obvious characters with clear 
characteristics, can see the play of good v. evil or truth v. dishonesty clearly 
unfold within the spectacle. When observing the characters, already existing 
schemata assist in the interpretation of events. 
The implication for any study of narrative (re)production within the courtroom is 
that narratives are understood as part of already existing schemata. If a narrative 
challenges these boundaries, it may meet with either incomprehension or be 
"0 Narrative reproduction often holds our attention when waiting for the plot twist, the 
unexpected where the good turn bad or the bad see the error of their ways. Even in these 
scenarios, the already existing schemata are used to define actions and part of the pleasure is in 
interpreting the twist and how it fits with these schemata. 
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interpreted in a manner that coincides with these schemata (Cortazzi, 1993). 
Bennett and Feldman for instance, noted how narrative acceptance is dependant 
upon the frames of meaning possessed by those who make fact determinations. 
Similarly, Bankowski and Mungham (1976b) commented on how class can 
influence the adjudication process; working class jurors are less likely than 
middle class jurors to accept that legitimate cheap goods are available for sale as 
this is part of their life experience: 
For the middle class juryman it is an incontrovertible fact that men come and offer you 
bargains and for the working class juryman it is an incontrovertible fact that men steal 
things. They are both right, for the worlds that are made for them are to an extent at 
least, different (Bankowski and Mungham, 1976b: 121). 
The examination of the meaning that audiences place upon stories is closely 
linked to the work of Van Roermund (1997); this examines what is described as 
the hierarchy between events and interpretation. The events of the narrative are 
self explanatory; these are the what happened in a story. The interpretation is the 
meaning of the narrative or its "discourse" (Van Roermund, 1997: 24). Hierarchy 
suggests the prioritisation "of one term over the other, in the case Event (E) over 
Interpretation" (Van Roermund, 1997: 24). Where the event is prioritised over 
the meaning or interpretation within a story, the meaning is said to originate from 
an analysis of the events. In other words, when (re)constructing a narrative, we 
describe the events and then interpret them, the interpretation resulting from the 
events. To explain this more fully, an example from the natural sciences may 
illuminate. When conducting an experiment, a scientist is said to operate in 
controlled conditions so as to lead to the production of results that can be used to 
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either generate or test theories. Such inductive reasoning presupposes that results 
lead to the generation of theory, hence the correspondence to narrative 
(re)production; interpretation (theory) results from events (facts). However, the 
event/interpretation hierarchy may be inverted to give the interpretation priority. 
Rather than events suggesting an interpretation; the interpretations (or schemata) 
influence the selection of relevant events. In short, narrative (re)production 
reflects individual world views: 
According to this presupposition, the narrative can only be understood if one 
acknowledges that the `events' referred to are not independent of and prior to the 
Interpretation, but are rather the products of discursive forces, restrictions and 
requirements (Van Roermund, 1997: 24). 
Using the example of the experiment, rather than fact generating or testing 
theories, it is the theories themselves that suggest experiments and assist in the 
selection of observable phenomenon as facts. l l' This takes us back to Riessman 
(1993) above, and the scepticism surrounding a "correspondence theory of 
truth". 112 Rather than truth being found from observable phenomena, we 
creatively produce truth from our theories about the world: 
our epistemic claims are not picturing reality, it is rather the other way round: reality is a 
picture of our epistemic claims (to be disguised as power claims rather than truth 
claims). Thus the pole of Event can be reduced to the pole of Interpretation (Van 
Roermund, 1997: 32). 
One could go so far as to say that theory suggests what is observed. 
Seep. 141. 
153 
For Van Roermund, either hierarchy privileges one pole at the expense of the 
other in a manner that fails to represent narrative (re)construction; both events 
and interpretation being crucial for (re)construction. Returning to schemata, 
Cortazzi (1993) noted how narrative (re)production was a top down and bottom 
up process whereby the audience constructed meaning from the events and the 
already existing schemata. 
Acceptance of the strong thesis that interpretation is prior to the event, or the 
weaker compromise that the interpretation is merely influential in (but not prior 
to) the framing of events, has serious consequences for the (re)construction and 
interpretation of narratives within the courtroom. This implies a limitation upon 
the range of courtroom narratives, with those outside of a dominant form either 
lost or reformulated to fit with dominant conceptions. Alternative narratives may 
be either dismissed as fanciful, unbelievable or implausible or (re)constructed to 
fit with already existing schemata that flattens and translates the participant's 
narrative. Bennett and Feldman (1981) would even go so far as to state that most 
instances of bias within the courtroom result from narrative interpretation. Rather 
than blatantly acting on prejudice, courtroom participants are said to discriminate 
through a rejection of narratives that do not fit with pre-conceived ideas, thereby 
leading to a rejection of culturally different interpretations: 
If legal facts are reconstructed as stories whose plausibility depends on understandings 
drawn from experience, then jurors who come from differing social worlds may disagree 
about the meaning and plausibility of the same stories (Bennett and Feldman, 1981: 
171). 
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The result of such processes of narrative (re)production is that the narratives that 
are delivered in court and accepted are constrained by culturally dominant 
ideologies, ideas and concepts. 
4.7 Conclusions 
It is hoped that this Chapter has provided a multi-faceted view of courtroom 
interaction. To understanding courtroom interactions necessitates an analysis of 
the psychobiography of the participants, the interaction that takes place, the 
setting of the courtroom and the contextual resources that the participants take to 
the interaction. While different research studies have prioritised different social 
domains, there is sufficient theoretically sound evidence to acknowledge the 
influence of the different domains. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
METHODS AND METHODOLOGY: 
THE GROWTH OF THE RESEARCH PLAN 
5.1 Introduction: The organic research project 
Research projects are frequently presented in a style that suggests a clear focus, a 
coherent plan and the execution of that plan. Such a clinical presentation 
suggests a project whereby every eventuality was contemplated and accounted 
for in the planning process with nothing left to chance. While this may well be 
the case for some research projects, it was far from the case for this particular 
project. A combination of problems and opportunities presented themselves so as 
to influence heavily the direction of the research process, while the methods used 
for data collection, as well as being theoretically driven, were also determined by 
practicalities in the field. In short, the practice of research failed to adhere to a 
straightforward process and was instead contingent and flexible. In order to 
capture adequately the dynamics of the process, the presentation of the methods 
of this project will not be explained in a clinical fashion where every turn 
appeared to be pre-planned, but rather the narrative of the process will be 
presented with all the setbacks and new avenues outlined in a manner that 
adequately reflects the organic nature of research in the social sciences. 
However, throughout the research process a number of constants remained. 
Firstly, the mode of trial decision was always the focus of the research (although 
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how this was to be examined was subject to amendment). Secondly, this was 
mostly to be conducted through direct court observation; ready public access to 
the court site ensured that this would always remain at least a last resort. Finally, 
it was always the intention to compare the approaches of two courts as utilised by 
Parker, Cashburn and Turnbull (1981). It was thought that this would enable a 
comparison between the two different courts so as to check for the influence of 
local court culture, while the selection of a busy city court and a more stable rural 
or suburban court would allow for further comparison. 
5.2 Research questions 
The earlier discussions have raised a plethora of issues that could have formed 
the basis of any research topic and were at some time or other within the sights of 
the research. As is the case with the methods used, the questions to be addressed 
were not identified from the outset and a plan then executed to research these 
questions; rather the questions addressed changed as the research progressed. 
Nevertheless, certain fundamentals (including an interest in the practices of the 
CPS) have remained constant. When more became known about the mode of trial 
process the issues shifted in response to this knowledge. Similarly, while the 
theoretical approach developed, this also impacted upon the methods to be used 
and the questions to be addressed. While the research was initially conceived as 
an exploration of the mode of trial decision in magistrates' courts, practicalities 
have narrowed the focus, while theoretical concerns have expanded that focus. 
The initial discussion in Chapter 2 highlighted the issues in the mode of trial 
hearing. Four different parties, the prosecution, the magistracy, the defendant and 
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the defendant's solicitor, can all potentially influence the mode of trial decision. 
The research examined in Chapters 2 and 3 outlined the intricacies involved in 
this decision making process and the potential impact of decisions. Much has 
been made, for instance, of the practices of defendants in electing trial by jury 
only to plead guilty subsequently. As a lone researcher, many of these issues 
were out of reach and not all of those within sight could form the basis of one 
viable research project. As a result, decisions had to be made as to what to 
include. Throughout the process though, a decision was made to retain a CPS 
perspective to the research. An interest in the practices of the CPS and the dearth 
of information available was the initial impetus for the research project. ' 13 While 
this was nearly discarded because of access problems it remained a focus for the 
research. 
Initial questions presented the possibility of many methods including the direct 
observation of courtroom practices, interviewing all four decision makers, 
tracking cases throughout the court process, simulating courtroom decisions in a 
manner that probed reasons for decisions and evaluating records on the mode of 
trial decision. When contemplating the research process, each of these differing 
methods was considered; practical considerations ruled out some, while 
theoretical concerns both expanded the questions to be addressed and limited the 
methods to be used. 
1 13 The debate between Ashworth and Fionda (1994) and Daw (1994) on the case screening 
practices of the CPS, the impact of the revised Code for Crown Prosecutors on these practices 
and the lack of empirical data available to inform this debate led to my first interest in an 
empirical research project. This initial interest eventually led to a focus upon mode of trial 
decisions. 
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5.3 Practical constraints 
Practical constraints led to the abandonment of some research questions and 
associated methods either before the commencement of the fieldwork stage or 
during the fieldwork process itself. The first data collection method to be 
abandoned was case tracking. Chapter 2 highlighted a number of problems with 
the mode of trial decision, including defendants receiving penalties within the 
powers of magistrates and defendants electing only to plead guilty subsequently. 
The tracking of cases from the magistrates' court and through the Crown Court 
may have assisted in explaining the processes that influence pleas and sentence. 
Unfortunately, case attrition, inevitable when a lone researcher performs a task of 
this magnitude, would raise serious doubts about the validity of such a project. 
Having to be in many places at once would result in a lone researcher failing to 
observe many cases, resulting in either the collection of a partial data set or a set 
of completed cases so small as to be relatively meaningless. In short, such a task 
is outside the range of a lone researcher. 
Access problems led to a re-evaluation of the project on numerous occasions. 
The main focus upon the CPS was nearly lost due to problems in gaining access. 
The first two initial requests for access were refused in different CPS areas. At 
this time serious consideration was given to the viability of the research project 
and an alternative focus was considered. Fortunately, as is all too often the case, 
a personal contact within the administrative staff of the CPS office researched 
arranged a meeting for the researcher with the Chief Crown Prosecutor for that 
area. On the basis of this meeting access was provisionally agreed, although 
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subject to formal approval from CPS Headquarters. After the granting of security 
clearance, formal access was granted. As is usually reported in methods 
textbooks, the granting of formal access is only the start of the process. Day to 
day access and co-operation has to be informally negotiated on a continuing basis 
and this project was no exception. While the Chief Crown Prosecutor made this 
process easier through a number of focused introductions to key personnel and a 
general introduction to others, co-operation was by no means guaranteed. 
Overall, the time spent in the field was best characterised as harmonious with 
free and unobstructed access. A desk amongst the legal staff was provided with 
licence for the researcher to set his own agenda. The only caveat was that 
consideration should be given to the workload of CPS staff. Most prosecutors 
and case workers were generous with their available time and eased the 
acclimatisation process. Even though most prosecutors were sympathetic to the 
research process and openly co-operated, there were varying degrees to which 
they donated their time and effort. Some were exceptional, willing to discuss 
individual cases (before, during and after the court hearing), general policy and 
their work as a CPS prosecutor. Others were willing, but demands upon their 
time restricted their generosity. A small minority appeared to be so busy that they 
were unable to extend co-operation much beyond the acceptance of work 
shadowing, with little interaction offered during the day as other tasks were 
engaged upon in any spare time. 
These access arrangements led to a number of alterations in the research plans. 
The first few weeks of the fieldwork period were designed to be an induction, 
where the researcher would orientate himself with the surroundings, review 
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decisions as to what was feasible and finalise the data capture methods. Thought 
was given to the collection of data on prosecutor's reasons for their mode of trial 
recommendations. While this information was usually available on the file this 
was frequently brief and of little assistance. Case interviews with prosecutors 
were contemplated but access problems were identified. While it was quickly 
apparent that some prosecutors would be free with their time to explore reasons 
for decisions, others would be virtually impossible to track down for this sort of 
discussion on a regular basis. This would lead to a skew in the sample, thereby 
questioning the validity of any data collected. Most importantly, however, the 
discussions with those prosecutors most willing to give their time suggested that 
these sorts of interviews would yield little information. Most mode of trial 
recommendations were seen as mundane and unworthy of discussion. 
Prosecutors seemed unable to verbalise adequately their reasons and instead 
suggested decision making was similar to the proverbial elephant; they could not 
describe it but they. would know it when they saw it. Any idea of interviewing 
prosecutors on individual decisions was therefore rejected as not feasible and 
unproductive. 
Given the problems encountered with gaining the co-operation of some 
individual CPS prosecutors in the favourable context of being based there, the 
opportunity constantly to develop working relationships, and the support of the 
Chief Crown Prosecutor, it was also decided that gaining the co-operation of 
defence solicitors and defendants was also impractical and probably of limited 
value. In some respects, defence solicitors seemed even busier at court than 
prosecutors and clearly would not be available during court hours for 
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consultation. 114 Problems were also identified in requesting interviews of 
defendants as it was expected that they would simply wish to leave the court 
premises at the earliest opportunity. Moreover, the focus of the research study for 
practical and theoretical reasons had to stay with the prosecution. The best 
method of analysing defence choices would necessitate case tracking, already 
jettisoned as unfeasible. 
The final decision makers, magistrates, were also rejected as possible interview 
subjects for focused interviews on particular decisions. It was made clear that 
access would not be granted for work of this sort. Practicalities thereby led to the 
rejection of case focused interviews as a research method. 
General interviews were also rejected both for theoretical and practical reasons. 
The theoretical reasons will be explored later. 1 15 On a practical level, as 
explained above, it was doubtful the extent to which worthwhile data could be 
collected from such a method and the data collection period had extended way 
past what was expected. After the initial orientation period, data collection was 
commenced in the Narey administrative courts. 116 The initial high frequency of 
mode of trial hearings in these courts led to some inflated estimations of the 
number of hearings it would be possible to observe as part of the fieldwork 
process. A high number of cases were observed in these courts and the 
114 Even if some defence solicitors were available, talking to them during court hours would 
necessitate ceasing direct observation of the courtroom resulting in missed cases. 
115 See section 5.3. 
116 These "Early First Hearing", and "Early Administrative Hearing" courts resulted from the 
Narey Report (Home Office, 1997b) and were part of a number of administrative reforms that 
were designed to reduce delays within the criminal justice system Defendants are now expected 
to appear in court days after charge and in court cases are separated depending upon their 
characteristics. Expected early guilty pleas for cases that are within the powers of magistrates' 
courts are handled by a designated case worker (rather than a CPS prosecutor) while a CPS 
prosecutor processes all other cases. These courts were, in effect, `plea courts'. 
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observation then moved into the custody courts so as to give a balanced sample. 
However, most of the business of custody courts consisted of bail applications, 
whereas the Narey courts contained a relatively high number of mode of trial 
decisions. It was in the custody courts that long periods of time could be spent 
observing court business with no mode of trial decisions being taken. This dead 
time is unavoidable in court observation but resulted in less time being available 
for alternative methods. Finally, the move to another court site with a general 
mix of court business and only two days of administrative hearings per week 
(unusually completed in the morning sitting) further elongated the research 
process. While such court observation was a necessary part of the process, the 
early optimistic estimates as to what was possible were unfounded, resulting in a 
longer fieldwork period than expected. Thankfully, the theoretical approach 
developed while in the field favoured direct court observation; interviews were 
therefore deemed to be impractical, methodologically less important (see the next 
section) and theoretically unnecessary. 
When initially considering methods, it was naively assumed that court records 
would be available on the mode of trial decision and that these would therefore 
be analysed. Such records were not available and the records taken by the CPS 
were also problematic. The recording by the CPS of this information was patchy 
at best with any reasons for the decision not being adequately recorded. 
Before an explicit description of the methods actually used, methodological 
problems need to be addressed, in addition to an examination of the impact of the 
163 
theoretical approach on the research question and viability of data collection 
methods. 
5.4 Theoretical expansion and limitation 
The theoretical approach to the research developed in Chapter 4 places the mode 
of trial hearing within the multifaceted context of the setting of the magistrates' 
court. By highlighting the theory of social domains, Chapter 4 suggests that 
interaction can be understood on a number of different levels and an appreciation 
of this expands the research project; a project that was limited to a legal 
understanding of the mode of trial hearing would focus upon the interplay of 
different legal factors (and maybe some `extra-legal' factors) on the mode of trial 
decision. The theory of social domains suggests that such a legal approach would 
produce a limited understanding of the interaction. However, while the 
theoretical approach suggests an expansion in research variables, it also limits the 
range of viable methods. By focusing upon the interaction as the intersection of 
the four social domains, this suggests an important role for naturally occurring 
data. While interviews and simulations may offer justifications for, or after the 
event rationalisations of, behaviour, they do not evaluate social interaction in 
situ. In short, the theoretical approach suggested court observation as a method 
best designed to capture naturally occurring interaction as it happened. Methods 
of textual analysis would then offer themselves as being appropriate to decode 
the data within the text such as conversational analysis, discourse analysis or 
narrative analysis (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996; Silverman, 2000). 
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5.5 Methodology 
5.5.1 Interview data 
As has already been highlighted, interviews were not pursued due to practical 
and methodological considerations. Turning to methodology, within the literature 
it is possible to discern three different approaches to interview data; positivism, 
interactionism and ethnomethodology. 
Positivism sees the social sciences as akin to the natural sciences. While practical 
scientific experiments generate facts about the world, positivists see interviews 
as giving access to the social world. Interviews are seen adequately to describe 
social facts and beliefs about the world and the interviewee is conceived as an 
object, a vessel from which the truth can be extracted through skilful 
interviewing. Interview techniques therefore need to be standardised in order for 
generalisations to be made from data, and the interviewer must take care to avoid 
distorting the data gathered or misrepresenting the research object through the 
operation of internal biases. 
Interactionism, meanwhile, focuses upon the interview situation; the interview is 
regarded as a symbolic interaction between the interviewer and interviewee that 
can only be understood in the wider context that situates the interview. The 
interview is a site whereby both participants construct the social world. 
Interactionism therefore regards interview data, not as a window for viewing (the 
positivistic approach), but as a joint construction of the actors as influenced by a 
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wider context. This suggests a degree of relativism to interviews; generalising 
from interview data may not be appropriate as the interview is only meaningful 
in the context of the particular interaction leading to problems of reliability. 
Rather than displaying a concern with these issues, researchers in this tradition 
emphasise the obtaining of "intersubjective depth" and the mutual understanding 
of participants (Silverman, 1985: 162). However, the desire to achieve mutual 
understanding, coupled with validity concerns (such as triangulation), leads an 
interactionist to acknowledge an approach that sees the interview process as a 
data collection exercise that can be improved by allowing the interviewee to 
describe the world in their own terms. This seems to be questionable as 
consistency would require that the interview data be seen not as giving access to 
social facts, but rather as a joint product of the particular interaction that 
constituted the interview. 
Ethnomethodology, on the other hand, considers interview data not as a window 
on the world or as a resource but rather as a topic. This focus is not upon what 
facts can be gleaned from the interview, nor upon finding the truth, but rather 
upon how members jointly produce the interview. The interview is important 
only in so far as it is a different example of how conversational practices are 
made real. The focus for conversation analysts, for instance, is upon the rules that 
operate during an interaction. While ethnomethodology displays how 
conversationalists are constrained by informal rules and expectations and how 
any interaction is framed by these rules, there are problems associated with this 
approach. As the focus is upon the achievement by members of the joint 
construction of an interaction, there can be a loss of focus upon the content of the 
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interaction (Silverman, 1985). Ethnomethodology fails to observe the influence 
of social structure on interactions. Instead, ethnomethodologists simply marvel at 
the achievement of members in the joint construction of conversations. 
Interviews can be viewed as both a resource and a topic. They allow access to 
conversational practices and attest to "the display of cultural particulars 
expressing variable social practices" (Silverman, 1985: 170). Given the 
theoretical concerns of this research project and the asserted view of courtroom 
interaction as a multi-faceted phenomenon, then consistency requires that the 
interview be seen, not as a window upon the world that helps to provide data 
about the social world, but rather as a focused interaction that can be viewed 
from the four different social domains. If the theory of social domains is relevant 
to interviews as an interaction then this suggests a limited role for the interview. 
While the product of the interview may well leave traces of the psychology of the 
participants and the contextual resources that they bring, a more appropriate 
research method would be one that turned directly to the phenomenon that is the 
focus of the research; the mode of trial hearing. Rather than relying upon second 
order descriptions of the mode of trial hearing that may well say more about the 
circumstances of that particular interaction, a direct focus upon the mode of trial 
hearing will allow an immediate focus upon how the four social domains 
influence the courtroom process. This is best done through observation. 
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5.5.2 Observation 
The theory of social domains gives an indication of how the social world of the 
magistrates' court is imbued with cultural meaning. The observational research 
technique allows some access to this world. Through an analysis of the language 
used within the courtroom, it is possible to observe the cultural meanings 
constructed therein and therefore court culture: 
The concept of culture that I espouse is essentially a semiotic one. Believing that man is 
an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be 
those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of 
law but an interpretive one in search of meaning (Geertz, 1993: 5). 
Although Geertz writes within the discipline of anthropology, a conception of 
culture as "webs of significance" equally attaches to differing social worlds 
within heterogeneous societies; "the experience of the stranger is not restricted to 
those moving in a different society" (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995: 9). 
Indeed, given the concern with law as a semi-autonomous social system or as a 
discrete discourse (although linked to other discourses), it is appropriate to view 
the observer of legal practice as an anthropological stranger. What is therefore 
required is a qualitative approach in which: 
The emphasis is not upon determinism and causality but upon the way in which social 
meanings, definitions and labels are generated and applied within social interactions and 
social processes. It is only by grasping the way in which individuals define situations, 
events and others' actions, and also the way in which such definitions frame and 
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influence their own and subsequent actions, that we can gain some understanding of how 
social reality is constructed (Jupp, 1989: 30). 
Ethnography lends itself to such an analysis; through the observation of actors 
within their natural setting an attempt can be made to describe their social world 
and the means by which actors make sense of that world. Such an approach 
borrows heavily from interactionist sociology that, as described above, 
emphasises the constructed nature of the social world. This implies that research 
should concern the methods by which actors attribute meaning to actions and 
interpret the world in addition to understanding how members joint/v construct 
social spaces, and this in turn leads to a preference for natural settings for the 
data collection process. 
The interactionist movement, however, fails to recognise the socially constructed 
nature of the research process (Silverman, 1985). There is a distinct 
unwillingness to apply these theoretical insights gleaned from interactionist 
sociology to the research process; the adoption of methods triangulation and the 
belief that research subjects can be captured in their natural setting is evidence of 
an underlying belief that there is an objective reality - something out there - that 
can be measured, described and analysed (Silverman, 1985; Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 1995). The adoption of the initial insights when thinking about 
research would lead to a different approach to research data: 
Truth is a matter of perspective, and perspectives are a byproduct of social interchange 
or `discourse'. One's language about the world operates as the lens that construes the 
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world into something not simply `out there'. It is an interactive process. The `observer' 
and `observed' are in constant dialogue (Krippner and Winkler, 1996: 159). 
In a like manner, Geertz identifies how anthropological writings (and therefore 
social scientific descriptions of culture) are second order constructions of "other 
people's constructions of what they and their counterparts are up to" (Geertz, 
1993: 9). As a result, he describes these as fictions, "in the sense that they are 
`something made"' (ibid: 15). While at first glance this may suggest an 
apocalyptic vision of research, it is not necessary to abandon the research 
process; it merely demands that the researcher be both aware of the problem and 
be constantly reflexive about her work: 
In our everyday activities we rely on presuppositions about the world, few of which we 
have subjected to test, and none of which we could fully test. Most of the time this does 
not and should not trouble us, and social research is no different from other activities in 
this respect (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995: 18). 
As much as is possible, researchers should examine the assumptions and 
presumptions that are brought to the research process; the researcher should 
always be aware that the process of interpretation is embedded in their socio- 
historical context. Naturally, there are some presuppositions that are so deeply 
embedded in culture and so taken for granted that the researcher will overlook 
them. This is still not a sufficient reason to abandon research; even though 
absolute objectivity is illusory - otherwise, in the words of Geertz, the researcher 
would lack culture - the research process still has merit: 
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I have never been impressed by the argument that, as complete objectivity is impossible 
in these matters (as of course it is), one might as well let one's sentiments run loose. As 
Robert Solow has remarked, that is like saying that as a perfectly aseptic environment is 
impossible, one might as well conduct surgery in a sewer (Geertz, 1993: 30). 
Researchers in the interactionist tradition emphasise the use of data and method 
triangulation so as to gain a fuller picture of the research object. By focusing 
upon the problem in many different ways, such as direct observation, interviews, 
surveys etc., the researcher is believed to improve the internal validity of the 
project by comparing the result of one method with another. For instance, by 
contrasting interview responses with direct observation in the natural setting, the 
researcher is able to juxtapose what was said against what happened. This, 
however, is problematic in that "[u]nderlying this suggestion is, ironically, once 
more, elements of a positivist frame of reference which assumes a single 
(undefined) reality and treats accounts as multiple mappings of this reality" 
(Silverman, 1985: 105). A more consistent approach would be to acknowledge 
the socially constructed nature of data sets from different methods; each method 
will therefore only make sense in the context in which it was utilised. But to 
return to Geertz, this does not mean that the research process should be 
abandoned, only that the researcher should be reflexive about the methods 
utilised. 
5.6 Methods 
As was indicated earlier, the fieldwork process took many twists and turns and 
finally resulted in a prolonged period of direct observation of mode of trial 
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hearings. The fieldwork stage was initialised on 6 March 2001 with a short 
orientation period that mainly consisted of shadowing CPS prosecutors and 
caseworkers within the magistrates' court. Most magistrates' court work was 
observed so as to gain an overall impression of the work of a CPS prosecutor. 
Prosecutors and caseworkers were also shadowed in the local City police station 
where files were reviewed and prosecutors were on hand to offer early advice to 
police officers on difficult cases. In total, 12 prosecutors were shadowed in the 
City Court and 9 in the County magistrates' court. Occasionally, agents would 
appear on behalf of the prosecution. During the fieldwork process the data 
capture forms prepared before entry to the field were amended after a short 
testing period and the final details of the fieldwork process were determined. The 
final data capture forms are attached as an appendix. The research was always 
designed to include two different court centres and the final venue allowed for 
the observation of two courts in one CPS area. The majority of the fieldwork was 
spent within the City Court; 70 mode of trial hearings were observed in this 
court. 
Initially, the CPS prosecutor was shadowed at the local police station in the 
morning when she reviewed the files for the Narey hearing conducted that 
afternoon. This enabled a detailed observation of the review process, an 
opportunity for informal discussion on the work of the prosecutor and the mode 
of trial decisions to be observed that afternoon, and a chance to inspect the 
prosecutors' files for the court hearing that afternoon. Detailed note taking of the 
prosecution case was therefore possible and also enabled a comparison between 
the case constructed by the police and that presented in court by the prosecution. 
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As access was given to the prosecution file, detailed notes were taken on data 
capture forms with a specific focus upon the witness statements. Additionally. 
other information was gathered on each case, such as the age of the defendant, 
the date of offence, arrest and charge, the extent of legal representation, the 
defendant's ethnic minority, both as it was stated on the file and appeared in 
court, the offences charged, the date of the first court appearance, the reviewer's 
comments on the mode of trial decision, any comments that the prosecutor made 
on the mode of trial decision to the researcher and the defendant's previous 
convictions. Additionally, the form left space for general comments. A further 
data capture form was constructed in order to link with this form and record data 
on the mode of trial hearing. This form recorded the representations of the 
prosecutor and defence solicitor, as well as recording the date of the court 
appearance, the plea entered, any decision on mode of trial, whether the victim 
consented to summary trial (if given the option) and the decision of the 
magistrate. It also recorded the name of the prosecutor and whether the bench 
was a lay bench or a District Judge, and if it was a District Judge, his or her 
name. A daily research diary was also kept to facilitate data collection. The diary 
was designed to record general observations about the court process and the 
researchers feelings as to the fieldwork process and overall progress. The diary 
was particularly important in the early stages of the research when it was utilised 
to record what were seen as novel features of the courts researched and the 
thoughts of the researcher on mode of trial and other, more general, topics. 
In the early stages of the fieldwork process it was not unusual to observe a high 
number of mode of trial hearings; the Narey courts were in effect plea courts 
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with the majority of defendants entering pleas at the first court hearing. Another 
court was also observed where cases adjourned from the Narey courts were 
heard. However, all of the administrative courts observed in the early stages of 
analysis concerned defendants remanded on bail. An important sample of cases 
was being excluded; custodial remands. As a result, after a sufficient sample of 
cases were observed in these administrative courts (53), "7 the research moved to 
a custody court. It was initially thought that a similar number of cases would be 
observed in the custody courts. However, the main focus for these courts was 
bail applications and as a result there were significantly fewer mode of trial 
hearings than expected. On more than one occasion, a whole week could be 
spend observing court business with no mode of trial hearings taking place. As a 
consequence, this stage of the fieldwork was terminated after the collection of 70 
cases in total. ' 18 While there were fewer mode of trial hearings observed with the 
defendant(s) remanded in custody than initially expected, the original plans 
would have led to an overrepresentation of defendants in custody, as the vast 
majority of defendants are granted bail. In total, six months were spent in the 
City Court. 
The next stage was the rather different environment of the County Court. The 
administrative court met only three times a week and the listed business was 
expected to be completed in the morning. While this had its advantages - all of 
the relevant cases were in one court only (there was no split between custody and 
1 17 The initial plan was to observe 50 cases in the administrative bail courts, but on the final day 
the numbers of cases observed increased the figure to 53. 
118 Of the 17 cases observed in the custody courts, two concerned defendants who were remanded 
on bail rather than in custody. As a result, therefore, the sample of 70 cases consisted of 15 cases 
where the defendant(s) was remanded in custody and a further 55 where the defendant(s) was 
remanded on bail. 
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bail courts) - it was slow going. The administrative courts here dealt with all 
administrative matters including traffic offences, pre-trial reviews, bail 
applications and sentencing hearings, in addition to the mode of trial hearing. 
Once again, mode of trial hearings were infrequently observed. Nevertheless, the 
fieldwork process resulted in the collection of data on a further 30 mode of trial 
hearings over a three month period, resulting in a total sample of 100 cases. The 
fieldwork period was completed on 31 October 2001. 
5.7 Analysis 
5.7.1 An introduction to narrative analysis 
During the fieldwork period it became apparent how administrative hearings, and 
in particular mode of trial hearings, failed to follow the structural regularities 
identified by Atkinson and Drew (1979). Atkinson and Drew approached the 
courtroom process from the perspective of conversation analysis. This led, inter 
alia, to a concern with how adjacency pairs, such as question-answer, operated 
within the specialist setting of the courtroom. The mode of trial hearing, 
however, followed a different regularity; the prosecutor delivered what appeared 
to be a standard statement followed by a brief statement from the defence 
solicitor 119 and a decision by the bench. ' 20 This suggested that, not only was the 
prosecutor's statement the main thrust of the hearing, but this followed a regular 
pattern, not unlike a narrative. In short, the prosecutor seemed to be telling a 
highly regulated story. 
19 Usually indicating that she had no observations to make. 
''" This decision was usually presented without the giving of reasons. 
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This observation resulted in a search for a tool that would adequately examine 
the narratives delivered by prosecutors. Narrative analysis seemed the ideal 
answer as it helps to examine "the ways in which social actors produce, 
represent, and contextualise experience and personal knowledge through 
narratives and other genres" (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996: 54). Narrative analysis 
presented itself as a fruitful line of inquiry given that it so clearly correlated with 
the natural state of the data collected in the mode of trial hearing. In other words, 
if it appeared that the prosecutor was in the business of telling stories, it made 
perfect sense to analyse these stories and consider how they reflected the 
categories and assumptions important to prosecutors. 
Narrative analysis also seemed a useful tool for other reasons; most qualitative 
data is analysed through the use of data coding, resulting in a fragmentation of 
the data. The selection from qualitative data of discrete episodes is used in the 
process of theory building and testing. The data set is trawled for similar 
occurrences that confirm or challenge the theory, thereby leading to constant 
theory re-evaluation. However, this process removes from view the creative work 
of human actors involved in the construction of meaningful utterances. The 
coding of data into theoretical concepts may provide insights into how these 
reappear throughout the dataset, but this is at the cost of observing how they 
operate in situ, in the context of the interaction in which they are located. 
Narrative analysis provides a means by which the oral practices of the courtroom 
participants can be examined in totality. This is all the more important when it is 
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acknowledged that the prosecutor's statement is an attempt to influence the court 
and is constructed as a meaningful whole. 
The decision to explore narrative analysis led to the dilemma of selecting an 
appropriate method of analysis. The most appropriate method for analysing 
narrative structure seemed to be the evaluation model developed by Labov 
(1977). 121 Labov suggested that narratives share a number of common features. 
At their most basic, narratives consist of a sequence of at least two narrative 
clauses that chronologically describe a series of events. While there must be two 
narrative clauses at a minimum, it is usual to encounter much more than two. In 
short, narratives usually have a beginning, middle and end. Next, narratives 
address a number of potential questions; the substance of any narrative answers 
these questions before the audience asks them. Finally, a common narrative 
structure can be identified with different sections performing different tasks and 
addressing different questions. This evaluation model was selected as the starting 
point for the data analysis as it appeared to provide a useful entry point into the 
data. The formal narrative structure developed by Labov was used as an aid to 
examine the themes and structure of courtroom narratives. 
Before a detailed examination of narrative analysis is conducted, it should also 
be pointed out that this was not the only method by which the data was analysed. 
The data captured from the fieldwork was also subjected to a mainstream 
qualitative analysis with the data coded and then compared to see if any general 
trends could be identified. Additionally, the data was also subjected to a simple 
'21 For further methods of evaluating narrative see Cortazzi (1991 and 1993) and Riessman 
(1993). 
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quantitative analysis to identify whether there were any obvious trends within the 
data set. This is explained further in Chapter 6 where the data is analysed in this 
way. 
5.7.2 Narrative structure 
Labov suggested six elements that may be present in a narrative; these are 
presented below. However, while a complete narrative may consist of all six 
parts to the structure, they are not necessarily required. As explained earlier, all 
that is required are two narrative clauses. 
The Abstract: This is the optional introduction that encapsulates the nub 
of the narrative. It also creates a space whereby the narrator makes it clear 
that a narrative will be delivered thereby suspending usual turn taking 
conversation conventions. 
The Orientation: This sets the scene and provides answers to questions 
such as `who', `what', `when' and `where? ' 
The Complication: This is the main text of the narrative; it addresses the 
question, `what happened? ' 
The Evaluation: This informs the audience of the rationale of the 
narrative and addresses the question, `so what? ' 
The Result: This section may precede or follow the evaluation and is 
intended as an answer to the question, 'what finally happened? ' 
The Coda: This informs the audience that the narrative is at an end. Oral 
narration, as explained above, involves the narrator, through the abstract, 
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creating the space for storytelling and the suspension of conversation 
conventions. The coda operates so as to notify the audience that the story 
has ended and the usual turn taking conventions are reinstated. 
Each of these elements is addressed to an, as yet unasked, question. For instance, 
the evaluation addresses the question, `so what? ' When we tell stories, we do so 
in order to make a point, address a concern or illustrate an argument. It is clear 
that narratives need to address this question from the response seen when stories 
fail to explain their pertinence to the interaction in which they are placed. One 
just has to think of a social situation where someone tells a story and the 
audience either misinterpret the thrust of the narrative or fail to understand; it 
creates a tumbleweed moment where everyone feels the embarrassment of an 
inappropriate intervention. Good stories avoid such awkward social situations by 
addressing these questions before they are asked. 
So as to illustrate the fit between Labov's evaluation model and the comments 
from the prosecutor in the mode of trial hearing, what follows is a fictional 
example of a mode of trial hearing: 
Abstract 
Prosecutor: Well Sir, as far as mode of trial is concerned the prosecution say that this 
matter is not suitable for summary trial. 
Orientation 
Your worships, the complainant and the defendant in this case are strangers and the 
incident took place outside of Stringfields nightclub. The complainant indicates that she 
was having a night out with friends and was leaving the club and on her way home. 
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Complication 
She says that the defendant walked up to her and her friends and started shouting. He 
suddenly lunged towards her and punched her once to the face. 
Result 
She says she was taken to Cityville General Hospital where she received treatment for a 
broken nose. 
Analysis 
Your worships, taking the prosecution case at its highest, they're not known to each 
other, and of course it's the town centre in a nightclub and we have, on the face of it, 
unprovoked violence. On balance, albeit that the complainant was struck only once... 
Coda 
I would have to suggest that your sentencing powers are insufficient. 
Defence Solicitor: No observations your worship. 
Chair of the Bench: Very well, we decline jurisdiction. 
While this is a fictional example, it is in some respects a typical mode of trial 
hearing. The prosecutor opens with a very brief abstract pointing out her 
recommendation. This answers the question, `what is this all about? ' The 
orientation is also brief; this provides information that allows the events in the 
narrative to be given some form of context. The complication is the main body of 
the narrative, and therefore the most important, as it contains the narrative 
clauses that describe what happened. Narrative clauses, according to Labov, are 
those that chronologically arrange the series of events that occurred some time in 
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the past (1977). In other words, this is where the prosecutor describes what was 
alleged to have taken place. The result follows; this addresses the question, 
4 what finally happened? ' In mode of trial hearings for violent offences, the result 
performs one of the tasks of the evaluation in that the prosecutor, as part of the 
result, describes the injuries sustained by the victim as a result of the assault. As 
the level of injury influences the trial venue decision, this information inevitably 
plays a role in the evaluation of the allegations; hence the evaluative function in 
the result. Following the result is the evaluation that answers the question, 'so 
what? ' The evaluation, similar to other narrative features but at the same time 
more so, needs to be understood in the context of the narrative performance site; 
narratives are "situated within a particular interaction and within specific social, 
cultural and institutional discourses" (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996). The mode of 
trial hearing is not simply an opportunity for storytelling; the narrative must be 
embedded within the legal process that is taking place and must therefore be 
constructed with an eye to the mode of trial decision. The analysis is focusing 
upon central aspects of what happened; these are the aspects that are important 
for the legal process. The analysis is therefore an important tool in understanding 
the cultural categories of the courtroom actors, and in the context of mode of trial 
decisions, shows the factors that are seen as important in making this decision. 
Within this example, the prosecutor examines the unprovoked nature of the 
assault, the relationship (or lack of) between the parties and the fact that the 
assault took place in the city centre at night. Finally, the narrative ends with a 
coda where the prosecutor repeats her recommendation. 
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The vocal contributions of the defence solicitor and the chair of the bench are 
typically short and to the point; defence solicitors usually remain silent in the 
mode of trial hearing whilst magistrates rarely give reasons for their decisions. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
"TWO PUNCHES AND A PUSH" IN A "SAUSAGE MACHINE": 
DECIDING VENUE IN THE COURT, 
THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE DECISION 
6.1 Introduction 
While much has been said about the importance of both macro and micro 
sociological explanations in the previous chapters, these approaches must be seen 
as supplemental to an examination of the legal basis of the decision. The thesis 
has so far explained the mode of trial hearing (and interactions in general) as 
multifaceted with many nuances and different levels of depth. One of these 
levels, for the purposes of the thesis, has to be the legal nature of the decision. 
Hence we need to be concerned with legally relevant case factors, the "two 
punches and a push", 122 and how these operate with the courtroom or "sausage 
machine". 1 23 The legal dynamics of the process will therefore be examined 
before an analysis of how the different social domains impact upon the process. 
However, before this work can be presented, we should start with an observation 
of some general trends in the data, through a brief quantitative analysis. 
122 One prosecutor openly justified in court the reduction of a section 47 assault to a common 
assault, on the basis that an assault that consisted of "two punches and a push" should not lead to 
the possibility of the defendant electing Crown Court trial. 
123 Another prosecutor was keen to describe the courtroom, and the legal process, as akin to a 
"sausage machine", and placed his work within the context of this metaphor; what others might 
term conveyor-belt justice. 
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6.2 Counting the cases 
This quantitative analysis will be by no means extensive; the main thrust of the 
thesis suggests a qualitative approach that captures data in situ. However, while 
numerical analysis may disguise the nuances to be found in any qualitative 
analysis, it is still useful to begin with a brief examination of general trends that 
can help situate the qualitative analysis. 
6.2.1 Counting practices 
The counting has been completed on the basis of cases. So, where more than one 
defendant appeared in a mode of trial hearing, if her case was presented as a 
coherent whole, this has been counted as one case. However, not all mode of trial 
hearings equate with cases; while some mode of trial hearings concerned 
multiple offences, these were usually presented as one course of conduct and the 
court therefore had to make one decision. However, there were cases when the 
prosecution would present discrete courses of conduct within one mode of trial 
hearing and request that the bench make separate decisions. These, for obvious 
reasons, have been analysed as different cases. Finally, there were occasions 
when the alleged events formed the basis of more than one hearing; either a 
different defendant could appear in court on different days for the same (joint) 
offence, or the same defendant could face two mode of trial hearings for the 
same event if the prosecution amended the charges after the mode of trial 
hearing. As these hearings in all cases concerned the same alleged events, these 
were counted as multiple hearings within the same case. 
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For the purposes of analysis, cases have been grouped together into offence 
categories, such as, inter alia, offences against the person, public order offences 
or dishonesty offences. However, in making this categorisation, there were some 
hearings where, for instance, the defendant was charged with an offence against 
the person and a dishonesty offence. For these cases, it was frequently difficult to 
make any decision as to whether or not the case belonged to one category rather 
than another. As a result, such cases have been included in both offence 
categories; the statistical data therefore has some instances of double, or even 
treble counting. 
When categorising the ethnic origin of defendants, information was gathered 
from the case file and then later verified by court observation. In some cases, this 
information would be unclear, as the front file sheet would state one ethnic 
grouping, while the charge sheet would indicate another. For some cases, this 
could be resolved in the courtroom by direct observation but this was not always 
possible. As a result, the ethnic category "other" also includes these unclear 
cases. 
Finally, it is important to note that offences of shop theft were excluded from the 
sample. It quickly became clear in the initial orientation period that shop theft 
was treated as a mundane event. Mode of trial decisions for shop theft followed 
(in all but one case that has been included in the sample) a similar pattern. The 
following example taken from the research diary shows the routine character of 
mode of trial hearings for shop theft: 
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[The pre-prepared plea before venue statement is read in court and the defendant offers a 
plea of not guilty. ] 
District Judge: Suitable for summary trial isn't it? 
Prosecutor: Suitable for... ... Yes. 
'24 
As the main thrust of the research concerns the nature of courtroom interaction, 
there was little need to collect data on such cases; while the mundane character 
of these hearings offers some theoretical insights, the effort needed to continue 
collecting such commonplace data was regarded as unnecessary. While this is 
justified given the nature of the analysis, it does create problems for the initial 
quantitative analysis that has been conducted. As these cases are invariably 
deemed suitable for summary trial, there is therefore a bias in the data collected 
towards more serious cases. However, given the nature of the evidence collected 
(CCTV and direct observation), most defendants charged with shop theft pleaded 
guilty; few shop theft cases were therefore excluded from the sample. 
6.2.2 Trends 
Table 4 provides data on the whole sample, separated into the City and County 
sample. 
124 Taken from the fieldwork diary for 22 May 2001. 
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Table 4: All cases 
Total Directed Magistrates Defendant Cases sent Agreement'" Defendant Magistrates' 
to Crown retain elects to Crown elections''' direction''' 
Court jurisdiction Court 
All 100 57 57% 43 43% 9 9% 66 66% 96 96% 21% 86°o 
City 70 44 63% 26 37% 8 11% 52 74% 66 94% 31% 850,6 
County 30 13 43% 17 57% 1 3% 14 47% 30 100% 6% 9306 
The majority of cases in the sample were either deemed too serious for the 
magistrates' court or the defendant elected. Overall, magistrates decided to retain 
jurisdiction in only 43 percent of cases, although this figure masks a substantial 
variation between the City and County Court. In the City Court, the bench 
accepted jurisdiction in 37 percent of cases compared to 57 percent in the County 
Court. The combination of not suitable for summary trial decisions and elections 
resulted in 66 percent of cases in the sample (and 74 percent in the City sample) 
progressing towards committal proceedings. These figures need to be explained. 
Criminal Statistics for the year 2001 showed that 12 percent of persons 
proceeded against for either way offences were committed to the Crown Court 
for trial. 128 This large discrepancy between official statistics and the research 
findings is due to a number of different reasons. Firstly, not all cases in the 
sample where the defendant elected or the magistrates declined jurisdiction 
would have been committed to the Crown Court. The defendant may have 
changed their plea before committal proceedings or the case against the 
defendant may have been discontinued. 129 Secondly, the sample did not include 
125 This column, in this Table and all subsequent Tables, shows the proportion of magistrates' 
decisions that accorded with the recommendation of the prosecutor. 
126 This column, in this Table and all subsequent Tables, shows the proportion of defendants who 
were given the option and elected Crown Court trial. 
$27 This column, in this Table and all subsequent Tables, shows the proportion of all cases 
directed to the Crown Court because the magistrates declined jurisdiction. 
128 See Table 3 above. 
$29 The institution of the Narey Reforms occurred before the initiation of the fieldwork and these 
may well have impacted upon the likelihood of cases actually being committed to the Crown 
Court. A number of prosecutors suggested that the reforms have resulted in committal 
proceedings being the only real opportunity for thorough review of the case. While Crown 
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guilty pleas that are the norm for hearings in the magistrates' court. ' 30 Finally, 
the sample excludes shop theft that in most cases would either result in a guilty 
plea or be deemed suitable for summary trial. 
In the sample, the bench made a decision at odds with the prosecution in only 
four cases and these were all in the City sample. This level of agreement (96 
percent) is comparable to that reported by Riley and Vennard (94.2 percent). 
Interestingly, the bench did not disagree with the recommendation of the 
prosecutor in any of the County cases. Additionally, three of the four 
disagreements occurred when the prosecutor made a firm or borderline 
recommendation that the case was suitable for summary trial only for the bench 
to decline jurisdiction. Only on one occasion did the bench accept jurisdiction 
when the prosecutor recommended that the case was not suitable for summary 
trial. This suggests that, if the bench are to disagree with the recommendation of 
the prosecutor, they are more willing to decline jurisdiction in the face of a 
suitable for summary trial recommendation, although care must be taken when 
drawing such conclusions given the small number of cases involved. 
The only other statistic of note in the figures, is the rate of elections in the 
County sample. Of those defendants given a choice as to jurisdiction, only 6 
percent in the County sample elected Crown Court trial. Within the City sample, 
Prosecutors acknowledged that theoretically they were placed under an obligation of ongoing 
review, that is initiated upon receipt of the case, working pressures affect the discharge of this 
obligation. 
130 The relevant table in Criminal Statistics for 2001 (Home Office, 2002a) (Table 6.2) suggests 
that out of 993,300 hearings, 82.2 percent (816,500) resulted in a guilty plea. However, cases 
committed for trial and other outcomes such as discontinued cases are not counted in the 993,300 
hearings. Counting these other hearings gives a total of 1,395,800 hearings and guilty pleas are 
therefore received in 58.5 percent of all hearings in the magistrates' courts. 
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31 percent of all defendants given the option elected Crown Court trial. The final 
column in Table 4 shows the proportion of cases where the magistrates declined 
jurisdiction as opposed to the defendant electing (excluding cases where the 
bench accepted jurisdiction and the defendant consented to summary trial). These 
figures (86 percent overall, 85 percent for the City sample and 93 percent for the 
County sample) suggest that the magistrates were heavily responsible for the 
progression of cases towards committal proceedings. Figures from the CPS for 
instance, suggested that in 2001-2002,71 percent of all either way cases were 
committed to the Crown Court because the bench declined jurisdiction. ' 31 
Hedderman and Moxon (1992) noted a figure of 59 percent while Riley and 
Vennard (1988) noted 40 percent. This may be explained on the basis that, in 
attempting to gain a theoretically balanced sample, the research methods resulted 
in an over collection of serious cases. Time was spent in the custody courts in 
order to account for a hunch that custody cases would be regarded as more 
serious than bail cases. 132 This was largely confirmed in Tables 5 and 6. 
Table 5: Defendant on bail 
Total Directed to Magistrates Defendant Cases sent Agreement Defendant Magistrates' 
Crown retain elects to Crown elections direction 
Court jurisdiction Court 
All 79 41 52% 38 48% 8 10% 49 62% 76 96% 21% 84% 
City 55 33 60% 22 40% 7 13% 40 73% 52 95% 32% 83% 
County 24 8 33% 16 67% 1 4% 9 38% 24 100% 6% 8 9% 
"' See Table 2 above. 
"`' This was only ever thought to be a rough and ready guide; the requirements at the time for 
refusing bail (a risk of committing further offences on bail, a risk of witness intimidation and a 
risk of failing to surrender to bail) are not necessarily linked to offence seriousness. 
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Table 6: Defendant remanded in custody 
Total Directed to Magistrates Defendant Cases sent Agreement Defendant Magistrates' 
Crown retain elects to Crown elections direction 
Court jurisdiction Court 
All 21 16 76% 5 24% 1 5% 17 81% 20 95% 20% 94°o 
City 15 11 73% 4 27% 1 7% 12 80% 14 93% 25% 92% 
County 6 5 83% 1 17% -- 5 83% 6 100% - 100% 
There is a clear difference in the decisions of magistrates between bail and 
custody cases. Overall, magistrates would decline jurisdiction in 52 percent of 
bail cases as opposed to 76 percent of custody cases. The greatest differentiation 
is between bail and custody cases in the County sample. Only 33 percent of bail 
cases in the County sample were directed to the Crown Court while 83 percent of 
custody cases were directed to the Crown Court. 
Table 5 assists the analysis above on the percentage of cases going to the Crown 
Court because the magistrate declined jurisdiction. One potential problem 
highlighted with the sample is the possible preponderance of more serious cases 
through an over-representation of custody cases. However, for all bail cases, 
magistrates were responsible for 84 percent of cases that were progressed 
towards committal proceedings compared to the CPS figures of 71 percent for all 
cases. Therefore, even the least serious cases display a higher proportion of cases 
going to the Crown Court on the direction of the bench. 
Tables 7 to 10 show the figures from the sample courts divided into ethnic 
groupings. 
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Table 7: White defendants 
Total Directed to Magistrates Defendant Cases sent Agreement Defendant Magistrates' 
Crown retain elects to Crown elections direction 
Court jurisdiction Court 
All 66 36 55% 30 45% 6 90/0 42 64% 66 100% 20% 86% 
City 39 23 59% 16 41% 5 13% 28 72% 39 100% 31% 82% 
County 27 13 48% 14 52% 1 4% 14 52% 27 100% 7% 93% 
Table 8: Afro-Caribbean defendants 
Total Directed Magistrates Defendant Cases Agreement Defendant Magistrates' 
to Crown retain elects sent to elections direction 
Court jurisdiction Crown 
Court 
All 9 6 67% 3 33% - -6 67% 8 89% - 100% 
City 7 6 86% 1 14% - -6 86% 6 86% - 100% 
County 2 --2 100% - ---2 100% -- 
Table 9: Asian defendants133 
Total Directed to Magistrates Defendant Cases sent Agreement Defendant Magistrates' 
Crown retain elects to Crown elections direction 
Court jurisdiction Court 
City 18 12 67% 6 33% 2 11% 14 78% 16 89% 33% 86% 
Table 10: Defendants whose ethnic origin was either of another category or unclear134 
Total Directed Magistrates Defendant Cases Agreement Defendant Magistrates' 
to Crown retain elects sent to elections direction 
Court jurisdiction Crown 
Court 
All 62 33% 4 67% 1 17% 3 50% 6 100% 25% 67% 
City 52 40% 3 60% 1 20% 3 60% 5 100% 33% 67% 
County 1-- 1 100% ---- 1 100% - - 
These show that Afro-Caribbean and Asian defendants are more likely to have 
the bench decline jurisdiction when compared to their white counterparts. While 
this may evidence the possibility of racial discrimination, it cannot be 
conclusively established. l35 No attempt has been made to apply statistical tools, 
such as multivariate analysis, to these figures to allow for other variables. Firstly, 
133 There were no Asian Defendants in the County sample. 
134 In none of these cases was the defendant white. 
135 Two earlier studies have suggested that Afro-Caribbean defendants are more likely to have 
their cases sent to the Crown Court after the bench decline jurisdiction (Brown and Hullin, 1992; 
Jefferson and Walker, 1992). Unfortunately, both studies failed to account for alternative case 
features that may have explained the differentiation. 
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for theoretical reasons the qualitative analysis was the main focus of the research. 
Secondly, the sheer volume of potentially relevant variables, and the illusive 
nature of some of these, did not facilitate the use of such statistical analysis. For 
instance, it is not possible to quantify the influence of some of the contextual 
resources identified as important in Chapter 4. As a result, the differentiation that 
is apparent in the figures may well be the result not of discrimination, but of 
other case factors such as offence seriousness. 
Tables 11 and 12 provide a breakdown of cases on the basis of lay benches and 
District Judges. 
Table 11: Lay benches 
Total Directed to Magistrates Defendant Cases sent Agreement Defendant Magistrates' 
Crown retain elects to Crown elections direction 
Court jurisdiction Court 
All 52 30 58% 22 42% 4 8% 34 65% 50 96% 18% 88% 
City 25 17 68% 8 32% 3 12% 20 80% 23 92% 38% 85% 
County 27 13 48% 14 52% 1 4% 14 52% 27 100% 7% 93% 
Table 12: District Judges 
Total Directed Magistrates Defendant Cases sent Agreement Defendant Magistrates' 
to Crown retain elects to Crown elections direction 
Court jurisdiction Court 
All 48 27 56% 21 44% 5 10% 32 67% 46 96% 24% 84% 
City 45 27 60% 18 40% 5 11% 32 71% 43 96% 28% 84% 
County 3 -- 3 100% -- -- 3 100% - - 
While there is a degree of difference between the decisions of lay justices 
between the City and County samples, overall the decision-making practices of 
lay benches and District Judges appears to be similar. Lay benches declined 
jurisdiction in 58 percent of cases, while District Judges declined jurisdiction in 
56 percent of cases. Even removing the County sample from any analysis on the 
grounds that District Judges were too infrequent an occurrence there to aid 
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analysis, the respective figures of District Judges directing 60 percent of cases to 
the Crown Court while lay benches declined jurisdiction in 68 percent of cases, 
are not too dissimilar. Given the perception that District Judges are tougher than 
their lay counterparts (Seago et. al., 1995), it is somewhat of a surprise to find 
that a lay bench is more likely to decline jurisdiction. 136 However, the evidence 
could be interpreted as District Judges being more robust and therefore more 
likely to retain jurisdiction in serious cases. 
6.3 Legal factors 
The theoretical approach so far developed places the mode of trial hearing within 
the context of a multifaceted courtroom. However, the mode of trial hearing is 
part of a legal process. While a pure legal analysis would miss many of the 
nuances of the interaction, this is not to say that a `non-legal' approach should be 
privileged; an analysis of the operation of legal processes still has an important 
part to play in understanding the process. 
In addition to a narrative analysis conducted in Chapter 7, the data was also 
analysed in more a conventional manner. For this qualitative analysis, the data 
has been subjected to a close reading and coding and from this a number of 
conceptual categories have been identified. In particular, this has assisted in the 
identification of recurrent themes and factors within the data set leading to an 
understanding of the relevant legal factors for the decision. These will be 
examined by offence category; offences against the person will be examined 
136 However, once again it has not been possible to account for other case factors. 
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firstly followed by public order, dishonesty offences, drug, sex, driving, inchoate, 
possession and preparatory offences, criminal damage, and finally offences 
against justice. 
Before the examination of these factors, two points need to be made. Firstly, the 
factors referred to are infrequently norms or laws that will necessarily guide 
behaviour. The process by which prosecutors decide upon venue appears to be 
more of an art than a science, with hunch playing an important role. The nub of 
the problem is one of deciding seriousness; while case features may be influential 
in such a determination, the reality seems to be that intuition plays an important 
role. For instance, for part of the fieldwork process, the researcher was able to 
observe the induction of a relatively inexperienced designated caseworker. ' 37 
While she did have a legal background, she had no relevant experience. As a 
result, she was being guided in all aspects of the prosecution process including 
mode of trial. The researcher was party to a conversation where an experienced 
caseworker described the mode of trial hearing; the new caseworker was 
struggling to get to grips with the mode of trial decision. The experienced 
caseworker could do no more than reassure the caseworker that she would "get 
the hang" of the decision, as it was largely based on intuition and eventually she 
would "just know". Secondly, and related to this issue, case factors cannot be 
determinative of the mode of trial decision due to the presence of a number of 
different factors in one case. Most factors point to a suitable decision but it is not 
137 The CPS branch concerned employed three designated caseworkers to present cases in the 
City magistrates' court. The third caseworker was employed near the beginning of the fieldwork 
phase. The two established caseworkers had been with this CPS office for a considerable period 
and were therefore exceptionally experienced. Whilst some prosecutors would question the 
appropriateness of the designated caseworker, none questioned the expertise or experience of 
these two caseworkers. 
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uncommon for conflicting factors to be present in the same case; as a result of 
the factors pulling in opposite directions, the prosecutor will simply have to 
make a `judgment call' as to the balance of the factors. While some may weigh 
more than others, the possible presence of a multitude of factors suggests that 
any one factor will very rarely be absolutely determinative. 138 
Additionally, given the nature of the mode of trial hearing, 139 most of the data for 
this analysis largely originates from the representations of the prosecutor. While 
the prosecutor's recommendations cannot be totally representative of the 
decision making process of the bench, there are good reasons for accepting their 
primary importance. Firstly, defence solicitors usually say little when given the 
opportunity. Most defence solicitors accept the prosecutor's recommendations. 
This is closely related to the second reason; the bench have to make a decision on 
the basis that the prosecution can prove their version of events. Defence 
solicitors therefore have little means of questioning the prosecutor's 
recommendation. Prosecutors are therefore able to effectively control the 
information placed before the court and therefore heavily influence the decision 
making process. As will be seen in Chapter 7, the prosecutor both presents 
information in a fashion that builds a persuasive case but can also omit or frame 
the information that is presented so as to support their recommendation. So, 
whilst it will be too simplistic to state that the decisions of magistrates simply 
follow the recommendations of the prosecutor, the importance of the prosecutor, 
combined with the high correlation between the recommendations of the 
prosecutor and the decisions of the bench, suggest that an adequate 
138 Additionally, the sociological influences upon behaviour may well pull in different directions. 
139 For more on this point, see Chapter 7. 
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understanding of the bench's decision can be gleaned from the observations of 
the prosecutor. 
6.3.1 Offences against the person (OAP) 
Table 13 outlines those cases in the sample classified as offences against the 
person. 
Table 13: Offences against the person 
Total Directed to Magistrates Defendant Cases sent Agreement Defendant Magistrates' 
Crown retain elects to Crown elections direction 
Court jurisdiction Court 
All 37 22 59% 15 41% 4 11% 26 70% 36 97% 27% 85% 
City 31 19 61% 12 39% 4 13% 23 74% 30 97% 33% 83% 
County 6 3 50% 3 50% -- 3 50% 6 100% - 100% 
The offences against the person sample has a similar statistical profile to that for 
the sample as a whole. A small majority of cases are directed to the Crown Court 
by the bench, and the magistrates' direction makes by far the largest contribution 
to all cases that are sent to the Crown Court. 
The offences against the person cases in the sample ranged from assaults 
occasioning actual bodily harm, section 20 assaults of inflicting grievous bodily 
harm, through making threats to kill, to harassment offences. Analysis showed a 
multiplicity of factors that were highlighted at some point as influencing the 
prosecutor's recommendation: the injuries caused; the modus operandi or method 
of assault; the relationship between the parties; the location and scene; legal 
factors; the characteristics of the victim; the existence of any provocation; and 
the existence of racial abuse. 
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6.3.1.1 OAP: Injuries caused 
The degree of any injuries caused is an important consideration when assessing 
mode of trial for offences against the person. Assaults are defined partly in 
relation to the harm that the defendant is alleged to have caused the complainant, 
with grievous bodily harm for instance defined as really serious harm. 140 The 
more serious the injuries, the higher up the scale of assault offences the possible 
charge. However, while the injuries caused are important, occasionally other 
considerations help to determine venue. 14' 
For section 20 assaults, the injuries caused in these cases ranged from the almost 
ubiquitous bruises to more serious injuries such as cuts requiring stitches, broken 
bones, and a fractured skull. For these cases, it was difficult to assess whether or 
not the injuries were the determining factor; nearly all case features referred to 
by prosecutors were described as aggravating the assault, and there appears to be 
a rule of thumb that section 20 assaults will be deemed not suitable for summary 
trial. In most cases the injuries sustained by the victim were usually taken for 
granted as being serious; the prosecutor did not highlight these as being a cause 
for concern. We can see a good example of this in case 2: 
Prosecutor: As far as mode of trial is concerned, the prosecution will suggest to you 
that this is not suitable to be dealt with here and ought to go to the Crown Court. It's an 
allegation of a nightclub assault, where it's said the defendant struck the complainant 
140 D. P. P. v. Smith [ 1961 ] A. C. 290. 
141 While the Mode of Trial Guidelines refer to serious injury, they suggest that cases of injury 
caused by use of a weapon, or more than minor injury caused by kicking or head butting, are 
those that should be directed to the Crown Court. 
197 
with a bottle to his head, requiring cuts, four stitches. In all those circumstances your 
sentencing powers are not sufficient. 
Unlike other cases the prosecutor actually failed to explain the relevance of such 
case features; it is almost as if the case speaks for itself. This case is typical of a 
number where the mode of trial decision is seen as axiomatic. 
In one case, the prosecutor made specific reference to the injuries caused as 
being determinative of venue. In case 33, the prosecutor initially suggested that 
the complainant sustained cuts and broken bones in his fingers and wrist as a 
result of the alleged assault. The defence solicitor, drawing upon a number of 
ambiguities within the prosecution case as described in the advance disclosure, 
questioned whether the broken bones were self-induced as a result of striking a 
wall. The chair of the bench unsurprisingly requested clarification and the 
prosecutor then reinforced the recommendation, on the basis that the head wound 
caused by the initial blow from the defendant was itself sufficient to justify the 
recommendation that the case was not suitable for summary trial. The bench 
accepted this alternative basis for the recommendation and declined jurisdiction. 
Two cases in the section 20 sample suggest that while injuries may be important, 
there is an expectation that section 20 cases are so serious that they should be 
simply sent to the Crown Court, these being cases 9 and 55.142 In case 9, there 
was a degree of ambiguity as to the injury caused by the alleged assault. There 
was a suggestion that the victim suffered from a fractured skull, yet the 
14` All of the section 20 assaults in the sample were directed to the Crown Court; this, coupled 
with the expectation displayed in the cases that the case will inevitably be so directed, questions 
the categorisation of these assaults as triable either way. 
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prosecutor was unable to confirm this through medical evidence. All that the 
prosecutor could safely say was the complainant suffered from a head injury and 
had received the standard advice appropriate in such cases from the local 
hospital. Nevertheless, the prosecutor recommended the bench decline 
jurisdiction: 
Prosecutor: There was some question of a fractured skull but I don't have any medical 
evidence to say that it was fractured, so it may well be that it was a suspected fractured 
skull but wasn't actually fractured. But Sir, nevertheless it was the vulnerability of the 
victim here, two onto one, punching. In that situation that's not suitable for this court 
Sir. 
This raises two issues; if the medical evidence is ambiguous on the injuries 
received, the charge may be inappropriate. More importantly for the thesis, while 
the aggravating features in this case may be serious, it could be doubted if they 
actually justified the recommendation made. Perhaps the recommendation, and 
therefore the decision, was simply made on the basis that section 20 offences are 
too serious for the magistrates' court. 
Case 55 also deals with a situation where the prosecution was unsure as to the 
medical basis of the evidence. In the hearing, the prosecutor stated that the victim 
said he suffered a fractured cheekbone. 143 Given the ambiguity in the 
prosecutor's 144 the defence solicitor unsurprisingly used this to add 
doubt about the extent of the injuries. He lamented the lack of medical evidence 
143 The prosecutor also refers to alternative aggravating features: a group assault, the defendant 
was trespassing, the victim was at his place of work, and was asking the defendant to leave. 
'" The use of the linguistic device, `the victim says', operates so as to distance the prosecutor 
from the statement of the victim. 
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and questioned the appropriateness of conducting the mode of trial hearing 
without this evidence. 145The District Judge failed to act upon this ambiguity: 
District Judge: if it can be proved against you, that you were involved, as is alleged, on 
educational premises in this kind of assault, causing the injury that you did, to a member 
of staff without provocation, that is a case likely to proceed, that is if you were 
convicted, a sentence beyond the powers of this court to give. " 
While the District Judge was clear when declining jurisdiction, it is interesting 
how little is made of these cases where the prosecution accept they cannot be 
sure as to the extent of the victim's injuries. In one sense, these are simple 
manifestations of the assumption that the prosecution can prove what is alleged. 
However, as the prosecution are unsure, the lack of effective challenge to their 
position suggests that section 20 assaults are simply too serious for the 
magistrates' court. 
For assaults that occasion actual bodily harm, the injury inflicted is a fair 
predictor of venue. In most cases with no significant injury, such as minor cuts, 
bruising, swelling or grazing, chipped teeth and "pain", the court retains 
jurisdiction, while broken bones (including a broken nose), cuts requiring stitches 
and puncture marks caused by biting normally result in Crown Court trial. A trip 
to hospital does not seem to be a determining factor. Outside of these general 
considerations, a number of cases are worthy of further consideration. 
145 Prosecutors usually rely upon medical statements when describing serious injuries to the 
court; to that end, they normally seek an adjournment so as to gain this evidence. 
" Emphasis added. 
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In case 39, the injuries received were bruising to the cheek, tenderness to the 
bone, pain to the left side of the head and a cut to the forehead. These usually led 
to a recommendation that the case was suitable for summary trial but due to an 
allegation of head butting, the prosecutor recommended Crown Court trial. The 
legal adviser made it clear to the un-represented defendant that this factor usually 
results in a recommendation for Crown Court trial. The manner of the assault 
was therefore seen as much more important than the injuries caused. 147 Similarly, 
in case 28, minor cuts were deemed to be too serious as they were the result of a 
"glassing", while an assault against a police officer who received minor injuries, 
was still directed to the Crown Court due to the racial aspect of the assault and 
the fact that this was an allegation against a public servant (case 48). 
In case 86, the victim suffered what was described in court as a one-inch cut to 
the head; nevertheless the court still accepted jurisdiction. This case is a useful 
comparison to cases 9 and 55 analysed above as part of the section 20 sample. In 
case 86, the defence solicitor was able successfully to cast doubt on the extent of 
the injuries sustained: 148 
Defence Solicitor: this is a three and a half page statement which goes into some detail. 
Had she had stitches, I would have assumed that quite properly that any decent police 
officer would have put that in the statement. 
Similarly, in case 62, the lack of medical evidence was seen as important. Here, a 
police officer that attended the scene, reported how the complainant's cheek had 
147 The Mode of Trial Guidelines suggest that only head butting that results in more than minor 
injury should be committed to the Crown Court. 
1 This built upon the ambiguity inherent in the prosecutor's borderline suitable for summary 
trial recommendation. 
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swollen to the `size of a tennis ball'. However, the lack of medical evidence 
pointed towards summary trial: 
Prosecutor: Sir, given the nature of the injury and there is no medical evidence to say 
why it was so swollen, simply that it was, I would say that this could be dealt with in 
this court. 
The lack of medical evidence however, was not important in case 62. Here, the 
defendant assaulted two women, one of whom was pregnant. The medical 
evidence was unclear as to whether or not the assault caused a problem with the 
pregnancy, yet the prosecutor still used this as a basis for a not suitable for 
summary trial recommendation: 
Prosecutor: there was an abnormality found but we don't know if that is linked to the 
kick but nevertheless, vulnerable victim, take your victim as you find them. 
For charges of harassment or making threats to kill, concerns other than injuries 
are usually at the forefront of the court's consideration. Even though these 
offences are best defined as offences against the person, the interests that are 
protected relate to the security of the individual rather than their physical 
integrity. 149 Nevertheless, the prosecutors in two cases made reference to the 
injuries received by the complainant. For instance, in case 47, the prosecutor 
supported the recommendation that the case was suitable for summary trial by 
highlighting that the punch thrown caused "soreness but happily no bruise or 
mark or lasting injury". The reference to injury in case 64, a harassment case, 
149 However, in some harassment cases the conduct that forms the basis of the allegation involves 
a direct attack upon the physical integrity of the complainant. 
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was to psychological injury, and it reinforced the totality of the course of conduct 
alleged by the complainant. No one incident in the case was seen as so serious 
that it justified Crown Court trial, yet judged together, the history of the course of 
conduct was serious. By stating that the complainant's "psychological well-being 
is severely affected", even though, "there does not appear to be any lasting 
physical harm", 150 the prosecutor was helping to reinforce the totality of the 
conduct alleged against the defendant. 
6.3.1.2 OAP: Modus operandi 
Whenever a feature was highlighted, in the section 20 sample, its effect was 
usually to suggest that the case was too serious for summary trial. However, in 
case 55, the prosecutor highlighted that the manner of the assault was not too 
serious: "so Sir, whilst the injury has been caused by punching rather than being 
caused by any sort of weapon, kicking etc. ", other features make the case too 
serious for the magistrates' court. Nevertheless, the District Judge, in declining 
jurisdiction, commented, inter alia, on the "kind of assault" perpetrated by the 
defendant despite the recommendation of the prosecutor. 
Despite this anomalous decision, the manner of the assault has to play an 
important part in the mode of trial decision. The Mode of Trial Guidelines refer 
to the use of a weapon that is likely to cause, or actually causes, serious harm. 
Also, the injuries sustained for serious assaults are frequently a product of the 
manner of the assault. For instance, in case 9, whilst there was a degree of 
130 Emphasis added. 
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ambiguity as to whether or not the complainant had suffered a fractured skull, the 
prosecutor was still able to rely upon the manner of assault as a reason for 
declining jurisdiction. Case 59 also shows the importance of the defendant's 
modus operandi. Here, the defendant was alleged to have walked towards the 
complainant, who was holding his ankle, ' 51 "and then without warning kicked 
the complainant violently and deliberately in the face with his right foot". By 
focusing upon the "violent -and deliberate" actions of the defendant, the 
prosecutor performed two functions; she described the culpability of the 
defendant and the clear intention that lay behind his action and she evaluated the 
manner of the assault. The phrase used gives a clear indication of how the 
prosecutor viewed the manner of the assault and the actions of the defendant. ' 52 
For most cases, the prosecutor failed to elaborate upon the manner of the assault 
other than to describe the incident; in these cases the facts are to some extent 
expected to speak for themselves. For instance, the prosecutor may simply 
describe how the defendant struck the complainant on the head with a bottle 
(case 36), causing cuts (case 2), or that the defendant used a police baton to strike 
the complainant on the head (case 45) and finally how the incident was a "knife 
attack", resulting in the complainant receiving six stitches (case 71). In all of 
these cases, the prosecutor assumed that the facts clearly pointed to Crown Court 
trial, to the extent that nothing more needed to be said. In this sample of section 
20 cases, only in case 35 did the prosecutor clearly evaluate the alleged actions 
of the defendant where the prosecutor described the head butting, repeated 
151 The complainant had just been tackled in a football match. 
152 It must be stated, however, that the injuries received -a fractured jaw - clearly made the case 
unsuitable for the magistrates' court. 
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kicking and banging the complainant's head against the wall as aggravating 
features. 
For the sample of cases where the defendant was charged with assault 
occasioning actual bodily harm, the manner of the assault was not decisive. 
There was a whole multitude of different activities that formed the basis of 
allegations: attempted strangulation, biting, pulling out earrings, head butting, 
punching, and "glassing". For some cases, the manner of the assault was all- 
important. So, while the complainant in case 28 sustained injuries that were "not 
severe", the use of a glass as a weapon aggravated the allegations. Similarly, the 
use of a hammer to hit the complainant over the head in case 58 also resulted in a 
serious view of the case and the bench declined jurisdiction. 
Yet a serious assault may not necessarily result in the bench declining 
jurisdiction. For instance, in case 86, the defence solicitor successfully built upon 
a degree of ambiguity in the prosecutor statement. Initially, the prosecutor 
commented upon the assault that consisted of the defendant using "a heavy glass 
ashtray", as being serious and "the fact that a weapon was involved" may have 
led to a conclusion that the case was too serious for the magistrates' court. The 
later acceptance that this was a solitary blow, was developed by the defence 
solicitor: 
Defence Solicitor: So far as this ashtray is concerned, this is a single incident, it's not 
repeated, it's not somebody literally banging away with an ashtray; it's a single incident 
as far as that matter is concerned. 
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The bench accepted jurisdiction in this case. The greatest degree of ambiguity 
surrounds cases where the defendant was alleged to have bitten the complainant. 
So, in case 38 the court declined jurisdiction, while in cases 3 and 17 the bench 
retained the cases. In case 38, the prosecutor described the defendant as using the 
"teeth as a weapon", that caused, "two puncture marks that drew blood". 
However, in case 3, the bite simply caused a "nasty mark" and in case 17 the skin 
was not broken. On the face of it, for these cases, the lack of serious injury 
seemed to be the defining characteristic. However, as we have seen above, if the 
manner of the assault was serious, the lack of any injury is not determinative of 
venue. More importantly, these two cases were both allegations of domestic 
violence and, as we shall see later, these raise discrete issues. '53 
For harassment cases, case 64 shows how the defendant's modus operandi can be 
seen to be all important, as here no one incident was so serious as to justify 
Crown Court trial. The prosecutor described an incident where the defendant was 
alleged to have attempted to drag the complainant from a car, There were other 
allegations of physical and verbal violence, as well as an incident of criminal 
damage. The key to this case, however, was the totality of the conduct; in order 
to convey the gravity of the defendant's conduct, the prosecutor waved a bundle 
of statements at the bench and stated, "Sir, as you can see, the bundle of 
statements is quite substantial". 154 Such an accumulation of evidence was not 
relied upon in case 47, where the prosecutor only made reference to three 
relatively minor and separate incidents when making the recommendation that 
the case was suitable for summary trial. In addition to these two harassment 
153 See section 7.3.6. 
154 This may also suggest that the case was too complex for the magistrates' court. 
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cases, the defendant was also charged with harassment in case 51, where the 
allegation concerned the use of a knife in making threats. However, as this case 
is another of domestic violence, this will be analysed later. Case 67, an allegation 
of making threats to kill, raises similar issues of domestic violence that will be 
considered later. Cases 1 and 8 also concern allegations of making threats to kill, 
and here the fact that there was a "simple" allegation of making threats, with no 
associated violence, resulted in the court retaining jurisdiction. Yet, even in cases 
83 and 89, where the threats took place in the context of incidents that were also 
charged as common assaults, the bench accepted jurisdiction. By comparison, in 
case 91, threats to kill combined with the possession of an offensive weapon (a 
circular saw and a knife) were seen as too serious for the magistrates' court. 
6.3.1.3 OAP: Relationship between the parties 
Incidents of domestic violence in the sample dealt with such complex issues that 
they are worthy of examination in a discrete part of the thesis. This relationship 
between the defendant and complainant will therefore be examined later. ' 55 
Nevertheless, there are other categories of relationship that can be examined 
now. Only very rarely did the prosecutor refer to the relationship between the 
parties as an important consideration used to evaluate the incident; it was usually 
nothing more than a passing reference. For instance, while in case 42 the 
prosecutor made reference to some relationship between the parties, this was 
only to say that, "this defendant and the victim are known to each other". 
ss See section 7.6.3. 
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Similarly, in case 61, the prosecutor referred, in passing, to "previous trouble" 
between the parties. ' 56 
6.3.1.4 OAP: Location and scene 
Within the section 20 offences sample, two offences (cases 2 and 36) were 
alleged to have been committed in or around a nightclub. This was regarded as a 
local problem within this CPS area and prosecutors, both in and out of court, 
frequently noted how a "city centre night time incident" in or around licensed 
premises would be seen as aggravating the offence. However, in both these cases 
the prosecutor did not specifically target this case feature as aggravating the 
alleged offence. 
The assault occasioning actual bodily harm sample gives a greater indication as 
to the importance of this factor. For instance, while in case 25 the prosecutor 
referred to the incident as "night time city centre violence", and highlighted this 
as an aggravating feature, the case as a whole was still seen as suitable for 
summary trial. Similarly, in case 90, the prosecutor referred to the assault outside 
licensed premises as problematic: 
Prosecutor: Obviously, that will be of concern to you because it is actually a public 
place and obviously, there is a suggestion to you also that perhaps alcohol may have 
played a factor in this. 
156 The defendant had previously been ejected from the complainant's breakers yard due to an 
alleged incident of disorder. 
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Nevertheless, as this was described as a single blow, the bench retained 
jurisdiction. Within this sample, other factors that related to the scene of crime 
were also described by prosecutors as important yet failed to impact upon 
decisions. 
There is much said by prosecutors about incidents that take place with children 
present. So for instance, within the first few weeks of the fieldwork process, a 
prosecutor commented (when reviewing the file) upon a case where children 
were present as being particularly serious. She went so far as to ask the rhetorical 
question, how could parents behave in this manner in front of their children, with 
an associated comment on how this must be distressing for the children. Yet, in 
the cases where a child did witness the assault (cases 17 and 67, where the 
presence of the child was specifically described as an aggravating feature and 1, 
18 and 47), the prosecution still recommended that the bench accept jurisdiction. 
Indeed, reading into the text of the hearing of case 17, it is apparent that the 
parents were actually fighting over the custody of the child. 157 While the 
prosecutor in case 91 made reference to a 10 year old child who witnessed the 
allegations, the court probably decided that the case was not suitable for 
summary trial on the basis that the defendant made threats to kill while in the 
possession of an offensive weapon. 
If victims were assaulted by defendants in their own home, then it would be 
expected that this would be seen as an aggravating feature. In two cases in the 
actual bodily harm sample the defendant did just that - cases 3 and 17 - and in 
157 For some of these cases, the fact that they were incidents of domestic violence no doubt 
played a part in any decision. 
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case 3, the prosecutor specifically referred to this as an aggravating feature. 
However, in both these domestic violence cases, the bench accepted the 
prosecution's recommendation that the case was suitable for summary trial. 
6.3.1.5 OAP: Legal factors 
Legal considerations usually relate to any likely sentence. Frequently, 
prosecutors referred to the possible sentence as being a reason for their 
recommendation. This was usually nothing more than a simple remark used as a 
conclusion to the observations. It encapsulated the thought that taking the case as 
a whole, it was either too serious for the magistrates' court or suitable for 
summary trial. However, on occasions, the prosecutor made a reference to the 
likely sentence that was more meaningful than this type of observation. For 
instance, in case 17, the prosecutor made the following observation in support of 
the suitable for summary trial recommendation: 
Prosecutor: six months can reflect the fact that you haven't committed him, say if he 
were to plead guilty, you haven't committed him to the Crown Court for sentence. 
This statement is linked to the sentence discount for pleading guilty; if the 
defendant pleads guilty at the earliest opportunity there is the possibility of a 
one-third discount on sentence. On that basis, a defendant who pleads guilty 
sufficiently early and might otherwise have received the six months maximum 
sentence that could be imposed in the magistrates' court, could have the sentence 
reduced to four months. The prosecutor in case 17 is suggesting, however, that 
even a sentence of six months could reflect the sentence discount; the discount 
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would therefore consist of a refusal to decline jurisdiction and initiate committal 
proceedings to the Crown Court where a sentence of more than six months would 
be available. However, if the defendant maintained innocence and was then 
convicted, the court would still have had the opportunity to commit to the Crown 
Court for sentence. 158 The prosecutor in case 18 canvassed the observation that 
committal for sentence remained an option: 
Prosecutor: this is a matter which this court could try if convicted on a full facts version 
and commit the defendant for sentence. 
Here, the prosecutor, in addition to reminding the court of its procedural powers, 
made an implied reference to one of the assumptions of the mode of trial hearing. 
The bench is to make its decision on the basis that the prosecution can prove 
what is alleged. However, in some cases the defendant may subsequently be 
convicted, but the prosecution will only be able to prove a less serious account, 
thereby resulting in a lower sentence. The implication in the prosecutor's 
recommendation may well be that, although on the prosecution's version the 
magistrates' sentencing powers would be insufficient, it is possible (or likely) 
that the defendant will be convicted on the basis of a less serious version of 
events. ' 59 
On some occasions, the defence solicitor made it known that the defendant 
would elect Crown Court trial regardless of the decision on venue. In such cases, 
158 The possibility of committal for sentence is also referred to in the Mode of Trial Guidelines. 
When the Criminal Justice Act 2003 is implemented this power will be lost. 
159 Interestingly, both these cases are incidents of domestic violence and the prosecutors in both 
cases utilised a number of different approaches that were aimed at keeping the cases in the 
magistrates' court. 
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the bench approached their decision on the facts as presented by the prosecution 
and ignored the indication of election. It has been suggested that the bench in 
such a situation may well decline jurisdiction so that "the procedures could be 
speeded up" (Hedderman and Moxon, 1992: 16). However, this did not occur in 
case 3 after the prosecution made a recommendation that the case was a 
borderline decision and the defence solicitor indicated that the defendant would 
elect. The legal adviser reminded the bench of the need to consider venue 
without this information and the bench therefore accepted jurisdiction. 
In the threats to kill sample, we can see in case 91 how a previous hearing in 
effect constrained the bench. There were two hearings for this case because the 
prosecutor amended the charges prior to committal proceedings. The prosecutor 
indicated that effectively the bench's hands were tied: 
Prosecutor: the fact that there are new charges of affray, as an alternative to a 
possession of an offensive weapon and threats to kill, clearly makes no, little difference 
to where this matter should be dealt with. 
The legal adviser in this case also reminded the bench of its power to commit for 
sentence. 
Another case worthy of examination in this section is case 64, the harassment 
offence dealt with above. So as to help indicate the totality of the course of 
conduct perpetrated by the defendant, in addition to waving the bundle of 
statements at the bench, the prosecutor also made reference to the involvement of 
the civil courts: 
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Prosecutor: There is also County Court involvement and injunctions to keep the 
defendant from her. 
This statement had two effects. Firstly, it made it clear that one of the possible 
problems with domestic violence cases - the possibility of withdrawal - was not 
an issue here, because the complainant had already displayed a willingness to 
persevere with the legal process. Secondly, it was a call for a severe intervention 
by the legal process; the civil law had failed sufficiently to address the problem, 
therefore greater steps had to be taken. 
The final legal consideration (and in some respects the most important) is the 
charge; while this is obviously important in the context of whether or not a 
section 20 or section 47 assault is charged, the borderline between common 
assault and battery, and assaults occasioning actual bodily harm is also 
important. If the prosecutor chose a common assault charge, this removed from 
consideration the option of Crown Court trial. Prosecutors do sometimes charge 
summary only offences as alternatives to triable either way offences so as to keep 
these within the magistrates' court. 160 Prosecutors view these cases as unworthy 
of Crown Court trial and so therefore remove the option. For instance, the 
prosecutor in case 61 openly canvassed this as a possibility at the review stage, 
but felt unable to do this as the injuries (facial swelling the size of a tennis ball) 
I`'ß It is difficult to state with any accuracy the extent of this practice. At the review stage, some 
prosecutors were open with their use of such charging practices. One prosecutor even went so far 
as to explain his approach at both ends of the triable either way category. He preferred less 
serious either way offences to be charged as summary only, to remove the possibility of election, 
and for the most serious either way cases he preferred indictable only charges, so that the case 
would be sent to the Crown Court within a week and they could sort it out there". 
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were such that only a charge of assault occasioning actual bodily harm would 
suffice. 
6.3.1.6 OAP: Characteristics of the victim 
The Mode of Trial Guidelines refer to attacks upon vulnerable victims or upon 
public servants in the course of their employment as aggravating features. In two 
cases in the section 20 sample, the prosecutor specifically referred to victim 
characteristics as aggravating the assault; in case 9, the prosecutor referred to the 
vulnerability of the victim as an important factor, 16' while in case 55, the 
prosecution referred, inter alia, to the fact that the victim was working as a 
college groundsman at the time of the assault, and the incident took place when 
the victim was at work and attempting to remove the defendant and others from 
the premises. In case 9, the prosecutor also pointed out the frailty of the victim; 
he was 65 at the time of the alleged incident, had endured two heart attacks, 
suffered from angina and diabetes, and had cataracts. 
It might have been thought that if the victims were children, this would aggravate 
the offence. While this is a relevant consideration, this does not necessarily result 
in Crown Court trial. So, in case 8, the defendant was charged with making 
threats to kill to two children (aged 11 and 12) who were throwing stones outside 
his house. So, while the District Judge enquired as to the age of the children, he 
also wanted to confirm if this was ``merely verbal abuse". Upon this 
confirmation, the District Judge accepted jurisdiction. 
161 Given the ambiguity surrounding the injuries received, this must have been an important 
consideration. 
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Police officers do retain special protection from the criminal law as public 
servants who are employed to keep the peace. We can see this in the prosecutor's 
summing up of case 48, where the defendants were charged with assaulting a 
police officer: 
Prosecutor: Firstly, there is the question of assaulting [the police officer], obviously he 
is in a vulnerable position, expected to go to houses and he doesn't know what he's 
going to find there. He is a person in a public office who is likely to be subject to 
assaults, and the Mode of Trial Guidelines suggest that cases of that sort may be 
unsuitable, even if the injuries received aren't that substantial. 
The pregnancy of the victim in case 62, examined above, is also an important 
feature. In this case the prosecutor referred to this pregnancy and the age of the 
second complainant, who was 17 years old. 
6.3.1.7 OAP: Provocation 
Prosecutors frequently made reference to the absence of provocation as an 
aggravating feature, although usually within the context of a serious offence. For 
instance, in the section 20 sample, the prosecutor made such a reference in case 
55.162 Likewise, the District Judge in case 42 questioned the prosecutor so as to 
confirm if the alleged offence was unprovoked, and this was referred to in the 
District Judge's reasons for his decision, although this was a case of head butting 
162 In case 55, the defendant was alleged to have assaulted a college groundsman. This is one of 
those cases where there was a degree of ambiguity as to the extent of the injuries received by the 
complainant. It is likely that the unprovoked nature of the attack was only one of many 
aggravating features and in no sense decisive. 
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and was therefore regarded as very serious. Similarly, while the victim in case 28 
was described as an `innocent bystander', the nature of the assault - an attack 
with a glass - would in itself justify Crown Court trial. Finally, in cases 38 and 
42, the prosecutor made reference to the unprovoked nature of the assault, but as 
these were allegations of biting, resulting in a puncture to the skin, and a group 
assault whereby the complainant suffered a broken nose, the lack of provocation 
can in no way be identified as the defining characteristic. 
Alternatively, if there is no provocation, and the offence is otherwise lacking in 
aggravating features, the court will in all probability accept jurisdiction. So, in 
case 90, while the prosecutor made reference to the unprovoked nature of the 
incident, the allegation that it was a single blow resulted in the prosecutor 
recommending summary trial. 
6.3.1.8 OAP: Racial abuse 
In case 48 referred to above, the assault upon the police officer, one of the 
defendants was charged with racially aggravated threatening behaviour. 163 The 
element of racial abuse here - to quote from the prosecutor's statement, the 
defendant allegedly said that the "officer in particular was a disgrace to his 
colour, he being an officer of mixed race" and other comments to the white 
police officers, describing them as "white trash" - was seen as an aggravating 
feature: 
163 Threatening behaviour is usually a summary only offence, but the aggravated offence is triable 
either way. This offence is a public order matter that is being analysed here as the case also 
involved an offence against the person. The Mode of Trial Guidelines for public order offences 
highlight clear racial motivation as a reason for declining jurisdiction. 
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Prosecutor: As far as the section 4A of the Public Order Act is concerned, your 
worships, the racially aggravating aspect, there aren't any specific guidelines, but of 
course the penalties are higher, they've been made deliberately higher for that sort of 
offence, and there are suggestions that cases of that sort may not be suitable for the 
magistrates' court ... 
6.3.2 Public order offences 
Table 14 shows the statistics for public order cases: 
Table 14: Public Order Act offences 
Total Directed Magistrates Defendant Cases Agreement Defendant Magistrates' 
to Crown retain elects sent to elections direction 
Court jurisdiction Crown 
Court 
All 17 8 47% 9 53% 1 6% 9 53% 16 94% 11% 89% 
City 12 8 67% 4 33% 1 8% 9 75% 11 92% 25% 89% 
County 5 -- 5 100% -- -- 5 100% - - 
While the public order offences in the City sample are similar to the overall 
sample, the preponderance of cases in the County sample (all 5), where the 
magistrates accepted jurisdiction, has skewed somewhat the total Public Order 
Act offence sample towards cases remaining in the magistrates' court. 
As for specific case factors, like the offences against the person cases, there was 
a multiplicity of case factors highlighted by the prosecutor. Once again, the 
defendant's modus operandi was clearly regarded as an important case factor. 
Others that entered into consideration were the location or scene of crime, the 
position of the victim, legal considerations, the existence of a local legal culture, 
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any injuries received, the size of any group involved, and the existence of racial 
aggravation. 
6.3.2.1 Public order: Modus operandi 
Overall, the defendant's modus operandi was a useful predictor of venue. Case 
56, an allegation of affray, is a case in point: 
Prosecutor: At that stage he says he gets out of the car, he looks at him gesturing to 
come out, saying words to the effect of you and me, let's sort it out. Says he tries to 
ignore him. [He says] I will kill your fucking kids. He looks outside of his window and 
sees him outside of his house. He goes out, the complainant goes out at this stage. He 
says that the defendant says, "you got a gun aint you? " He says, "what are you on 
about? " He then says, "I've got one", puts one of his hands behind his back and begins 
to make a move towards the complainant - he opened the gate. "4 
Although there is a reference to a gun in this case, in reality the defendant was 
merely aggressive and actually posed little danger to the complainant. Both the 
prosecutor and District Judge (who accepted jurisdiction) described the 
defendant's behaviour as little more than "words and gestures". 
In contrast to this, we have case 12, where the defendant's modus operandi was 
so serious that only Crown Court trial would have been suitable. The brevity of 
the prosecutor's recommendations highlight the clear seriousness in this case: 
164 This is the extent of the allegations against the defendant; it is at this point that the 
complainant hits the defendant over the head with a pickaxe handle. 
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Prosecutor: As far as mode of trial is concerned Ma'am, the matter of affray involves 
the placing of a knife against someone's throat, and I would ask you to consider that 
being unsuitable for summary trial. 
Contrast case 12 with case 88; here the defendant was charged with affray, and 
one of the allegations was of the defendant pushing his wife face down into the 
sofa, holding a wallpaper scraper over her throat saying, "who hasn't the guts to 
do it now? You'll squeal like a pig when I cut your throat". The bench accepted 
the prosecutor's recommendation that the case was suitable for summary trial. ' 65 
Case 20 is also an interesting contrast to case 12, in that it also involved an 
incident where the defendant possessed a knife. However, in this case, the 
prosecutor initially made no firm recommendation as to venue; it was only when 
the District Judge pushed the prosecutor for a recommendation that she 
recommended the case be sent to the Crown Court. Such a weak 
recommendation, combined with the intervention of the defence solicitor, 
resulted in the District Judge accepting jurisdiction. The case concerned a 
suggestion that a knife was present, although not used, and the complainant felt 
threatened and intimidated. It is at this point that the District Judge asked for a 
firm recommendation. The prosecutor's reasons for eventually recommending 
Crown Court trial were the presence of the knife - and she took the unusual step 
of showing the District Judge a photograph of the knife, so as to emphasise its 
size - and the fact that the defendant had gained entry to the house. In the face of 
such an initially ambivalent recommendation, the defence solicitor chose to 
question the recommendation on two grounds. The first ground, on the Mode of 
165 Perhaps the key to this case is an understanding that this is an allegation of domestic violence. 
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Trial Guidelines, was a simple challenge. The defence solicitor pointed out that 
the facts in this case did not suggest that the case should go to the Crown Court 
under any application of the Mode of Trial Guidelines. In particular, the fact that 
the knife was not used, regardless of its size, suggested that the bench had the 
authority to accept jurisdiction. 166 The second ground of challenge in most cases 
would be seen as problematic. The bench have to make their decision as to venue 
on the assumption that the prosecution can prove what they allege. Yet, in this 
case, the defence solicitor did question whether the defendant gained entry 
without permission and suggested that the complainant invited the defendant into 
the house, thereby challenging one of the aggravating features in the case 
identified by the prosecutor. The challenge of the defence solicitor, combined 
with the `weak' recommendation of the prosecutor, led the District Judge to 
accept jurisdiction. 
In case 74, the defendant's "swearing and shouting" was regarded as suitable for 
summary trial, while in case 72, mostly concerning shouting and gesturing with 
some attempts at engaging in a fight, the defendant's actions were also regarded 
as suitable for summary trial. In case 72, there was a suggestion that one of the 
defendants was in possession of a curtain pole that could have been used as a 
weapon, but the prosecutor noted that this was not used. 
166 The Mode of Trial Guidelines specifically refer to the eise of a weapon (emphasis added). 
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6.3.2.2 Public order: Location and scene 
Case 20, examined above is another example of the defendant gaining entry to 
the complainant's home; once again, this was not a decisive factor, although in 
this case the defence solicitor did challenge this part of the allegation. 
Interestingly, in case 7, the presence of a child may have been decisive; the 
defendant was alleged to have threatened an off-duty police officer. On the 
recommendation that the case was not suitable for summary trial, the District 
Judge questioned whether the Crown Court was an appropriate venue, as the 
allegations involved one attempted punch and jostling and pushing. It is at this 
point that the prosecutor made reference to the presence of a 17 month-old child. 
However, the defence solicitor also indicated that the defendant did not object to 
Crown Court trial; perhaps an indication that the defendant would be electing in 
any event. The District Judge therefore declined jurisdiction. 
6.3.2.3 Public order: Position of victim 
In both of the City cases of violent disorder, police officers were subjected to the 
defendant's behaviour, but only in case 6 was this probably decisive. In case 69, 
the throwing of bottles, in the context of football hooliganism, resulted in the 
case being directed to the Crown Court. In case 6, the defendant led a group of 
youths towards police officers while waving a wooden baton above his head. 
While the incident was merely a "stand off' between the police and youths, the 
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direct targeting of police officers' 67 aggravates the offence. In one of the City 
affray cases (case 7 examined above), it is doubtful if the status of the defendant, 
as an off-duty police officer, was determinative of venue. The prosecutor made 
no reference to the allegation that the victim was targeted because of her status as 
a police officer. In her statement, she alleged that the defendant stated to one of 
his friends, "there's that fucking pig bitch" before the confrontation. 
6.3.2.4 Public order: Legal considerations 
Case 7, examined above, contrasts with case 3, examined as part of the offences 
against the person sample; here the District Judge did decline jurisdiction after 
hearing an indication from the defence solicitor that the defendant would elect. 
While at first not convinced by the prosecutor's recommendation that the case 
was not suitable for summary trial, the District Judge may well have considered 
the futility of accepting jurisdiction, given this indication by the defence 
solicitor. 
In case 80, the prosecutor pointed out that the bench possessed a maximum 
sentence of 12 months' imprisonment due to the existence of two either way 
offences. The effect of the possibility of consecutive sentences enables the bench 
to accept jurisdiction in more serious cases that would otherwise be directed to 
the Crown Court. 
167 As highlighted in the Mode of Trial Guidelines. 
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6.3.2.5 Public order: Local legal culture 
For the most serious either way offences, it appears that there almost exists a 
local legal culture where these offences will nearly always be regarded as not 
suitable for summary trial and this process operates for charges of violent 
disorder. 168 Case 6, an allegation where the activities of the defendant would 
most probably be regarded as an affray, was regarded as not suitable for 
summary trial; in effect there was nothing more than a "stand off' between the 
police and a group of youths with the defendant waving a baton around his head. 
While there may have been a threat of violence, none was actually used by the 
defendant. The prosecutor noted, "violent disorder is usually seen as not suitable 
for summary trial". 
Case 69 involved different considerations of a local legal culture. The offence, 
being one of football hooliganism, was seen as a specific local problem that 
necessitated local action. As a result, local criminal justice professionals took a 
dim view of such violence and were more willing to push for deterrent sentences. 
While the conduct (throwing bottles at police officers) may have more 
explanatory power than this specific local effect, there is little doubt that this 
local problem was influential. The file review noted, when recording the 
recommendation as to venue, this involved, "the throwing of bottles associated to 
football hooliganism". 
168 The Mode of Trial Guidelines state that cases of violent disorder should be committed for 
trial. This must raise questions as to the classification of this offence. 
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6.3.2.6 Public order: Injuries 
Given that the rationale of public order offences is to provide a remedy for 
activities that threaten peace and security, the causing of injuries is in no way the 
primary consideration for these offences. However, occasionally the violence 
used by the defendant may cause harm to others. '69 For instance, in case 69 the 
"barrage of bottles" caused "facial injuries" to one of the police officers at the 
scene. While not specifically referred to in the mode of trial hearing as an 
aggravating feature, the use of such a weapon resulting in injuries must 
inevitably be an important consideration in the process. ' 70 
6.3.2.7 Public order: Group offences 
No prosecutor specifically referred to the group nature of the charges of violent 
disorder in cases 6 and 69. The criminal law adopts the approach that group 
offences are more serious than lone criminal enterprises, due to the group 
dynamics that are larger than the sum of the individual contributions. While the 
existence of a group no-doubt influenced the choice of charge in these two cases, 
there was no specific reference to this consideration in the mode of trial 
hearing. 171 
169 Prosecutors may charge public order offences for violent conduct, either in addition to or as an 
alternative to an offence against the person. Where the defendant faces a charge of assault and a 
public order offence, these cases have been examined as part of the offences against the person 
sample as the case features identified by the prosecutor concerned the assault. 
170 The Mode of Trial Guidelines refer to the use of a weapon, or the causing of significant injury, 
as reasons for declining jurisdiction. 
171 The Mode of Trial Guidelines refer to "organised violence" as an aggravating feature. 
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6.3.2.8 Public order: Racial aggravation 
In the examination of offences against the person, we have already examined 
case 48, where the defendant was charged with the public order offence of 
racially aggravated threatening behaviour, and the recommendation from the 
prosecutor that the case was not suitable for summary trial partly on the basis of 
the racial aspect of the allegations. 172 In case 80, the defendant was also charged 
with racially aggravated threatening behaviour and affray. While the offence 
mainly consisted of the defendant "shouting and screaming" after being found by 
the police in a "disturbed and upset condition", comments made to a police 
officer - "fuck off you dirty smelly paki bastard" - undoubtedly aggravated the 
offence. Before the presentation of the case, the legal adviser was surprised to 
hear that the prosecutor would be recommending summary trial due to the 
existence of the racial aggravation. The prosecutor explained the 
recommendation on the likely available sentence; the charging of two either way 
offences opens the possibility of two consecutive six-month sentences. The 
bench accepted jurisdiction. 
6.3.3 Dishonesty offences 
Table 15 outlines the figures for dishonesty offences: 
172 The Mode of Trial Guidelines are clear on this point; if the "offence has clear racial 
motivation" then it should be regarded as not suitable for summary trial. 
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Table 15: Dishonesty offences 
Total Directed to Magistrates Defendant Cases sent Agreement Defendant Magistrates' 
Crown retain elects to Crown elections direction 
Court jurisdiction Court 
All 30 17 57% 13 43% 3 10% 20 67% 29 97% 23% 85% 
City 18 11 61% 7 39% 3 17% 14 78% 17 94% 43% 79°o 
County 12 6 50% 6 50% -- 6 50% 12 100% - 100% 
Once again, the profile for dishonesty offences is similar to that for the sample as 
a whole. If there is any difference, the rate of elections in the City dishonesty 
sample (17 percent) may be high compared to the 9 percent for all cases in the 
sample. 
The offences against the person and dishonesty samples are the two largest in the 
whole sample, and the dishonesty sample therefore shares with the offences 
against the person cases the presence of a multiplicity of case factors. As is the 
case with all offences, the modus operandi is important but additional factors 
include the value of any property taken, if the defendant is in a position of trust, 
the existence of a local legal culture and legal factors. 
6.3.3.1 Dishonesty: Modus operandi 
In three cases in the City sample (cases 11,23 and 24), the defendant was alleged 
to have taken property from a motor vehicle. In short, this offence was 
considered to be non-serious, similar to shop theft. For instance, in case 11, the 
prosecutor stated that this offence was in no way serious. In this case, the mode 
of trial hearing actually concerned two separate cases; three dwelling house 
burglaries along with an associated theft and the theft from a motor vehicle. The 
prosecutor made two separate recommendations in this one hearing for the two 
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courses of conduct and distinguished between them. As to the theft from a 
vehicle, the prosecutor noted that: 
Prosecutor: so far as the theft from the motor vehicle is concerned, I can't pretend that 
that in itself is so serious that it should go to the Crown Court but certainly, in itself, it's 
a matter where the Crown would quite clearly have to say it's suitable for summary trial. 
The existence of aggravating features did not make theft from a motor vehicle 
unsuitable for summary trial. So, in case 23, the prosecutor specifically referred 
to two aggravating features in the case; the time of the offence13 and the fact that 
the defendants were engaged on an offending spree. ' 74 Nevertheless, partly on 
the basis that the vehicles were unattended, the bench accepted the 
recommendation that the case was not suitable for summary trial. Case 24 was 
clearly regarded as suitable for summary trial as a simple theft from a motor 
vehicle in the afternoon, with goods of low value taken. Within the County 
sample, offences of theft from a motor vehicle were also regarded as mundane. 
So, in case 81, a case where two defendants were charged with theft from a 
motor vehicle but were processed on different dates, the two mode of trial 
hearings were exceptionally similar. In the first hearing the prosecutor noted that: 
Prosecutor: Yes, it's suitable [for summary trial]. It's an allegation of theft from a 
motor vehicle. 
While in the second hearing, the prosecutor remarked: 
173 The defendants were arrested at 4: 10. 
'" They were charged with stealing from three vehicles. 
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Prosecutor: It's an allegation of theft from a motor vehicle, suitable for summary trial. 
There were frequent cases within the County sample where the facts, and the 
method of criminality, were regarded as `speaking for themselves' in justifying 
the prosecutor's recommendation. Case 75 is a case in point: 
Prosecutor: It's alleged the defendant stole some wheels and tyres and wheel, wheel 
nuts from a Ford Escort car, parked on a garage forecourt. Total value involved Sir, 
eight hundred pounds. The prosecution submit that summary trial is appropriate. 
Similar treatment can be seen in case 99, an allegation of stealing and cashing a 
benefit cheque. 
One offence of theft from a store was recorded in the City sample and somewhat 
surprisingly this was deemed unsuitable for summary trial. As explained 
above, 175 most cases of shop theft were regarded as the archetypal `simple' case. 
In case 41, the prosecutor began by making a similar observation: 
Prosecution: In terms of the circumstances of the theft itself, that would be suitable [for 
summary trial] as a simple sneak theft. The two items were taken from [the store], were 
put in the back of a child's pushchair and he [the defendant] leaves the store. 
However, upon being apprehended by two store detectives, the defendant 
resorted to violence to try to resist arrest. This violence, although rather severe - 
one witness said it took five men to restrain the defendant and the struggle lasted 
13 minutes, while another reported 45 minutes - failed to cause serious injury. 
175 See section 6.2.1. 
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One store detective complained of cuts and reddening to the skin, while the other 
reported grazing, bruising, and soreness. If this case were to be determined 
purely upon the basis of the assault, then although the injuries are relatively 
trivial, the length of the assault, combined with the position of the victims - store 
detectives - would probably result in a determination that the case is not suitable 
for summary trial. However, the prosecutor chose to proceed with the summary 
offence of common assault, dropping the either way offence of assault with 
intent to resist arrest. The bench was therefore only at liberty to make a 
determination on venue upon the basis of the theft. However, the prosecutor 
asked the court to examine the conduct of the defendant "in the round" and take 
the associated violence against the store detectives into account when coming to 
a decision. 
Prosecutor: The court as a matter of routine for the sentencing purposes regard any 
violence towards store detectives, whether or not it is charged, as being an aggravating 
feature, would the court take the surrounding circumstances into account when 
sentencing for the pure theft? You would give credit for the co-operative defendant who 
pleaded guilty to the matter and offered no threat of violence towards the store detective. 
The defence solicitor took issue with this attempt to decide the issue by referring 
to conduct that was charged as a summary only offence. 
Defence Solicitor: The Crown have doctored their position as regards any assault - 
they've dropped any indication of with intent to resist, `cause they've dropped the 
charge. My view, Sir, is that you should deal with it on the circumstances of the theft. 
We think it's not good for the Crown to change the charges to a simple assault and then 
try to argue the reverse with that. 
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The District Judge accepted the prosecutor's recommendations and declined 
jurisdiction. 
Three cases in the City sample are worthy of mention where the course of 
conduct was seen as deserving Crown Court trial. In case 50, the prosecutor 
made specific reference to a prolonged course of conduct. In case 66, the 
prosecutor made reference to the professionalism inherent in the defendant's 
actions, 176 and in case 60, reference was made to the number of victims subjected 
to the defendant's actions. 
In case 50, the defendant was charged with one offence of theft and five offences 
of evading liability by deception. The main thrust of the allegations against the 
defendant concerned receiving goods from a tool hire and sale shop through the 
use of a credit account and dud cheques. In effect, the defendant received a 
number of tools, both purchased and hired, without making payment for these, 
and he offered numerous excuses as to why payment had not been received. The 
prosecutor, when making a borderline suitable for summary trial 
recommendation, made specific reference to the period of time over which the 
conduct took place. 
Prosecutor: it is over a period of time, and it appears from the prosecution version of 
events to be a calculated course by the defendant. He must have known, at all stages, 
that the account cheques would not be honoured. 
176 The relevant section of the Mode of Trial Guidelines refer to conduct, "which has been 
committed or disguised in a sophisticated manner", or to "[t]heft or fraud committed by an 
organised gang". 
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The District Judge was also concerned about the period of time that 
encompassed the allegations, but for different reasons: 
District Judge: What are you saying is the period? I only have dates spanning back two 
months. 
The reply to this question, that he received from the prosecutor, of two and a half 
months, confirmed his suspicion that this was not too lengthy a period; he 
accepted jurisdiction. 
In case 66, the professionalism of the defendant's conduct was seen as an 
aggravating feature. All three of the defendant's vehicles were found to be 
displaying false number plates and all vehicles were stolen. The prosecutor 
suggested a degree of professionalism, in that he bought the cars at a low value, 
bought new plates and then fixed these to the cars. However, the overall value 
(£21,500) was probably seen as decisive. 
In case 60, the defendant was an operator for British Telecom and he used his 
position to obtain the account numbers and pin codes from charge card customers 
in order to make international calls. The numbers of victims were highlighted in 
the hearing, as this displayed the systematic, calculated and prolonged period of 
time involved in the allegations. The defendant was alleged to have made calls 
over a 10-month period, hence the high number of victims. 
An allegation of organisation and coercion was important in case 76: 
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Prosecutor: The allegation is that he effectively coerced other employees to steal diesel 
fuel on his behalf. It's also an allegation that he has coerced people who are, were below 
him in the organisation - he's intimidated them to steal fuel on his behalf, not just the 
defendants who are in court [and pleaded guilty] but other people who have been 
cautioned for offences. And also Sir, that it's relatively organised in arranging for the 
CCTV to be turned off before he arrives at the depot. In those circumstances Sir, I say 
the matter isn't suitable for summary trial. 
After being asked for the value of the diesel taken, the prosecutor remarked that 
the value is relatively low, but reinforced his recommendation: 
Prosecutor: Sir, the value concerned is relatively low, but the breach of trust and 
particularly also the coercion of other employees who are dependent upon [the 
defendant] for effectively obtaining better employment within the depot itself - he's 
responsible for what shifts the other people worked and so he could influence greatly the 
amount of pay that they received. They describe themselves as feeling intimidated. 
The District Judge declined jurisdiction. 
The course of conduct in case 87, where the defendant was charged, inter alia, 
with seven offences of burglary, was clearly decisive: 
'77 
Prosecutor: Well Sir, there are one, two, three, four, five to six dwelling house 
burglaries and associated handling and possession of drugs matters. Because of the 
dwelling houses, the prosecution submit that this is more suitable for trial at the Crown 
Court. 
177 The Mode of Trial Guidelines relating to burglary draw attention to allegations of a series of 
offences as being too serious for the magistrates' court. 
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The prosecutor simply counted the burglary charges, and this in itself was seen as 
enough to justify Crown Court trial. The reviewing lawyer commented upon the 
"course of conduct" engaged upon by the defendant. 
For two other burglary offences in the County sample, the prosecutor made 
reference to the method of entry. So in case 77, the prosecutor noted how the 
defendant entered "through an insecure window"; such an unforced entry should 
be placed in juxtaposition with forced entry. While the bench accepted 
jurisdiction, the decisive case features were probably the fact that this was not a 
dwelling house burglary and the low value of property taken. In contrast, the 
prosecutor in case 94 made reference to a forced entry, although the high value 
of property taken was probably more instructive of the final decision made by the 
bench. 
6.3.3.2 Dishonesty: Value 
It was usual for the prosecutor to make a reference to the value of goods involved 
in the allegations; sometimes this was a passing reference and in others this was 
utilised as a reason for the recommendation. 178 Additionally, loose rules of 
thumb are used by the prosecution in relation to value. For instance, in case 11, 
the prosecutor referred to the value of property taken when explaining what 
became of the goods; "the cassette player is subsequently sold by the defendant 
178 The Mode of Trail Guidelines for all dishonesty offences refer to the value of un-recovered 
property as a consideration for the court. 
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for thirty pounds", whereas in cases 15 and 24, the low value of the property was 
referred to as a reason for recommending the bench accept jurisdiction. 
In some cases within the sample, the value of property was clearly substantial, 
resulting in some simple decision-making for the court. So, in case 66, the 
defendant was alleged to have stolen or handled cars to the value of £20,500, and 
in case 46, the defendant, when acting as a financial adviser, was alleged to have 
taken cheques from his clients of a value of £24,000. The defendant in case 32 
was alleged to have obtained over £20,000 from his employer; he had been 
disqualified from driving yet continued to claim a mileage allowance when using 
the train. Also, in case 85, three defendants were alleged to have stolen a car 
valued at £ 18,500. In case 43, where the defendant was alleged to have stolen a 
car and received a stolen car with a combined value of £45,000, the prosecutor 
simply stated that she would be asking for Crown Court trial in view of the value 
of the goods concerned. Before she could add to this statement, the District Judge 
agreed and declined jurisdiction. After the hearing, the researcher questioned the 
legal adviser in court about this case and the brevity of the hearing; he suggested 
that where the value of goods exceeded £10,000, the case would be too serious 
for the magistrates' court. 
The value of goods concerned will not necessarily be decisive; benches will 
decline jurisdiction in cases where the value of any goods is small if there are 
other aggravating features. Benches will usually decline jurisdiction for domestic 
burglary cases, regardless of the value, and a severe breach of trust may also lead 
to the bench declining jurisdiction. So, in case 50 examined above, the 
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prosecutor recommended that the bench decline jurisdiction, not on the value of 
the tools taken (the prosecutor described the value as "over five thousand 
pounds"), but on the number of offences. However, given the availability of a 12- 
month sentence, the District Judge accepted jurisdiction. 
If the goods are recovered, then even allegations of high value takings may be 
heard in the magistrates' court. ' 79 So, in case 82, the defendant was alleged to 
have handled a car although this was recovered: 
Prosecutor: Sir, in respect of that matter, you've heard an eight thousand pounds motor 
vehicle had been taken and was recovered by the police but it had been recovered. I 
suggest in the circumstances it's suitable for summary trial. 
The legal adviser reiterated that although this was a case of "high value", the 
recovery of the property was something that should be taken into account as "that 
hasn't been lost as the property has been returned". 
6.3.3.3 Dishonesty: Position of trust 
If an offence is committed in breach of a position of trust then this is regarded as 
an aggravating feature, as the offender has been placed in a situation where extra 
responsibilities have been agreed and with these, correlating duties. Indeed, the 
Mode of Trial Guidelines specifically refer to breaching a position of trust as 
being an aggravating feature. The extent of a breach is an important 
179 This is reflected in the Mode of Trial Guidelines. 
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consideration when assessing mode of trial. 180 For instance, in case 22, the 
prosecutor noted that the defendant was an employee who was in a position of 
trust, but not to the extent that the case should be directed to the Crown Court. 
The defendant was an employee in a fast food establishment and was alleged to 
have taken money from a cash-box. The District Judge was happy to accept 
jurisdiction once he was sure that the cash-box was accessible to other 
employees. Similarly, the prosecutor in case 68 referred to a breach of trust as the 
defendant was an employee, but because of her "lowly position" this was not 
regarded as serious. 
In contrast, the breach of trust in case 46, where the defendant was acting as a 
financial adviser and was handling large sums of the complainant's property, was 
regarded as serious. However, the large sums involved (£24,000) were probably 
enough to justify the prosecutor's recommendation. Similarly, in case 32, while 
the defendant breached trust by continuing to claim his mileage allowance, the 
sum involved (over £20,000) was probably decisive. 
In case 60, the breach of trust was all important; the defendant was alleged to 
have taken over £3,000 by deception, using the charge card account details of 
British Telecom customers when he was acting as an operator. In summing up, 
the prosecutor noted that: 
Prosecutor: It's a breach of trust, large number of victims, over three thousand pounds, 
we say that's not suitable. 
180 The relevant part of the Guidelines read, "[b]reach of trust by a person in substantial authority, 
or in whom a high degree of trust is placed. " 
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Finally, in case 76, the allegation of theft of fuel from the council depot, the 
prosecutor made specific reference to the breach of trust involved as the 
defendant was in charge of the depot. 
6.3.3.4 Dishonesty: Local legal culture 
We have already seen how shop theft and theft from a motor vehicle are clearly 
regarded as suitable for summary trial. In this regard, these cases are within a 
clear local legal culture that all the courtroom regulars share. A similar 
phenomenon exists in relation to dwelling house burglaries. The prosecutor's 
statement in case 14 goes straight to the heart of the matter: 
Prosecutor: Sir, I have to say that this matter is not suitable for summary trial, and your 
sentencing powers are not sufficient due to the fact that it is a dwelling house burglary, 
of a flat, during the day, whilst the occupier was out. 
A similar approach can be seen in case 5; here the District Judge asks a simple 
question of the prosecutor, before any representations have been made: 
District Judge: Burglary of a dwelling house is the one that would take it up [to the 
Crown Court] I'd have thought? 
The District Judge did not need to hear any representations and simply declined 
jurisdiction. 
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These two City cases show how prosecutors and District Judges view domestic 
burglaries. A third City case (14) shows how defence solicitors share this view. 
Here, the prosecutor made reference to the use of force to gain entry and the 
defence solicitor challenged this observation: 
Defence Solicitor: Sir, I would take issue with only one thing that my friend had to say 
there, and that's the matter of force being used; that doesn't seem to be in the statement 
within the papers that I've been given today... 
The use of force to gain entry would no doubt be an aggravating feature, yet the 
defence solicitor continued by accepting the prosecutor's recommendation: 
Defence Solicitor: But, nonetheless, I don't dissent from my friends' view about the 
appropriate venue. 
In a similar vein, within the County sample, case 87, an allegation of dwelling 
house burglary, was directed to the Crown Court, whereas case 77, an allegation 
of burglary of a bowls club where six pounds were taken, remained within the 
magistrates' court. 
At this point it is worthwhile considering the Mode of Trial Guidelines. They 
assert that jurisdiction should be retained in either way cases unless any likely 
sentence will exceed six months and that an offence specific factor is present in 
the case. The case factors pertaining to dwelling house burglaries are that: entry 
is effected in the daytime when the occupier is present; entry at night to a house 
that is usually occupied, whether or not it is at that time; the offence is alleged to 
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be one of a series; soiling, ransacking, damage or vandalism occurs; the offence 
has professional hallmarks; or the unrecovered property is of high value. These 
features were not present in all of the domestic burglary cases within the sample 
yet the bench declined jurisdiction in every case, suggesting the existence of a 
local legal culture. Additionally, in case 87, the defendant was alleged to have 
entered at night when the occupants were at home, yet no reference of this fact 
was made by the prosecutor. In all probability, the number of allegations against 
the defendant suggested a prolonged course of conduct that made the decision a 
simple one. 
6.3.3.5 Dishonesty: Legal factors 
In a number of cases within the sample, the defendant faced multiple allegations 
of either way offences, meaning that the magistrates' court could impose a 12- 
month sentence. So, in case 50, the District Judge thought that although the case 
was serious, the extended available sentence resulted in him retaining 
jurisdiction: 
District Judge: I believe that if you are convicted this is likely to attract a custodial 
sentence, but it seems to me within the court's power potentially to order consecutive 
sentences, and it would be within the power of this court to deal with it, and therefore I 
could accept that the trial might take place here in the magistrates' court. 
The linkage of separate cases can sometimes result in cases being sent to the 
Crown Court. For instance, in cases 10 and 11, the defendant was charged with a 
number of separate offences analysed as two separate cases. Case 10 concerned 
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allegations of domestic burglary, while in case 11, the defendant was charged 
with theft from a motor vehicle. These are both cases where the prevailing legal 
culture points to a clear decision for the court. However, in case 11, the bench 
actually declined jurisdiction. This is partly explained by the link between the 
cases: 
Prosecutor: I can't pretend that that in itself is so serious that it should go to the Crown 
Court, and the only way it might be pertinent because other matters are going to the 
Crown Court, but certainly, in itself, it's a matter where the Crown would quite clearly 
have to say it's suitable for summary trial. 
However, in addition to such an ambiguous recommendation, the defence 
solicitor also indicated that the defendant would elect Crown Court trial. 
Whatever the reason - the linking of cases or the indication of the intention to 
elect - the bench declined jurisdiction. 
Case 10 is also partly explained on the basis of a link between that case and 
another allegation not part of the sample. Within the mode of trial hearing, the 
prosecutor refers to a co-defendant who appeared before the court on a previous 
occasion where the bench declined jurisdiction. The prosecutor is suggesting that 
the decision has already been made for the bench when the co-defendant's case 
was sent to the Crown Court. The defence solicitor builds upon this: 
Defence Solicitor: The co-defendant has been before your colleagues, and they decided 
that that should go to the Crown Court on dwelling house burglary. So be it. I think what 
my friend is alluding to, is that the young man is going to the Crown Court. 
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In case 93, the prosecutor and defence solicitor agreed that the existence of other 
matters at the Crown Court should result in these allegations of handling stolen 
cigarettes being directed to the Crown Court: 
Prosecutor: You're already aware that they already have matters at the Crown Court. I 
think the defence, I think my friend, accepts that this matter will be going to the Crown 
Court in due course, if you agree Sir. 
The defence solicitor clearly agreed: 
Defence Solicitor: in view of the other matters that they have, it would be quite sensible 
to send them [to the Crown Court]. 
The defence solicitor also suggested that the bench's hands were tied in case 92. 
In this case, there were two mode of trial hearings, as after an initial mode of trial 
hearing, the prosecution amended the charges. As a result, the court reconsidered 
mode of trial. The defence solicitor clearly thought that this was a simple 
decision for the bench: 
Defence Solicitor: Well Sir, the other charge that was originally laid was to be 
considered suitable, and these [new charges] just clarify [matters]. So Sir, there's no real 
difference and they're within your powers. 
In contrast to case 11 examined above, the defence solicitor's indication of 
election in case 23 did not lead to the bench declining jurisdiction, one of the 
probable reasons being that the legal adviser reminded the bench that their 
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decision had to be made irrespective of this indication of the defendant's 
intentions. Similarly, in case 97, the defence solicitor stated that the defendant 
would elect. The legal adviser once again reminded the bench that they were to 
make their decision regardless of this indication. However, the bench responded 
to the prosecutor's borderline recommendation by declining jurisdiction. 
6.3.4 Drug offences 
Table 16 shows the figures for drug offences: 
Table 16: Drug offences 
Total Directed to Magistrates Defendant Cases sent Agreement Defendant Magistrates' 
Crown retain elects to Crown elections direction 
Court jurisdiction Court 
All 10 9 90% 1 10% -- 9 90% 10 100% - 100% 
City 8 7 88% 1 13% -- 7 88% 8 100% - 100% 
County 2 2 100% ---- 2 100% 2 100% - 100% 
Drug offences do not share the same profile as other offences, as by far the 
majority of such cases are directed to the Crown Court. There was a clear 
preponderance of possession with intent to supply cases that, as shown below, 
were regarded as serious. It is speculated that straight possession offences either 
result in a caution, or when coupled with other allegations, usually result in a 
guilty plea. As a result, only those serious cases of possession with intent to 
supply undergo a mode of trial hearing. ' 81 
The case features that were identified in the sample can be grouped into different 
categories: the amount of drugs possessed or cultivated; the allegation of an 
181 An examination of the police interview records reveals that frequently the defendant admits 
possession, but denies any intention to supply. 
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intention to supply; the defendant's modus operandi; the scene of crime; and the 
existence of a local court culture. Two of these categories are unique to drugs 
offences; the amount of drugs and any intention to supply. These both go to the 
heart of the prohibition on drugs. Drug offences, unlike say offences against the 
person, do not involve any specific actions of the defendant that cause direct 
harm to another, but are instead concerned with possession of substances that are 
regarded as involving the risk of long term harm. The amount of any controlled 
substance therefore impinges upon seriousness and greater quantities lead to a 
greater risk of harm. Similarly, the existence of any intention to supply is the 
defining characteristic of this aggravated offence, as it involves a direct 
amplification of the problem. 
6.3.4.1 Drugs offences: Amount 
In all of the cases in the City sample, the prosecution had something to say about 
the amount of drugs seized. In some cases, this was the defining characteristic, 
while in others different case features were important. ' 82 For instance, in case 29, 
the defendant was apprehended in possession of 360g of cannabis and was 
charged with possession with intent to supply. While reviewing the case, the 
prosecutor stated that such a case would inevitably be sent to the Crown Court, 
as anything more than an ounce was not suitable for summary trial. Similarly, 
182 For drugs offences, the Mode of Trial Guidelines suggest that the amount of drugs seized 
should only have influence in restricted circumstances. The Guidelines suggest that, for 
possession with intent to supply class A drugs, all cases should be committed to the Crown Court. 
For possession with intent to supply class B drugs, these should "be committed for trial unless 
there is only small scale supply for no payment. " Simple possession of class A drugs should be 
"committed for trial unless the amount is consistent only with personal use. " Simple possession 
of class B drugs should "be committed for trial when the quantity is substantial and not consistent 
only with personal use". 
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possessing 39 ecstasy tablets (case 31), possessing 172g of cannabis (worth 
£861.05 - case 79) and the cultivation of 30 cannabis plants (case 37), were 
regarded as too serious for the magistrates' court. In contrast, the possession of 
0.53g of heroin was regarded as suitable for summary trial. While the District 
Judge was unsure as to whether the case should go to the Crown Court because 
of the weapon possessed by the defendant, nothing was said about the heroin. 
6.3.4.2 Drugs offences: Intention to supply 
In case 16, the allegation of possession with intention to supply resulted in the 
possession of a small amount of drugs being sent to the Crown Court: 
Prosecutor: you have people within a vehicle, and they were concerned in what the 
Crown would say is the supply of drugs - 80 grams of heroin and supply of crack 
cocaine and clearly it's going to be supplying to clients and people who want it, cruising 
around and selling it. 
The defence solicitor challenged this recommendation: 
Defence Solicitor: whether or not you feel the powers of this court are suitable [for 
summary trial], bearing in mind' the amount of drugs that you've been told about. I'd 
rather give you a street value, but it's not a massive amount of drugs in terms of dealing 
values, but obviously, it's a matter of preference for you. Possibly borderline. 
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The defence solicitor acknowledged the amount as more than simple personal 
use, but questioned whether Crown Court trial was justified. 183 However, the 
prosecutor expanded upon this suggestion of a low street value: 
Prosecutor: The reason why I don't have a street value - one thing about the value is 
this, that as the supply of drugs increases, and drugs have become cheaper, and they do 
become cheaper, and they are much cheaper, the fact is, by giving a street value I reduce 
the scale of the problem. The greater the supply, the lower the value, and the lower the 
perceived problem, so amount is more important than street value. 
On one level this statement was a defence of the practice of giving amounts 
rather than street values, but it also performed a more evaluative function. The 
prosecutor was implying that the local problems of drug use had reached the 
stage where the market was saturated, resulting in a fall in prices. As a result, the 
implication was that the courts needed to deal with this specific local problem. 
The importance of intending to supply is also displayed in case 30; the defendant 
was charged with possessing 1.8 and 0.53 grams of heroin (contained in 11 and 5 
cling film wraps respectively) with intent to supply. The prosecutor 
acknowledged that this was not an excessive amount, but went on to state that 
case law' 84 suggested the supply of class A drugs (no matter how small the 
amount), even if an example of `social supply', should be directed to the Crown 
Court. 185 
183 In the face of the Mode of Trial Guidelines. 
184 The prosecutor only made a generic reference to case law and failed to refer to any particular 
case. 
cgs This approach accords with the Mode of Trial Guidelines. 
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6.3.4.3 Drugs offences: Modus operandi 
Any allegation that the defendant was engaged in a professional or commercial 
venture will aggravate the offence. For instance, in case 65, the allegation of a 
commercial enterprise was probably decisive. The defendant was charged with 
possession of 5.68 and 5.6 grams of cannabis with intent to supply. The 
prosecutor stated that, although the amount of drugs seized was small, the case 
may be just outside the powers of the magistrates' court. Great importance was 
placed upon a piece of paper found in the defendant's possession; a list of names 
and numbers. This list was said to suggest commercial activities, along with the 
associated "paraphernalia" also found to be in the defendant's possession. 
Similar conclusions were drawn in case 29, where the defendant was alleged to 
have £11,000 passing through his bank account, that could not be legitimately 
explained. In case 37, the prosecutor noted how the defendant was involved in a 
"very nice set up" that involved "lights and leads and that sort of thing". 
6.3.4.4 Drugs offences: The scene of crime 
In two cases, the prosecutor made an indirect reference to the scene of crime. So, 
in case 16 the prosecutor suggested that the defendants were "cruising" around 
and selling to people who wanted to buy. The prosecutor was implying that the 
defendants were being proactive and looking for `customers' rather than waiting 
for their usual `clients' to contact them, therefore suggesting an aggressive 
`marketing strategy'. Rather different was the reference in case 31 to the offence 
taking place in a "nightclub situation". This linked to a perception that drug use 
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was prevalent in nightclubs and that criminal justice agencies should respond 
appropriately. 186 
6.3.4.5 Drugs offences: Local court culture 
In case 54, the prosecutor was clear on the existence of a local court culture that 
generated expectations as to how to dispose of drug offences: 
Prosecutor: Ma'am, the normal policy, as far as possession with intent to supply is 
concerned, is committal to the Crown Court, and is what we advise in this case. 
Certainly, all of the cases in this sample concerned with possession with intent to 
supply were sent to the Crown Court, supporting the existence of a local legal 
culture. However, the comments from the prosecutor in case 65, that the case was 
not suitable for summary trial because of the commercial nature of the 
defendant's activities, suggested that this was not a rigid policy, more a guide to 
action. 
6.3.5 Sexual offences 
Table 17 outlines the cases of sexual assault: 
186 For more on the perceived problem of drug use in nightclubs see Collin (1998). 
247 
Table 17: Sex offences 
Total Directed Magistrates Defendant Cases Agreement Defendant Magistrates' 
to Crown retain elects sent to elections direction 
Court jurisdiction Crown 
Court 
All 52 40% 3 60% 1 20% 3 60% 5 100% 33% 67% 
City I-- 1 100% ---- 1 100% - - County 42 50% 2 50% 1 25% 3 75% 4 100% 50% 67% 
Somewhat surprisingly, the norm for sexual offences seems to be that the 
magistrates retain jurisdiction. Early impressions in the field suggested that sex 
offences were one of the few offences (along with those against children) that 
could have an effect on prosecutors. Upon entering the field, it was surprising 
how prosecutors could routinely discuss serious crime in an everyday, mundane 
manner. This did not apply, however, to sexual offences, which were still 
discussed with a degree of shock and sadness, not usually associated with the 
work of a prosecutor. It was therefore expected that sexual offences would 
predominantly be sent to the Crown Court. The most serious sexual offences 
against children were transferred to the Crown Court to make use of video links 
for the giving of evidence (thereby bypassing the mode of trial procedure). 
However, others resulted in a guilty plea, even though the concern shown by the 
professionals inevitably inflated their appearance during the course of the 
fieldwork process. So, while concern about sexual offences played a large part in 
the fieldwork experience, this was not translated to cases in the sample. 
Within the mode of trial hearing, prosecutors again made reference to different 
case features: the defendant's modus operandi; the age of the complainants; the 
available courtroom procedures; the injuries received; and legal factors. 
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6.3.5.1 Sexual offences: Modus operandi 
For some offences, prosecutors almost expected the facts to speak for 
themselves; the implication being that the case was so obviously clear that the 
prosecutor did not need to expand upon her recommendation. ' 87 For instance, in 
case 98, the prosecutor simply described the alleged indecent assault - the 
defendant stopped the complainant in the street and asked her if she would like to 
appear in a "home movie" while kissing her hand and cheek; this was deemed 
sufficient to justify the recommendation that the bench retain jurisdiction. By 
contrast, the allegations in case 95 were so serious that again little needed to be 
said. The defendant was alleged to have "caressed and sucked" the breasts of his 
daughter's friend and "then rubbed her vagina" on more than one occasion. The 
prosecutor also indicated that similar acts were alleged to have been committed 
against the defendant's daughter. 
6.3.5.2 Sexual offences: Age of victim 
The ages of the victims were aggravating features in cases 78,95 and 96. In case 
78, the ages of the complainants (9 and 12) did concern the court, but by far the 
greatest problem was the availability of courtroom procedures. While the victims 
in case 95 were 13 and 15, the seriousness of the allegations were clearly the 
defining characteristic in the case. In case 96, the prosecutor referred to the 
187 The Mode of Trial Guidelines refer to the "[s]erious nature of the assault" as an aggravating 
feature. 
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disparity in age between the victim and the defendant as being a reason for the 
recommendation that the offence was not suitable for summary trial: 188 
Prosecutor: Madam, given the disparity in ages - the youth being some thirteen years of 
age and [the defendant's] age189 -I would submit that it's not suitable to be dealt with in 
this court and insufficient powers of sentence. 
6.3.5.3 Sexual offences: Courtroom procedures 
In case 78, there was an allegation that the victims "felt their bottoms squeezed" 
by the defendant; the prosecutor thought that the case was within the sentencing 
powers of the court, and that summary trial would be more appropriate given the 
age and welfare of the complainants: 
Prosecutor: Of course, you have to take into account the welfare of the two victims, and 
the prosecution suggest that having the trial sooner rather than later, in the less formal 
proceedings perhaps of the magistrates' court, would be of benefit to them. 
The defence solicitor was happy with this recommendation, but the legal adviser 
did foresee a problem; the need for evidence to be given by video-link and the 
non-availability of such procedures in the magistrates' court. The prosecutor then 
acknowledged this as a potential problem, but described the issue as a balancing 
act: 
188 The Guidelines refer to vulnerable victims, of a "[s]ubstantial disparity in age between victim 
and defendant and a more serious assault". 
189 The defendant was 49. 
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Prosecutor: Sir, obviously the two victims couldn't give evidence by video-link in the 
magistrates' court, but part of the consideration is obviously how long they have to wait 
before they have to give evidence at the Crown Court. Obviously, video-link, they give 
their evidence by way of video, and are then cross-examined in the Crown Court, so one 
way or the other they face questioning. It's a balancing act and that's the difficulty of it. 
The legal adviser agreed that the issue was one of balance between the available 
facilities in the Crown Court and the delay that would be generated by sending 
the case to the Crown Court. He also pointed out that screens would be available 
in the magistrates' court to lessen the impact of having to face the defendant in 
court. After retiring, the bench accepted jurisdiction. 
6.3.5.4 Sexual offences: Injuries 
The defendant in case 53 was charged with indecent assault and the allegation 
concerned an incident outside a fast food establishment. The defendant was 
alleged to have approached the complainant, said, "I know your wife" and then 
grabbed his testicles. In making his recommendation, the prosecutor drew 
attention to the lack of injuries caused: 
Prosecutor: I don't think he refers to any injuries apart from the obvious discomfort 
from the initial assault. In the circumstances, Sir, I think it is a matter properly for this 
court to deal with. 
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6.3.5.5 Sexual offences: Legal factors 
In case 78, as well as referring to the need to dispose of the cases as soon as 
possible for the benefit of the victims, the prosecutor also noted how the 
existence of two either way allegations increased the court's sentencing powers 
to 12 months' imprisonment. 
6.3.6 Driving offences 
Table 18 displays the figures for driving offences: 
Table 18: Driving offences 
Total Directed to Magistrates Defendant Cases sent Agreement Defendant Magistrates' 
Crown retain elects to Crown elections direction 
Court jurisdiction Court 
All 4 2 50% 2 50% -- 2 50% 4 100% - 100% 
City 2 2 100% ---- 2 100% 2 100% - 100% 
County 2 -- 2 100% -- -- 2 100% - - 
In all four driving cases, the prosecutor's observations focused upon the modus 
operandi of the defendant. Dealing with the two City cases first, the defendants 
in case 4 faced allegations of aggravated vehicle taking and allowing to be 
carried in the taken vehicle. A number of aspects of the driving were highlighted 
as aggravating features: on the motorway the car was driven at speeds in excess 
of 100 miles per hour; 190 the driving was for a lengthy period of time; '91 and 
there were two near misses where the driver nearly collided with other road 
users. Finally, the defence solicitor, in accepting this recommendation, referred 
to an allegation that the car attempted to ram a police vehicle off the road. In the 
190 The Guidelines draw attention to "[g]rossly excessive speed" as an aggravating feature. 
191 The Guidelines also require a consideration of whether the course of driving could be 
described as prolonged. 
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other City case (34), an allegation of dangerous driving, the two main features 
also concerned near misses. So, when driving down the motorway, the defendant 
used the hard shoulder and came "very close to a broken down vehicle" while the 
driver of that vehicle was standing nearby. Later, when driving on A roads, the 
defendant crossed a red traffic light "on the wrong side of the road causing traffic 
in the other direction to swerve in order to avoid a collision". At this point, the 
District Judge stopped the prosecutor and declined jurisdiction. ' 92 
As for the County cases, these were both allegations of dangerous driving where 
the bench accepted jurisdiction. In case 73, the prosecutor stated that there was 
an aggravating feature, but this simply made the case one of dangerous driving 
rather than driving without due care and attention. The defendant was alleged to 
have made the wheels spin on his car so that "plumes of smoke were observed 
coming from the front tyres of the vehicle that was being driven under harsh 
acceleration". The aggravating feature was the presence of a crowd watching the 
driving. However, as there was no allegation of driving with excess alcohol or 
driving whilst disqualified, the case was regarded by the prosecutor as suitable 
for summary trial and the bench accepted this recommendation. In case 100, an 
unmarked police car encountered the defendant driving a vehicle at "an excessive 
speed", with the driver "driving erratically and braking suddenly". Once the 
police attempted to stop the vehicle, the defendant executed a U-turn and drove 
at the unmarked police vehicle in an attempt to ram it off the road. When the 
police vehicle successfully evaded this attempt, the defendant then reversed his 
car, again towards the police vehicle. The prosecutor noted that "more by good 
192 The Guidelines refer to incidences of significant injury or damage, rather than the potential for 
such injury or damage. 
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luck" no collision took place, yet was able to recommend the bench accept 
jurisdiction. While the two cases in the City sample involved more prolonged 
courses of conduct, they seemed to be decided differently on the basis of similar 
near misses. 
6.3.7 Inchoate offences 
There was only one inchoate offence in the sample. The bench directed this case 
to the Crown Court after a recommendation to this effect by the prosecutor. In 
case 13, the defendant was charged with inciting another to inflict actual bodily 
harm. Here, the defendant was in prison and while there, he wrote a letter to his 
sister. Part of that letter contained an instruction to his sister to contact a third 
party to arrange for the assault of two complainants, who had made another 
allegation against the defendant. The prosecutor did not focus upon the substance 
of the allegations, but instead asked the court to view this as analogous to 
interference with witnesses as the reason for his recommendation that the case 
was not suitable for summary trial. While the defence solicitor attempted to 
minimise the impact of the letter - he noted how the defendant merely suggested 
that the complainants be "cuffed" and that he didn't expect them to operate upon 
this suggestion - the defence solicitor did accept that this case would be directed 
to the Crown Court. 
6.3.8 Possession of weapons and preparatory offences 
Table 19 shows the figures for possession of weapons and preparatory offences: 
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Table 19: Possession and preparatory offences 
Total Directed to Magistrates Defendant Cases sent Agreement Defendant Magistrates' 
Crown retain elects to Crown elections direction 
Court jurisdiction Court 
All 8 5 63% 3 38% --5 63% 7 88% - 100% 
City 6 3 50% 3 50% --3 50% 5 83% - 100% 
County 2 2 100% -- --2 100% 2 100% - 100% 
Given the small number of cases in the County sample, it is worth examining the 
total number of possession and preparatory offences; these display a similar 
profile to the sample as a whole, with a bare majority of cases being directed to 
the Crown Court because the bench declined jurisdiction. Of the three cases 
where the defendant was given an option, none elected Crown Court trial. 
Analysis of these cases suggests a number of considerations: the type of weapon 
possessed; whether it was used; and the time and place of possession. 
6.3.8.1 Possession: Type of weapon 
In only one case did the type of weapon actually have any influence the decision 
of the court. In case 26, the defendant was alleged to be in possession of a CS gas 
canister. The prosecutor thought that magistrates' court trial would be sufficient, 
as the canister was not used, and the defence solicitor concurred with this view. 
However, the District Judge was not convinced and suggested this was an 
unusual weapon that demanded a more severe response. However, as the 
defendant was also charged with another either way offence, resulting in a 
possible 12-month sentence, and that the weapon was not used, the District Judge 
finally accepted jurisdiction. Otherwise, a variety of different weapons such as a 
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rounders bat, a kitchen knife with a nine inch blade, a 20 inch wooden stick with 
two sharpened ends and a lock knife drew no specific comment. 
6.3.8.2 Possession: Use of weapon 
It has been seen above how the non-use of the CS canister in case 26 was 
regarded as justifying summary trial by the prosecutor and reluctantly accepted 
by the District Judge. Similarly, in cases 27 and 52, the prosecutor made similar 
representations. In case 27, the prosecutor noted that: 
Prosecutor: There's no suggestion, Sir, of any use or threatening at the scene, and 
therefore a matter suitable for summary trial in my submission. 
In case 52 the prosecutor said: 
Prosecutor: Sir, the prosecution say that there are no aggravating features attached to 
this. There was no suggestion that it was used. 
Case 19, however, was far more complex and the prosecutor, if not directly, gave 
the impression that the weapon had been used in an assault. The prosecutor could 
not directly state that the weapon had been used, as the victim to the implied 
assault did not wish to complain, and the available CCTV evidence was not clear 
on this point. Under such circumstances, the prosecution would have been unable 
to prove any assault allegation, hence the necessity of proceeding with the 
offensive weapon charge. The prosecutor's conclusions summed up the case: 
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Prosecutor: It's a very difficult case, your worships, it's the town centre, it's at night, 
and it's with a baseball bat, but on the other hand the man lying on the floor didn't 
apparently wish to complain. 
In other parts of the hearing, the prosecutor describes how the defendant was 
seen standing over the victim holding a bat and the CCTV evidence showed the 
victim lying "on the floor apparently trying to defend himself'. The bench, 
confronted with such an ambiguous set of observations (the prosecutor made a 
borderline suitable for summary trial recommendation), accepted jurisdiction. 
Given the context of the implied assault (a night time city centre attack with a 
weapon that resulted in facial injuries), had it been possible to prove these 
allegations, there is little doubt the prosecutor would have firmly recommended 
that the bench decline jurisdiction. 
6.3.8.3 Possession: Time and place 
The prosecutor's statement in case 19 above makes it clear that any allegation of 
night time city centre violence will be regarded as an aggravating feature. 
6.3.9 Criminal damage 
There was only one offence of criminal damage in the sample. The bench 
declined jurisdiction after a recommendation that the case was not suitable for 
summary trial by the prosecution. 
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In this case (84) the defendant was charged with possession of petrol bombs 
"with intent to use them at various premises" and an allegation of causing 
criminal damage by fire, with a value placed upon the damage of £6.000. ' 93 The 
prosecutor noted, in addition to these bare details, that: 
Prosecutor: It seems to be a spree of offending and damage. I suggest the matters aren't 
suitable for summary trial. 
In reaching their decision, the bench commented upon the value of the damage 
caused: 
Chair: Yes, well we would agree with that because of the high damage caused, and 
everything else that goes along with it, we believe that it's better to be dealt with at the 
Crown Court. 
6.3.10 Offences against justice 
There were two cases of offences against justice in the sample. The bench 
retained jurisdiction in both cases following the recommendation of the 
prosecution. Both defendants consented to summary trial. 
In case 63, the defendant was charged with interference with a witness after 
threatening his partner, who had made a complaint to the police against the 
defendant. The prosecutor chose to focus upon the trivial nature of the 
193 The Guidelines draw attention to deliberate fire raising and causing damage of a high value as 
aggravating features. 
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defendant's conduct. 194 The defendant was alleged to have shouted, "If I go to 
court, I'm going to kill you, I'll have you". Additionally, two small children were 
present at the scene. Nevertheless, the prosecutor, due to the absence of any 
direct violence, recommended that the bench accept jurisdiction and the bench 
agreed. Similarly, in case 1, the bench accepted jurisdiction when the defendant 
made threats to kill a witness (his ex-partner) and then left (again when children 
were present). 195 
6.4 Conclusions 
A number of different conclusions arise from the disparate threads of this 
analysis. Firstly, there is a clear multiplicity of case factors raised by the 
prosecution and these are not necessarily highlighted in the Mode of Trial 
Guidelines. Indeed, in some circumstances, actual court practice does not fit with 
the Guidelines. For instance, the bench declined jurisdiction as a matter of course 
for allegations of domestic burglary, even in situations where no case factors 
were present that are highlighted in the Guidelines as reasons for declining 
jurisdiction. This leads to the second conclusion: a local legal culture helped 
determine venue for a whole host of cases. Domestic burglary, section 20 
assaults, violent disorder, possession of class A drugs with intent to supply, and 
property offences where the value of the property taken exceeds £ 10,000, are all 
deemed to be unsuitable for summary trial regardless of any other case features. 
Similarly, there are offences - shop theft and theft from a vehicle are two 
194 This can be compared to case 13, where the prosecutor likened the activities in inciting others 
to commit violence as akin to witness intimidation, therefore supporting the recommendation that 
the case was not suitable for summary trial. 
'95 Both of these could be classified as domestic violence cases, thereby raising the discrete issues 
that will be examined in Chapter 7. 
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examples - where the bench will nearly always retain jurisdiction. Thirdly, some 
of these case factors appear to be more important and more influential than 
others, even to the extent that some case factors seem to be decisive in the 
recommendations of prosecutors, while others simply appear to be paid lip 
service by prosecutors. For offences against the person, the manner of the assault 
and the extent of any injuries inflicted were highlighted as highly influential, 
while factors such as the location of the incident, the absence of provocation or 
the presence of children, while described as important by prosecutors, very rarely 
proved decisive. Finally, the multiplicity of factors suggests that an analysis of 
these cannot give an indication of venue in all cases. The existence of many 
factors that can sometimes result in contradictory indications gives credence to 
the professional's belief that deciding upon mode of trial is something that is a 
practiced art which cannot simply be reduced to words. The induction of the 
designated case worker evidenced how the professionals utilise an inherent 
common sense and understanding of the local culture that frames behaviour. 
While an understanding of the factors used does get us closer to comprehending 
this decision, such an understanding cannot be complete without analysis of the 
sociological aspects of practice. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
"HE'S SHOUTING ABOUT THE CHILD": 
DECIDING VENUE IN THE COURT, 
SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 explained the theoretical approach of the thesis and described 
(courtroom) interactions as multifaceted with different layers of depth. Within 
Chapter 5, it was explained how narrative analysis could offer an entry point into 
the data in order to explore these levels of action. Now legal aspects of the data 
have been examined, sociological influences upon the data will be examined 
through an analysis of narrative (re)production practices. 
7.2 Narratives and legal storytelling 
Within Chapter 5, a fictional mode of trial hearing was created to explain how 
prosecutors generally constructed narratives within the courtroom. Typical 
narratives consist of different sections that address specific questions before an 
audience asks them. Narratives can contain an abstract, orientation, complication, 
result and evaluation, and all of these sections were found within the narratives 
delivered by prosecutors. However, each narrative section took a particular form 
within the mode of trial hearing, and this form gave some important insights into 
the work of prosecutors and criminal justice agencies. 
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7.2.1 The abstract 
The abstract is most notable by its absence in the data. As the abstract functions 
to create space for the delivery of a narrative, it is not strictly necessary in the 
mode of trial hearing. Conversational analysis suggests that everyday 
conversation is marked by the use of adjacency pairs, such as question-answer, 
and complicated turn-taking rules. The abstract is the means by which the 
narrator informs (or requests of) those listening that normal turn taking 
conventions are suspended and an extended turn will follow where the narrator 
tells the story. 196 In everyday conversation we might say "let me tell you a story". 
However, in the mode of trial hearing, such requests are unnecessary as 
institutional conventions determine who speaks when. Courtroom participants 
know the sequence of utterances within the courtroom and come to expect that 
certain speech acts will take place in certain places at certain times. The 
prosecutor therefore does not need to begin with an abstract, as all regulars know 
what will happen next. ' 97 The magistrate will deliver a standard statement asking 
the defendant for her plea and explaining the consequences of that plea. If there 
is a plea of not guilty, the prosecutor will then deliver their mode of trial 
observations, followed by the defence solicitor's statement. Nevertheless, even 
though an abstract is unnecessary for the court regulars, prosecutors did 
occasionally introduce their observations with an abstract. For instance, the 
196 See for Cortazzi (1993) for one attempt at incorporating some of the tenets of conversational 
analysis into narrative analysis 
197 The absence of an abstract could be said to indicate who owns the court. While courtroom 
regulars may know what to expect next, the same cannot be said of others, such as defendants and 
members of the public who are observing. By not using an abstract, prosecutors could be said to 
be neglecting these courtroom outsiders. 
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prosecutor in case 25 opened with a typical abstract; '`as far as mode of trial is 
concerned, the prosecution say that this is a matter -which you can try here". 
Similarly, the prosecutor in case 40 started by saying that, "the prosecution say 
that this matter is not suitable for summary trial". These are just two examples of 
standard abstract clauses that can be found, albeit infrequently, within the data 
set. Although mundane, they evidence two considerations on the work of lawyers 
within the legal process. Firstly, they do suggest an expectation that stories begin 
with a beginning. We expect narratives to start with a brief introduction. 
Secondly, these abstracts show something of the nature of legal storytelling; 
whilst we might start an everyday story by saying, `let me tell you a story that 
explains this', or `I know another story about that', lawyers start (and tell) stories 
differently. This can be seen most clearly in the abstract to case 18; "Sir, there is 
an aggravating feature". All three abstracts are focused upon the legally relevant 
details of the case. The narrative is a legal one, that tells the story from a legal 
perspective. While this is, in some senses, a trite statement (what else are lawyers 
going to do if they don't tell legal stories? ) it does give an indication of what to 
expect from prosecution narratives. 
7.2.2 The orientation 
Orientation clauses in narratives set the scene; they introduce characters, the 
setting and the time, before proceeding to what happened next. While orientation 
clauses can be distributed throughout a narrative, most are grouped together at 
the beginning (immediately following the abstract), with a few later orientation 
clauses utilised to introduce new characters or scenes. Within the mode of trial 
263 
hearing, it is normal for the orientation clauses to be grouped together at the start. 
For instance, in case 59, the prosecutor opened with an abstract (the 
recommendation) and then introduced the characters: 
Prosecutor: Both the defendant and the complainant at the time of the matter are 
inmates at [a young offenders institution]. They were at the gym, five-a-side football 
match. They were on opposing teams. 
This orientation introduced the central characters to the narrative, explained the 
location of the incident and what the participants were doing at the time. 
However, there is little of the character development associated with mainstream 
narrative forms; the audience was given the minimum details needed to interpret 
the complication that follows. Unlike everyday narrative forms, there was no 
subtle introduction of the characters and their role; the prosecutor was much 
more explicit on this point, labelling each character - defendant and complainant 
- in a way that left little to the imagination or interpretation; the roles for each 
character being fixed from the outset. Once again, the institutional site of the 
narrative heavily influences form. The mode of trial hearing is not an opportunity 
for storytelling per se, but is a forum for making a particular legal decision. 
Again, this is a trite statement, but nevertheless it assists in the description of a 
legal process that utilises a particular form of narrative (re)production. However, 
on some occasions the prosecutor expanded upon these minimum details, such as 
in case 17. The abstract, orientation and complication are reproduced below: 
Abstract/Orientation 
Prosecutor: Sir, the ABH is upon his partner [... ] 
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Orientation 
What seems to have happened is that they have, she's told him that the relationship is 
over, she doesn't want him at the premises. 
Complication 
He forces his way into her address - that's the summary only offence of using violence 
to secure entry - and she then describes how he assaulted her there so whilst he pushes 
the door in or kicks the door in, he punches her to the side of her neck which she says 
causes her to move past. He goes into the living room where the child is -I think the 
child is about six months old or thereabouts - he picks up the child in his arms and kicks 
the child's bouncer towards her so that he kicks the outside of her right thigh. He then 
pulls the phone out of the socket, he takes the handset, she says he hit her with the phone 
handset two or three times to the back of her head. She puts her arms to push him away, 
he grabs her hand and bites her, she says, on the left forearm. She says he's holding it 
for about five seconds - she's got a circular purple mark on her left arm as a result of 
that. He shoves her with the side of his body causing her to move out of the way. He 
then picks up the baby's milk, pushchair and what have you. Tries, she tries to take the 
child back and he uses his hand to push her right shoulder, causing her to fall onto the 
bed. Then she says he takes her tee-shirt and drags her into the hallway and says he 
shook her causing her to fall to the floor. She says he then kicks her to her left outer 
thigh when she turned around. He's shouting about the child, not being able to see the 
child. She goes into the living room. She says he comes in and stamps on the phone in 
the living room, runs into the bedroom, he tries to pick the child up, he tries to take the 
child as well. He then punches her to the left temple. She says she's feeling dizzy. She 
goes into the living room, she collapses on the floor. She says she's there two or three 
minutes but she doesn't blank out. She goes back into the bedroom at that stage. He's 
got the child and the pushchair by then. She says he runs towards her, pushes her back 
again into the living room, causing her to fall to the floor, and then he gets the phone 
wire, she says, and puts the telephone cord over her head and onto her neck. She says, "I 
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realised he was going to choke me with the telephone cord, I grabbed it and pushed it 
away to stop him". She describes herself as feeling very frightened. She says he then 
grabs her arm and swings her, causing her to fall to the bed, and at that stage he goes off 
and I think he took the child. 198 
While the orientation section in this narrative is more complete than that outlined 
as typical in case 59, the mere details given are still insufficient for a full 
understanding of the interaction. While the three details outlined - the assault is 
said to take place against the defendant's partner, the relationship is now over 
and the complainant no longer wants the defendant at the address - provide some 
context to this incident (this is a case of domestic violence and the relationship 
between the parties is breaking down). Many more questions need to be 
addressed to enable a thorough understanding of the context of the incident. For 
instance, we could ask why the relationship is over? Who, if anyone is to blame 
for this? Why does she no longer wish to see him at the premises? Does she have 
something to hide, or is she afraid of him? Does he have a right to be at the 
premises or an interest in being there? 
The orientation section in this narrative failed to address adequately any of these 
(and other) questions, yet there was an indication of a wider context in the text. 
Throughout the complication, orientation clauses told another tale (these have 
been highlighted in the text) and these referred to the existence of a child who 
was present during this encounter. 
199 Taken as a whole, it is most likely that this 
198 The highlighted sections reveal the underlying child custody dispute. 
'99 Such clauses do not necessarily have to sit within their respective sections: "it is theoretically 
possible for all free orientation clauses to be placed at the beginning of the narrative, but in 
practice, we find much of this material is placed at strategic points later on" (Labov, 1972: 364- 
5). 
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incident resulted from an argument over custody of the child; both parties picked 
up the child on at least one occasion, he complained about not being able to see 
the child and he eventually left with the child. An appreciation of this possible 
context, however, simply leads to more unanswered questions; does the 
defendant have a right to take the child and does he have good reason for doing 
so? 
The analysis so far suggests that narrative (re)productions delivered by 
prosecutors in court are partial and fail, therefore, to reflect adequately what has 
occurred. While this is to some extent inevitable - as a (re)counting of events, 
narratives flatten reality when describing the important features of an event - 
legal narratives are prone to intensify this process. The mode of trial hearing, 
being concerned with one particular legal process, the venue decision, situates 
narratives within this institutional structure. Much of the human interest in case 
17 is lost; the courtroom participants don't need to hear this information when 
assessing the defendant's case. All that is needed is an outline of the legal case 
against the defendant, along with an evaluation of how this fits in with an 
understanding of the mode of trial decision. In short, the prosecutor is making a 
specific recommendation on trial venue. 
Contextual information may be supplied in the orientation if this forms a relevant 
part of the case. For instance, in case 61, the defendant is alleged to have caused 
trouble in a breakers yard; the prosecutor noted in the orientation that the 
incident took place against the backdrop of "previous trouble" between the 
parties. The defendant had been excluded from the yard on a previous occasion 
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due to his behaviour. While this may help place the incident within a context, it 
is one that is unfavourable to the defendant, as it presents this incident as part of 
a prolonged conflict. The context supplied is therefore still focused upon the 
mode of trial decision, thereby supporting a view that the institutional context 
plays an important role in the framing of prosecution narratives. 
7.2.3 The complication 
The complication is the main body of a narrative; it is here that we find the 
narrative clauses that (re)produce past experiences in a sequence of clauses that 
describe the events central to the narrative (Labov, 1972). The complication (or a 
string of narrative clauses) is the only essential feature of a narrative: "[o]nly... 
the complicating action is essential if we are to recognise a narrative. The 
abstract, the orientation, the resolution, and the evaluation answer questions 
which relate to the function of effective narrative" (Labov, 1972: 370). 
While complication clauses are usually grouped together, both in everyday 
narratives and those observed, it is not unusual for orientation clauses or 
evaluative clauses to be interspersed throughout the central events. 200 If we return 
to the text of case 17, we can see how the prosecutor inserted a number of 
evaluative statements into the text of the complication. For instance, after stating 
that the defendant forced his way into the house, the prosecutor evaluated the 
legal significance of this action by pointing out how this was an incidence of 
"using violence to secure entry". Later, the prosecutor noted the age of the child 
200 Indeed, it is an important feature of effective evaluation that the storyteller pauses and 
evaluates so as to reinforce the importance of the central action. 
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after stating that the defendant entered the room where the child was situated. 
After describing the bite by the defendant, the prosecutor noted how "she's got a 
circular purple mark on her left arm as a result of that". Finally, towards the end, 
the prosecutor suspended the narrative to describe how the complainant felt, 
thereby reinforcing the impact of the incident: "She says `I realised he was going 
to choke me with the telephone cord, I grabbed it and pushed it away to stop 
him. ' She says she was feeling very frightened. " These pauses serve three 
different functions. Firstly, the prosecutor evaluated the defendant's conduct to 
highlight the legal implications of the defendant's actions (using violence to 
secure entry). Secondly, the comment on the age of the child, while also 
highlighting an important legal feature in that it aggravates the offence, also 
described the moral context of the defendant's actions. Finally, and this is an 
exemplary method of storytelling, the prosecutor suspended the action to 
describe the full impact of the defendant's actions upon the complainant, but 
importantly, this was done in the complainant's words. She feared that she was 
going to be choked, and she was very frightened. These three different clauses all 
suspended the action so as to either evaluate the narrative or describe the result of 
an incident. We can see, therefore, how effective storytellers will insert these 
clauses into a complication when narrating events. 
Given that this is an important storytelling device, it is unsurprising to find these 
used in other narratives in the sample. So for instance, the prosecutor in case 38 
inserted into the complication the legal implications of the defendant's actions: 
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Prosecutor:... it seems that he punches out towards either her or her friend. Technically 
that means there was an assault in any event. 201 
Similarly, the prosecutor in case 18 suspended the action to explain the meaning 
of the incident for the mode of trial decision: 
Prosecutor: To read various extracts from her statements; "he grabbed hold of my legs, 
dragged me off the settee onto the floor and then started to kick me in the legs and on 
my backside and continued by kicking me on the side of my head. " On that last feature, 
I'm sure the court will have concerns as to jurisdiction. 
Finally, in case 39, the prosecutor highlighted the emotional impact of the assault 
upon the complainant: 
Prosecutor: He grabs her wrists saying don't push me, don't make me hit you. She's 
telling him that he's hurting her. She's frightened she says and crying. He then grabs her 
hair with one hand and her coat with the other and she alleges that he pushed her head 
against the passenger window. She was very frightened, more so than before. She was 
asking him to let her go. 
While most of these clauses are result or evaluation clauses, they are interspersed 
within the complication to reinforce the impact of central narrative actions. 
However, such clauses are also frequently grouped together, both within 
everyday narratives and those found in the mode of trial hearing. 
201 This incident differs from that outlined in case 17 as this assault was not charged as a separate 
offence. 
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7.2.4 The result 
The result clauses inform the audience of what finally happened to the central 
characters in the story. Labov suggested that the result is usually delayed until 
after the evaluation clauses; the narrator concludes a story by stating what finally 
happened, after pointing out the meaning of the narrative through the evaluative 
clauses. However, within the mode of trial hearing, the result frequently preceded 
the evaluation; this can be explained on the basis that result clauses (especially 
for offences against the person cases) often contain information used to evaluate 
the events. In this sense they are also quasi-evaluation clauses. For instance, case 
18 displayed a typical result section for offences against the person: 
Prosecution: The injuries are detailed as follows: "my lip is swollen, I have bruises on 
the top of my head, my wrists are also slightly red and bruised, I've got bruises on the 
top of my leg. " 
The prosecutor here utilised the victim's words to describe the result of the 
assault. If a trip to hospital were required then this would be highlighted at this 
time. In short, when describing the injuries and outlining what happened, the 
prosecutor was also describing an important feature of the allegations: the harm 
caused. 202 Most mode of trial hearings for assaults had a section where the 
prosecutor outlined the extent of the injuries, even if these were not expanded 
upon for evaluative purposes. 
202 The injuries caused are an important consideration in the mode of trial decision. 
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Other prosecutors went further than outlining the injuries when telling the court 
what finally happened. Some described the actions of the police upon arrival at 
the scene, or disclosed the details of any police interview. Such matters, while in 
no way central to the legal aspects of the decision, do close the chapter as they 
inform the audience of the eventual outcome. For instance, in case 18 the court 
was told that, "the police attend, other matters follow"; these related to a 
summary only public order offence and an assault on the police. Likewise, the 
prosecutor in case 38 referenced "some problem with the police subsequently". 
While both statements drew the narrative to an end, they also served another 
function; they helped to describe the general lawlessness of the situation, 
justifying the intervention of criminal justice professionals. As for the police 
interview, the statement by the prosecutor in case 39 is typical of this approach: 
Prosecutor: The defendant does make some admissions in interview; he says he may 
have grabbed her hair and pushed her against the window, he denies head butting and 
suggests that anything he did do may have been in self-defence. 
An examination of result clauses gives an interesting insight into case 
construction practices. Case 38 is a good example of this: 
Prosecutor: What she says is that she has five one-inch long scratches on the left side of 
her neck; there's some blood drawn, a bite mark on her right cheekbone with two 
puncture marks that drew blood, bruising and slight swelling as a result of the bite and 
she is happy for the police to see her medical records. 
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Two observations can be made about this section of text. Firstly, it shows how 
prosecutors make observations directly from the witness statement. 203 After 
describing the injuries received, the prosecutor continued to read from the 
witness statement and therefore indicated to the court that the complainant was 
happy for the police to access her medical records. This information has no 
bearing upon the decision, but was necessary because it enabled prosecution 
authorities to conclude the exact nature of any injuries received. It is suggested 
that the prosecutor simply kept on reading. Secondly, it highlights the important 
role that the police command in the preparation of witness statements. The 
construction of these parts suggests official assistance; the precise nature of this 
statement - five one-inch long scratches to the left side of the neck - evidences 
this involvement. The statement regarding access to medical records is technical 
usage that also suggests assistance. This is a common feature of witness 
statements. Nearly all complainants outline their injuries in this way, as all 
witnesses of public order offences note how they fear for their personal safety; 
this evidences how the defendant's actions in such cases actually caused in 
another the fear required for the offence. The role of the police in constructing 
witness statements was clearly acknowledged in the defence solicitor's 
representations in case 86: 
Defence Solicitor: Now this is a three and a half page statement which goes into some 
detail. Had she had stitches I would have assumed that quite properly that any decent 
police officer would have put that in the statement. 
203 Due to workload demands, prosecutors may simply read relevant sections in the courtroom. 
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For dishonesty offences, it was commonplace for further details to be included 
within the result. For instance, in case 14, an allegation of burglary, the 
prosecutor noted how the defendant's fingerprints were found on electrical 
equipment. Similarly, in case 5, the prosecutor remarked how the defendant was 
apprehended after traces of his DNA were found at the scene of the burglary, and 
in case 11, the prosecutor noted how the defendant sold a cassette player, 
allegedly stolen from a car, for 30 pounds. These are all examples of hearings 
where, to this point, no mention had been made of the defendant. So in case 14, 
the prosecutor previously outlined that this was an allegation of domestic 
burglary, during the day, when the occupier was out and force was used to gain 
entry. The result in these cases performed the function of linking the defendant to 
the case - being apprehended with the property or finding fingerprint or DNA 
evidence firmly tied the defendant to the allegations. For other offences, the 
defendant was clearly central to the action; for instance, a complainant or witness 
described the details of an assault perpetrated by the defendant, or a police 
witness described how the defendant was found in possession of a weapon. Yet, 
for some dishonesty offences, it was rare to find the defendant at the scene of the 
crime; some other evidence linked the defendant and the crime. The existence of 
such a link can be made explicit in these cases in the result. The prosecutor can 
tie the alleged incident to the defendant by noting how evidence was utilised to 
apprehend the defendant. While these wider details of the legal process (the 
investigation of the case and the apprehension of the defendant) were not 
necessary for the mode of trial decision, they did operate to locate the defendant 
within the narrative. 
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7.2.5 The evaluation 
In the evaluation, the narrator informs the audience of the reason for the story. In 
the mode of trial hearing, the events are retold so that the court can make a 
decision on venue; the evaluation is focused upon this reason for the narrative. It 
has already been seen how evaluative clauses can be distributed throughout the 
text of a narrative. These external evaluation devices, according to Labov, can be 
phrased in a number of different ways. The narrator can explicitly stop and 
inform the audience of the point of the story; an interpretive remark can be 
attributed to the narrator at the time of the actual incident; the narrator as 
principal may quote himself as addressing other characters in the narrative; or the 
narrator can narrate an evaluative action (i. e. what the character actually did 
rather than said) (Labov, 1972). In the mode of trial hearing, the prosecutor has a 
limited number of evaluation devices at her disposal; as she was not present at 
the scene, two of the devices are unavailable. She cannot attribute an interpretive 
remark to herself, nor can she quote herself as addressing other characters. 204 
However, it was most common to find evaluation clauses grouped together at the 
end of the mode of trial hearing, along with the prosecutor's recommendation. 
Here, the prosecutor was performing this function much more explicitly. The 
following, from case 38, is typical of an evaluation section. The prosecutor noted 
all the main features of the allegation, and how they tied together to suggest the 
recommendation: 
204 Labov also identifies internal evaluation devices that depend upon, inter alia, tone, context and 
the nuances of the voice. They are identified as lexical, syntactic, phonological and paralinguistic 
devices, and include intensifiers (heightened stress, variation in pitch range and intonation) and 
the use of comparators (negatives that did not, but could have occurred). 
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Prosecutor: Your worships, if you take the prosecution case at its highest, we have the 
pulling out of earrings, which could actually cause very serious injury, although 
fortunately didn't in this case, and a bite to the cheek, so we've got the use of teeth as a 
weapon, they're complete strangers to each other - they're not known to each other - 
and of course it's the town centre in a nightclub, and we have, what on the face of it, the 
complainant is suggesting unprovoked violence. I'd have to ask you, in all seriousness, 
whether the case is one suitable for magistrates' court trial. 
7.2.6 The coda 
Labov suggested that the coda operates to "bridge the gap between the moment 
of time at the end of the narrative proper and the present" (1972: 365). The coda 
effects a clear indication that the narrator has ceased telling the story and 
therefore normal turn taking conventions are restored. The recommendation 
therefore usually operates as a coda, because at that point the narrative has 
performed its function and the courtroom regulars are aware that the defence 
solicitor is then at liberty to make her representations. Nevertheless, some 
prosecutors will occasionally make an utterance that resembles a coda. For 
instance, in case 38, the prosecutor closed by stating, "[y]our worships, there is 
nothing else really that I can usefully say". 
7.3 Narrative forms 
In the mode of trial hearing, prosecutors utilised different narrative forms at 
differing times. These usually fell into one of three different categories: full or 
complete narratives; truncated or brief narratives; and finally prosecutors may 
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not deliver a narrative as commonly understood at all. Each of these different 
forms will be examined in turn. 
7.3.1 Full narratives 
Some prosecutors in the sample displayed propensities to storytelling, delivering 
complete and extensive narratives, while others only utilised this form for 
difficult decisions. Case 38 provides a good example of an extensive narrative, 
where the prosecutor expanded upon the details of the allegations and made 
frequent pauses to either evaluate the events or speculate upon gaps in the 
witness statements: 
Orientation 
Prosecutor: As far as the assault is concerned, the incident happened in Kudos 
nightclub - it goes back to [a date]. The complainant says that she was there with various 
friends. She says she's not drunk, although I would have to say that she seems to 
consume rather a lot in the way of Vodka. Around seven drinks which contained Vodka 
in greater or lesser extent. It is unclear what the time might be... 
Complication 
but she says she hears a man standing to her right, saying something along the lines of 
you're a slag - that seemed to be directed at her friend and not her. She says something 
back to the man. And what she then alleges is that he reaches over to her with both 
hands and he pulls her earrings out. 
ResultlEvaluation 
Her ears then bled, but fortunately he hasn't badly damaged her skin because the clips 
on the back popped off. I think they are pierced ears your worships and the butterflies 
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have actually come out, fortunately, or otherwise it is thought that they could be pulled 
right through the ears. 
Complication 
She says he then ran from the dance-floor, she followed and they are now near to the 
area where the toilets are. As far as she was concerned, he then turned around and bit the 
right side of her face on her cheekbone and she can feel his teeth digging into her skin. 
She wanted to get him off - she says she struggled and tried to punch this man, but she is 
not aware if any punches made contact. The moment passed, somebody pulled him off 
and what then happened is that she seemed to be expelled from the nightclub, her friend 
was expelled and it seems the man as well was expelled. Something is then said at the 
entrance - it seems that he punches out towards either her or her friend. 
Analysis 
Technically that means there was an assault in any event. 
Complication 
And then, your worships, there is some problem with the police subsequently. 
Result/Analysis 
What she says is that she has five one-inch long scratches on the left side of her neck; 
there's some blood drawn, a bite mark on her right cheekbone, with two puncture marks 
that drew blood, bruising and slight swelling as a result of the bite... 
Analysis 
and she is happy for the police to see any medical records. 
Result/Analysis 
It seems as far as the police can tell that at the time she didn't wish to make a complaint 
- they did speak to 
her, but whether it's been all through the drink, I'm not sure, but at 
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that point she wasn't saying that she probably wanted to complain, but she did 
subsequently. 
Analysis 
Your worships, if you take the prosecution case at its highest, we have the pulling out of 
earrings which could actually cause very serious injury, although fortunately didn't in 
this case, and a bite to the cheek, so we've got the use of teeth as a weapon. They're 
complete strangers to each other: they're not known to each other. and of course it's the 
town centre in a nightclub, and we have what, on the face of it, the complainant is 
suggesting unprovoked violence. I'd have to ask you, in all seriousness, whether the case 
is one suitable for magistrates' court trial. Obviously, there are some features that might 
make it unsuitable. 
Coda 
There's nothing else really that I can usefully add. 
Result/Analysis 
The defendant was subsequently arrested; I think really that he put up something of a 
struggle, but basically he is saying that she attacked him, along with her friend, but 
obviously that's a matter for another court to decide, not you today. 
Coda 
There is nothing else that I can really say your worships. 
Analysis 
There is one thing that I haven't told you which may be of some relevance is the 
complainant is 19, oh she's 18 - not especially young, she's not a juvenile certainly, but 
the sort of age that you might expect to be at a nightclub. 
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Coda 
Your worships, there is nothing else really that I can usefully say. 
The prosecutor frequently interrupted the flow of the narrative to evaluate the 
incident or comment upon the actions of the parties. The prosecutor noted the 
drinking habits of the parties, their co-operation (or lack of) with criminal justice 
agencies, drew inferences from the age of the complainant and generally left 
little to the imagination. In short, the prosecutor was engaged in storytelling. All 
narrative details were disclosed, from the most serious allegations to the 
technical (and maybe trivial) assaults. Interestingly, however, even when 
engaged in storytelling practices, the prosecutor remained largely focused upon 
the legal implications of events. Those fringe details not specifically relevant to 
the decision at hand still concerned the legal process. The prosecutor commented 
upon the potential effect of removing the earrings (the potential for injury), the 
"technical" assault, the "subsequent problem" with the police (a summary only 
public order matter and an allegation of assaulting a police officer), the consent 
given to the authorities to access records and the subsequent arrest and interview. 
While there were other comments on non-legal matters, the overwhelming focus 
of the narrative was upon the legal process. In other words, even in their most 
storytelling moments, prosecutors were engaged in the art of legal storytelling. 
That prosecutors were focused upon the legal process can be seen in more of 
those rare cases when an extended narrative was delivered. For instance, in case 
9, the prosecutor delivers an extended orientation: 
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Orientation 
Prosecutor: The victim of the section 20 is, was catholic, was born in 1933, so he's 68 
years of age. At the time of the offence he would've been 65. [The complainant] is a 
neighbour of this defendant. 
Orientation/Complication 
Sir, he was reprimanding the defendant's children who were making a lot of noise 
outside his window. They were shouting "fucking dickhead" at [the complainant] who 
was asking them to be quiet and not to swear at him. He said "I went to my car and told 
them to pack it in". At that stage the children left, [the defendant's wife] arrived and she 
berated [the complainant] for speaking to her children. 
Complication 
She began to assault [the defendant's wife] - she's not before the court but that's how 
the matter started. He took hold of her to try and push her off his property. At that stage 
he said "I'd managed to push her about two paces when I saw her husband running 
down the road towards us. I could hear him shouting "take your hands off my wife". I 
turned my attention back to her. The next thing I knew, her husband had jumped from 
the neighbours drive-way, barged into me heavily, causing me to be pushed back 
quickly and I banged myself heavily against the wall. I rebounded off the wall and he 
started to punch me about my face and head. I tried to block these blows with my arms. 
Whilst this was happening, his wife got behind me and held me around the shoulders so 
that I couldn't stop him. I struggled to get free and away from the attack. I got free and I 
fell over and I was disorientated. I saw [the defendant] run off up the park. She stepped 
over me, broke my glasses and she left too". 
Evaluation 
He said, "I suffer from angina, I've had two heart attacks in the last 15 years, I have 
diabetes and I also have a cataract"... 
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Result 
and he had obviously to go to a hospital as a result. 
Evaluation 
Sir, what I don't have is a medical report. What I do have is a one page document from 
the [hospital] saying that he has a head injury and that he was given head injury advice. 
There was some question of a fractured skull, but I don't have any medical evidence to 
say that it was fractured, so it may well be that it was a suspected fractured skull but 
wasn't actually fractured. But, Sir, nevertheless, it was the vulnerability of the victim 
here, two onto one, punching, in that situation that's not suitable for this court Sir. 
The prosecutor could have introduced the central events by noting a conflict 
between the complainant and defendant that was precipitated by the behaviour of 
the defendant's children. However, she instead described the behaviour of the 
children in detail. In so doing, the prosecutor painted an unpleasant picture of the 
defendant's family life; this context introduced the main action in the narrative. 
While not strictly speaking relevant to the mode of trial decision, this would have 
been effective in removing sympathy for the defendant and it also deflected 
attention from the ambiguity surrounding the victim's injuries. 
Continuing with the legal focus inherent in the narratives, it is worthwhile 
exploring case 46. Here the prosecutor utilised a relatively complete, if brief, 
narrative so as to outline the alleged events: 
Abstract 
Prosecutor: Sir, the charge involves a sum of around £24,000 allegedly taken. The 
prosecution case is this... 
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A 
Orientation 
the defendant is a financial adviser and one of the people that he is advising is [the 
complaint] who is a private dentist... 
Complication 
and the essence of the case is that he said [the complaint] should invest lots of money 
in [a company]. He then, the defendant, the prosecution will allege, opened an account 
in the name of [this company]. The cheque from [the complainant] was paid into that 
particular account and the defendant, according to his admission, then took the money 
out... 
Evaluation 
because he actually had some debts. 
Result 
He hoped to be able to pay [the complainant] in due course, but it would appear that no 
money has been set aside, not before now. 
Evaluation 
That, in essence, is the prosecution case. It is a substantial sum of money and a breach of 
trust. 
District Judge: Not suitable? 
[Prosecutor nods his head. ] 
Nearly all parts of this narrative focused upon legal aspects of the allegations. 
The abstract noted the value of property taken; important in considering venue. 
The orientation described the relationship between the parties; this displayed the 
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breach of trust inherent in the allegations. The complication outlined how the 
defendant affected the transference of the property, while the result questioned 
the defendant's intention to return the property: an implied claim that he did not 
intend to deprive permanently the owner of the property. There was one passing 
reference to an alternative narrative -a narrative that would explain why the 
events took place - and this was the comment that the defendant took the 
property to repay debts. This alternative narrative was outlined by the prosecutor 
in the police station while reviewing the files; she suggested that the defendant 
probably had drinking or gambling debts that explained the offending behaviour. 
She made a number of sweeping comments that suggested an alternative 
evaluation of the narrative. She stated that, "men did this sort of thing" to clear 
debts and that drinking and gambling was prevalent in City's Asian 
community. 205 The court narrative focused upon the elements of the offence and 
a consideration of venue, while this alternative narrative focused upon crude 
social stereotypes and common sense as a means of explaining what was alleged 
to have taken place. This is a good example of how a legal focus results in 
different narratives from what might be delivered elsewhere. 
One further case will suffice for an examination of legal storytelling; case 50: 
4 hstract 
Prosecutor: There are certain aggravating features in the commission of these offences 
overall, but given the sentencing powers, it may be within the sentencing jurisdiction of 
this court. 
, `" , rhe detendant as cif : \sian origin. 
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Orientation 
The offences, Sir, relate to this defendant establishing an account with a tool hire and 
sale company. They sell their merchandise to the trade or the public. 
Complication 
On [a date] the defendant made enquiries about establishing an account in his own name 
with a view to hiring power tools. A standard procedure was followed and a cheque was 
presented to the commercial concern involved, and the intention was that this would be 
retained by the company practically as a guarantee in default. 
Orientation 
If any account holder defaulted, the cheque would be presented with a view to settling 
any liability. That sum of a£ 150 was also the maximum amount under the contract of 
the value of tools that could be hired, so the cheque always acted as a guarantee for any 
equipment that was on hire at the time. 
Complication 
During the following two weeks the defendant hired various items, mostly power tools, 
and at that stage he remained within the financial limit on the account. However, at the 
end of the two-week period, the defendant advised the full time manager that there was a 
delay on a contract that he was working on. In fact no such contract existed. He 
therefore asked for longer to settle the account... 
Evaluation 
this is not unknown... 
Complication 
... it was granted. That manager went on 
holiday and thereafter the defendant, on various 
occasions, [on such dates] for example, the defendant purchased power tools using 
cheques from the same account. Values £217, £411, £ 125. For each item a cheque was 
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issued, and subsequently cheques were to be returned dishonoured by the bank. 
Enquiries were made by [such a date], [the defendant] wrote to them and offered to 
settle my account, he enclosed a cheque for £500 to the branch in question and also said 
that he'd sent a cheque for £785 to the head office, to cover the other cheques in relation 
to the power tools that had been bought. Both of those cheques were returned 
dishonoured. The cheque for £500, the defendant had stopped payment for that cheque. 
Various promises in telephone calls from the defendant thereafter - at one stage the 
defendant said that he would only pay the debt off if the manager called the police off 
the enquiry. 
Evaluation 
Evading promises that were never met, numerous appointments that were never kept. 
Result 
The tools that had been purchased were never returned. The total value of the tools on 
hire that is still outstanding is £2,706. 
Evaluation 
In addition, you have the value of the goods that have been purchased by the 
dishonoured cheques. 
Result 
Interviewed, the defendant effectively says that this was a contractual matter between 
them. No payments have subsequently been made, none of the tools have ever been 
returned. 
Evaluation 
Sir, the overall value is under £5,000, but it is over a period of time, and it appears from 
the prosecution version of events to be a calculated course by the defendant. He must 
have known, at all stages, that the account cheques would not be honoured. It was such 
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over a period of time to accumulate property belonging to the hire firm, he was 
throughout, and he must have been, acting in breach of contractual arrangements. 
There are two orientation sections that help make legal sense of the allegations. 
The first introduced the parties and the second outlined their legal position. There 
was a description of the defendant's contractual position and his concurrent 
obligations. The prosecutor therefore began by not only introducing the parties, 
but also explaining the legal basis of their relationship. The real storytelling took 
place in the complication: initially this outlined uncontroversial details. The 
defendant was acting within the limits of the contractual agreement and within 
what was expected. At this point the prosecutor introduced the twist to the 
narrative by outlining the first problematic incident; the defendant's claim that he 
was awaiting payment on a contract that necessitated an extension to the credit 
agreement. After this initial problem, the prosecutor outlined how the defendant 
then made a number of additional purchases with dud cheques. Evaluation 
clauses reinforced the dishonest nature of the defendant's conduct, such as the 
reference to "evading promises" and failing to keep appointments. The story 
continued with a description of the result of the police's enquiries; the interview 
and the subsequent explanation. Finally, the prosecutor evaluated the narrative by 
highlighting the important case features. 
Overall, although this prosecutor utilised a storytelling style, most of the hearing 
focused upon legal aspects of the case. The addition of the twist, the plot line that 
clearly indicated where events started to take a sinister turn, is a common 
narrative tool. Similarly, the prosecutor utilised evaluation clauses that reinforced 
a negative view of the defendant. However, these were all related to a legal 
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interpretation of the story. The plot twist allowed the audience to compare the 
innocent with the guilty -a use of the legal binary legal/illegal - while the 
evaluation clauses emphasised the dishonest nature of the conduct. These factors 
linked to the legally focused orientation and show this narrative to be a legal 
story with definite and specific legal implications. 
7.3.2 Truncated narratives 
Frequently, prosecutors will deliver what can be called a truncated narrative. 
These can be truncated in a number of different ways. Either narrative sections 
are omitted by the prosecutor, or while each section is presented, the prosecutor 
reduces the events to the bare minimum, losing much of the detail seen in 
everyday narrative practices. 
Case 15 is a good example of a case where all the relevant narrative sections 
were present yet the narrative was truncated: 
Abstract 
Prosecutor: The Crown would ask that you accept summary jurisdiction. This involves 
the theft of a mobile phone... 
Complication 
basically she asked the complainant... 
Orientation 
who knew her.. . 
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Complication 
... whether she could borrow it. She took the phone.. . 
Result 
.. and then allegedly disappears. 
Evaluation 
Value £50 at most, so therefore summary trial. 
Here, there was an absolute paucity of information; there were no details as to 
the location of the incident, for how long the defendant asked to borrow the 
phone or how the defendant actually disappeared. There were only three 
narrative clauses that described the allegations; the request to borrow, the taking 
and finally the disappearance. Yet, given the low value and the nature of the 
taking, the narrative contained sufficient information for the bench to make a 
decision. 
Case 42, on the other hand, is an example of where the prosecutor failed to 
deliver one of the narrative sections, in this case the evaluation: 
Orientation 
Prosecutor: Sir, the defendant and the victim are known to each other. They were in a 
public house and... 
Complication 
... during the course of the evening, the two of them went out of the public 
house 
together. The complainant indicates that the defendant, on the way through the door, 
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head butted him, shoved him to the ground and sat on him, pinning his arms to his side 
and rained blows about his head. 
Result 
He received injuries: broken cheekbones on both sides, a broken nose, a bruised temple, 
a cut inside his mouth, bruising to the right of his head and pain to his neck, back and 
bottom. He went from the scene, home from the scene, but was sick at home and very 
unwell, called an ambulance and was then detained in the hospital for two days. 
Coda 
The prosecution say that this is not suitable for trial in this court. 
District Judge: Is this presented, or likely to be presented, as a completely unprovoked 
assault? 
Prosecutor: It is, yes. 
District Judge: Do you mean they were apparently friends and they drink together? 
Prosecutor: They certainly have been acquaintances and shared each other's company 
at the public house over a number of months, the victim purchasing drinks for the 
defendant. 
District Judge: Thank you, [prosecutor]. 
The questions the District Judge asked sought to elucidate information usually 
found in the evaluation. If one existed, this could have noted the absence of 
provocation as an aggravating case feature, and combined this with the manner 
of the assault and the injuries received, as explaining the recommendation. As 
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this was absent, the District Judge had to search for this information. Therefore, 
while many decisions were based upon sparse details, prosecutors, except in the 
most obvious of cases, would evaluate the defendant's actions. Otherwise, the 
bench would remedy this failure by asking questions. 
However, questions were not always necessary; for instance, in case 59 the 
prosecutor also omitted the evaluation. Nevertheless, the District Judge failed to 
ask any questions. The difference was that in case 59 the defendant suffered a 
fractured jaw, was hospitalised for five days and underwent surgery. This case 
was clearly going to be directed to the Crown Court and so the prosecutor did not 
need to evaluate the narrative. The facts were expected to speak for themselves. 
7.3.3 No narrative 
One step further than the truncated narrative is the mode of trial hearing where 
the prosecutor failed to deliver any narrative clauses. In these hearings, the 
prosecutor failed to describe the alleged events. Instead, she simply evaluated the 
cases. Case 25 is a good example: 
Abstract 
Prosecutor: Well Ma'am, as far as mode of trial is concerned, the prosecution say that 
this is a matter which you can try here. 
Result/Analysis 
The injuries complained of are a chipped tooth and swelling in relation to the assault 
occasioning actual bodily harm. 
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Analysis 
There are no weapons used, although it is aggravated by the fact that it's a late night city 
centre violence. On that basis, we say that your sentencing powers are suitable to deal 
with it. 
While the prosecutor noted the important case features, at no point did she 
describe the details of the allegations. This case shows that it is not necessary to 
describe the allegations in order to make a decision. 
Case 87 is another good example of the prosecutor's failure to deliver a 
narrative: 
Prosecutor: Well Sir, there are one, two, three, four, five to six dwelling house 
burglaries and associated handling and possession of drugs matters. Because of the 
dwelling houses, the prosecution submit that this is more suitable for trial at the Crown 
Court. 
The prosecutor simply counted the allegations. The case was so clear that the 
prosecutor did not note that these were allegations of night time burglaries when 
the residents were at home and asleep in their beds. 
7.3.4 Choosing narrative form 
While it is difficult to encapsulate how different narrative forms were utilised by 
different prosecutors, there are a number of rules of thumb that help explain the 
different approaches. Firstly, different prosecutors have different propensities; 
one prosecutor within the sample, for instance, nearly always utilised a 
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storytelling style, while others would frequently abstract from the case its 
essential features. Nevertheless, depending on the context, nearly all prosecutors 
would switch between styles. Secondly, workloads could impact upon style; busy 
court days demanded that business be expedited as much as possible and, as a 
result, prosecutors would reduce their observations. The Tuesday administrative 
courts for instance, would handle all the allegations from the previous weekend, 
resulting in exceptionally heavy workloads. While business would often be 
moved to other courts (especially if trials collapsed), there was no guarantee that 
this would happen, so court regulars were aware of the amount of work that 
needed to be completed. Thirdly, different offence types could be treated 
differently. The truncated narrative was initially identified in a shop theft mode 
of trial hearing; these nearly always followed a similar pattern, with the 
prosecutor divulging no details and simply stating that the case would be suitable 
for summary trial. As shop theft was regarded as obviously suitable for summary 
trial, there was little reason for the prosecutor to go into any detail. To some 
extent, therefore, the most truncated narratives would be delivered for the 
simplest cases, whereas if there was any doubt as to venue, then a more complete 
narrative could be expected. These three influences interact somewhat, resulting 
in no obvious rule as to when a truncated or complete narrative could be 
expected. Some prosecutors would persist with their style, no matter what the 
case or the court's workload, while others would adapt to the situation. 
That full narratives are not needed in simple cases can be clearly seen from an 
examination of case 45: 
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Abstract 
Prosecutor: Sir, the Crown would say that this matter is not suitable for summary trial. 
It involves a taking by the defendant of a police baton, as a result of the police attending 
the defendant's ex-girlfriends home address and the defendant striking his ex- 
girlfriend's father on the head with that police baton, causing eleven stitches to a cut on 
the back of his head. 
Orientation 
The defendant had gone to the home address of his girlfriend threatening, demanding the 
continuation of the relationship and demanding she give him money... 
District Judge: I probably don't need to hear any more. 
The prosecutor for this case did have storytelling telling propensities that were a 
product of her desire to be thorough and well prepared. She gave a thorough 
abstract (so thorough in fact that for most prosecutors this would suffice for the 
hearing). We know that this is simply the abstract that introduces the narrative 
because the prosecutor moved to introduce the parties and the scene of the 
incident before describing what occurred. Recognising that the prosecutor was 
about to deliver a full narrative, the District Judge intervened and indicated that 
he agreed with the recommendation. Obviously, all the District Judge needed in 
this case was the extent of the injuries and these being so serious the decision 
was regarded as straightforward. While such representation sufficed for the 
hearing, the voices of those involved in the incident have, for the time being, 
been silenced. 
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In case 43, the prosecutor once again effectively delivered a truncated narrative 
without meaning to: before she could continue the District Judge indicated that 
he would decline jurisdiction. 
Prosecutor: Sir, I would be asking for Crown Court trial... 
District Judge: Yes 
Prosecutor: 
... 
for both of these matters in view of the value... 
District Judge: Yes, I agree. 
The District Judge decided on the value of the goods - over £45,000 - that he 
would decline jurisdiction. 206 The prosecutor was delighted; both the researcher 
and prosecutor spent most of the morning reading the witness statements, so as to 
understand these complex dishonesty allegations of stealing and handling cars. 
The prosecutor was about to start a complete narrative with this abstract; more 
was to follow. However, as this was undoubtedly regarded as a straightforward 
decision, the complex facts were reduced to a simple statement on the value of 
the goods concerned. 
It is not always possible to truncate a narrative effectively in this fashion. For 
instance, in case 21 where the allegations were of making threats to kill, the 
assumption that the decision was straightforward did not apply. That cases are 
regarded as easy can be explained on the basis that there is a shared stock of 
2°6 The prosecutor did not need to highlight the value, as this would have been apparent to the 
District Judge from the charge sheet. 
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knowledge that assists in interpreting the cases. When this stock of knowledge 
does not exist, then assumptions on how the case will be understood no longer 
apply. 
Abstract 
Prosecutor: Sir it's an allegation that the Crown would submit is suitable for summary 
trial. 
Orientation 
Effectively Sir, the complainant in the case, [... ], and the defendant were business 
partners. That was ended by the complainant: he was of the opinion that he was 
effectively doing all the work, paying all the bills and the defendant wasn't effectively 
paying his way within the business. At the end of it, the defendant took exception to this 
and he believed that [the complainant] owed him a sum of money: somewhere in the 
region of £22,000. That's by way of background Sir... 
Complication 
... on [a date], [... ], the complainant, was 
in [a] shopping centre with some friends. 
There's a chance meeting with the defendant who approaches him, grabs him by the 
arm, and effectively frogmarches him out of the [... ] shopping centre saying, "you're 
going to take me to your house and you're going to give me the £22,000 or I'll kill you". 
In the course of the frogmarching, he's taken out of the [... ] shopping centre and then 
being walked towards [an] estate, holding him tightly by the arm. During the course of 
which there is a repeated threat, which the complainant says he took very seriously and 
was in fear for his safety. Sir, their journey takes them on to [another] street and near to 
the police station, and as they get there the complainant manages to free himself, runs 
into the front office and complains to the police. So that effectively is the allegation... 
Coda 
I would submit that your sentencing powers are sufficient. 
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Defence Solicitor: Yes, it's an allegation that's going to be denied quite vehemently Sir. 
So far as the court regards mode of trial, matters could be dealt with summarily and my 
client would be happy with that. 
District Judge: [To the legal adviser. ] Do we have any Thomas Sentencing Guidelines 
that we can refer to? 
Legal Adviser: Sir, we do downstairs, I'll just see if there are any relevant cases in 
Stone's. 207 [Legal Adviser reads Stone's and passes to District Judge pointing out 
extract]. 
In this hearing there was little in the way of evaluation, although the prosecutor 
gave some history to the interaction in the orientation. Any evaluation would be 
expected to draw attention to the seriousness (or otherwise) of the allegations. As 
seen above, this can be omitted if the case is regarded as straightforward and 
unworthy of extra comment. However, it is doubtful if the common stock of 
knowledge important for such cases actually exists for allegations of threats to 
kill. They do not appear as a specific offence in the Mode of Trial Guidelines and 
most prosecutors preferred to proceed with an alternative charge. 208 As a result, 
the infrequency of such cases most probably has not allowed for a common 
perception to take hold and the usual comfort of working within knowable 
boundaries no longer applies. As a result, the District Judge had to ask for 
advice. Interestingly, a similar process did not occur with a similar threats to kill 
case (83) in the County sample. The bench simply accepted the prosecutor's 
207 Stone's Justices' Manual, Draycott et. al. (2003). 
208 There is a perception that the necessary intention to kill in these cases is difficult to prove. 
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recommendation that the case was suitable for summary trial on the bare details 
provided by the prosecutor. 
A similar communication breakdown was observed in case 26: 
Prosecutor: Sir, suitable for this court to deal with. The heroin was found was a small 
amount; 0.53 grams for personal use. As far as... 
District Judge: Sorry, 0 point... 
Prosecutor: 0.53 grams. 
District Judge: Right. 
Prosecutor: As far as the matters as to the spray are concerned, Sir, both were recovered 
from the defendant when he was arrested - there's no suggestion that they were used. 
Therefore suitable for this court. 
District Judge: What are the guidelines on the CS gas canister. 
Legal Adviser: Imprisonment Sir, I think on conviction but generally it's okay to deal 
with it. Right then, I'll see if I can refer to a particular case Sir. [The Legal Adviser 
starts to look through one of his books and states] I believe that custody, Sir, is the 
starting point. 
Defence Solicitor: I'll concede that. 
District Judge: I'm just concerned about the venue. 
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Legal Adviser: Well Sir, I can't find the case that I had in mind that gives reference to 
the noxious gas, but I am fairly satisfied that as it wasn't being used Sir, that it will fall 
within the powers of this court, given the six months' sentence that you can impose. 
Defence Solicitor: I think the situation generally is that if there is no evidence at all that 
it's going to be used, or has been used, or that it's brandished during arrest - that type of 
situation - then under normal circumstances the court will deal with it. In this case, 
obviously the court can have a combined sentence of up to twelve months in any event. 
The amount of heroin is a tiny amount. 
District Judge: Mmm. 
Defence Solicitor: But the knuckle duster these days isn't unusual now but certainly the 
CS gas is not an uncommon thing. 
District Judge: Well, if that's the guideline case. 
Defence Solicitor: It's my experience, I'm not sure if... 
Legal Adviser: I could make further enquiries Sir if you wish to be... 
Legal Adviser: I'm just checking now Sir if that's alright [Legal Adviser is looking 
through Stone's]. 
District Judge: What section is the offence? 
Legal Adviser: It's under the Firearms Act Sir. 
Legal Adviser: Sir, the record Stone's gives is towards the use of firearms in the 
ordinary sense of the word, as opposed to CS gas which isn't helpful. There may be a 
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case in Thomas' Sentencing Guide, Sir, downstairs that might give a more accurate 
information... 
District Judge: I'll deal with it. 
Legal Adviser: The point remains that you have twelve months of course. 
The prosecution narrative mostly consisted of evaluative clauses that highlighted 
her view of the case and what she felt were the non-serious nature of the 
allegations. The important observation is the inappropriate use of truncated 
narratives in some cases. They seem to work adequately in a context of shared 
assumptions and familiar patterns, but once something different occurs - here it 
was the charge of possessing a CS gas canister - the participants are uncertain 
how to proceed. The legal adviser was searching for an appropriate case, the 
District Judge was acting on a hunch that six months' imprisonment would be 
insufficient, whilst the defence solicitor was trying his best to assure the District 
Judge that he could accept jurisdiction. In the end, given the lack of any 
guidelines, the District Judge had to make his decision on the basis of the 
defence solicitor's "experience" 
7.3.5 Implications of different narrative forms 
While there may be good institutional reasons for the particular narrative forms 
utilised by prosecutors, their effect was to silence the narrative's characters. The 
defendant was silenced in many different ways; the bench made their decision on 
the basis that the prosecution could prove their case and as a result, defence 
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solicitors infrequently addressed the court. Additionally, we can see from case 17 
examined above, 209 how the narrative (re)production practices of the prosecutor 
lost the context to the narrative that may have explained what took place. If the 
defendant had a story to tell as part of this process, this was not raised in the 
hearing. The merits of the child custody dispute that underpinned this incident 
were absent. As a result, both parties were silenced. The most disturbing feature 
of the hearing, however, is that the prosecutor's representations are designed to 
reflect the incident from the complainant's perspective. The norm that the bench 
is to assume that the prosecution can prove their case, means that the mode of 
trial hearing is one of the few occasions where the victim can have their story 
told in court unchallenged. Yet, the process operated in such a manner so as to 
radically distort their narrative. Once again, this was at its most obvious with 
truncated narratives, 210 but it also operated when the prosecutor engaged in 
storytelling. 
The first site of narrative (re)production is the police station. Upon contacting the 
police and complaining, the witness tells her story; the police must take this and 
form it into a legal narrative in the witness statement. It has already been noted 
how these statements were indelibly marked through police recording practices 
with legal terminology. Witness statements and other evidence were then used to 
construct a case summary that lay at the front of the prosecution file; in this 
summary the case was abstracted to a brief narrative that recorded the essential 
features in the case. However, this was not the end of the (re)production process; 
209 See section 7.2.2. 
210 Almost to the extent that some of these hearings have a Kafkaesque air to them, where it is 
unclear to all but the courtroom regulars what is the subject of discussion. Kafka's, The Trial 
(1935) is a very good literary examination of the dread that can be caused from confusing legal 
processes. 
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file review necessitated another filtering process whereby salient case features 
were identified from the case summary and the statements. What appeared in 
court was therefore a representation of a representation of a representation, with 
the associated procedure of review, selection and abstraction amending the 
victim's narrative to one that was more appropriate for the legal process. 
However, this was not simply a legal process; case review was not a value 
neutral process whereby successions of disinterested professionals reviewed from 
a distance. Rather, each review was undertaken by an interested party who had a 
stake in the process and was situated within the context of her particular 
institution. The prosecutor's context can be seen most clearly in cases of 
domestic violence where the most serious transformation of narratives took 
place. These will be examined shortly, 211 but before that can be achieved, it is 
necessary to examine in greater detail the legal narratives that have been 
produced. 
The end product of the prosecutor's work accorded with legal and professional 
considerations. The prepared text was not designed to be an entertaining story, or 
a faithful account of "what happened"; rather, it was the preparation of a legal 
case against the defendant. The lawyers selected those facts that accorded with 
legal precedents and presented these as a legal case. Throughout the texts of the 
mode of trial hearings, for instance, it was possible to identify a number of 
recurrent themes; it would be misguided to suggest that these were simply 
offered by witnesses and complainants to the police, who then recorded these and 
passed the case to the prosecutor. The police and prosecution chose what was 
211 See section 7.3.6. 
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relevant from the complainant's narrative and a case was then constructed for the 
courtroom. The examples above all show how prosecutors frequently omit details 
and condense the case down to its bare bones. Yet, the benches were usually able 
to make a decision despite such sparse information because the prosecution had 
focused upon the important case features that were necessary for the decision. 
Another problem with the truncated narrative is what can be omitted; the 
prosecutor controls access to information. This was a problem in case 33 and 
only addressed when the defence solicitor intervened. The prosecutor in this case 
delivered a standard truncated narrative. She explained that the defendant was 
acting as a nightclub doorman and the complainant was a guest. She noted how 
the complainant was punched several times by the defendant and then outlined 
the injuries; stitches were required and bones were broken in the fingers and 
wrist. The prosecutor closed with a recommendation that the case was not 
suitable for summary trial. The defence solicitor, however, noted a problem with 
the version of events described by the prosecutor; a witness statement that he 
received from the prosecution suggested that the broken bones might have been 
self-inflicted as a result of striking a wall. The prosecutor then had to 
acknowledge this problem; in effect, the truncation process in simplifying events 
glossed over the ambiguities and problems in the case. 212 
212 A further ambiguity was not addressed. The prosecutor noted how the defendant was working 
as a doorman and the incident took place as part of his employment. This must be an aggravating 
feature, as the defendant is employed to ensure the safety of the nightclub customers not threaten 
that safety. Yet the witness statement makes it clear that the defendant and complainant were 
friends. This suggests a slightly different interpretation of events but the truncation process masks 
such fine details. 
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The extent of truncation in the mode of trial hearing is highlighted by a 
comparison between bail applications and mode of trial hearings. Case 1 assists 
here; the defendant was charged with making threats to kill and witness 
intimidation and the prosecutor mistakenly opened with a request to remand in 
custody: 
Prosecutor: Sir, the Crown do ask that you consider remanding this young man in 
custody and I perhaps... 
District Judge: Mode of trial Miss [Prosecutor]? 
Prosecutor: Oh, mode of trial, I do beg your pardon, I'm going the wrong way. 
Abstract 
Entirely suitable for this court Sir, no weapons just verbal threats. 
Orientation 
I will in a moment give you the full history, as you've heard already I will be applying 
for a remand in custody... 
Complication 
... but he is reputed to have shouted at this young 
lady witness, "I'll get you, I'll kill you 
for grassing me up" and "if you don't have those kids with you, I'd take you somewhere 
and murder you for grassing me up" and as the car drove away he shouted back to her, 
44 and don't forget I'll be back"... 
Evaluation 
which takes one out of the realm of conditional. Sir, those are the very brief facts that 
I would say that this court is suitable to deal with it. 
304 
This short hearing says a lot about the perceived place of the mode of trial 
hearing in the court's schedule and of the narratives that were told. This was 
another truncated narrative; there was little indication of any relationship 
between the parties - the complainant was a witness in another case against the 
defendant - although this could be implied from the substance of the allegations. 
The prosecutor even went so far as to note the delivery of "very brief facts" and 
that "the full history" would be disclosed later in her bail representations. An 
expanded history was indeed delivered as part of the bail representation. `13 This 
use of expanded narratives (when compared to the mode of trial hearing) for bail 
hearings was observed throughout the research and was due to a number of 
reasons. The bail hearing was regarded as important. While quantitatively it was 
a relatively infrequent occurrence (few defendants were remanded in custody), 
the effects of a custodial remand - immediate custody before trial - were 
apparent to all courtroom participants. A denial of bail not only results in a loss 
of liberty, but also has important consequences. Defendants remanded in custody 
are more likely to be convicted, more likely to receive custodial sentences (and 
this is true after allowing for other factors) and any such custodial sentence 
impacts upon future sentencing decisions (Hucklesby, 2002). While there were 
implications associated with the mode of trial decision, 214 the defendant's ability 
to elect somewhat militated against these and there remains the immediate 
impact of the bail decision. 
213 It is by no means clear if the prosecutor's observations on bail could be described as the "full 
history". While inevitably more detailed, there is no reason to believe that the processes that 
operate upon narrative (re)production within the mode of trial hearing will not shape bail 
applications. 
`' 4 See Chapter 2. 
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Bail hearings display a sense of urgency because of this immediate impact. When 
denied bail, the defendant is taken downstairs to the court cells to await 
transportation to prison. The dramaturgical features of this decision are clear to 
all: the defendant and supporters frequently express their emotions. This needs to 
be contrasted with the mundane in the magistrates' court; the steady processing 
of cases towards a future outcome. While outputs are the focus of magistrates' 
courts, they can be in the distance, remote and far from view. Moreover, this 
conveyor belt is relentless: each professional's workload adds to the pressure to 
keep things moving. Therefore, when the outcome is apparent and near, as is the 
case with a bail hearing, there is good reason to expect an immediate focus. 
The bail hearings also examine an alternative subject matter to the mode of trial 
hearing: the bail hearing is offender focused, while the mode of trial hearing is 
concerned with the offence. The mode of trial hearing is directed towards the 
allegations against the defendant and personal factors, such as previous 
convictions, are specifically removed from consideration. All of the important 
case factors, identified in Chapter 6, are offence focused. In contrast, the criteria 
for considering bail - the likelihood of absconding, the threat of committing 
further offences and the risk of witness intimidation - are offender focused. The 
defendant's actions will therefore be examined, when considering bail, from a 
perspective that places those actions within a wider context. More of the 
defendant's personal history will inevitably be considered, along with a fuller 
analysis of the background to the allegations. Moreover, the defence solicitor is 
able to question and challenge the prosecutor's recommendations, thereby adding 
to the narrative before the court. 
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Taken together, this helps explain the time spent upon the bail decision by the 
courtroom regulars when compared to the mode of trial hearing. It also assists in 
an understanding of the truncated and partial narratives that are seen within the 
mode of trial hearing. 
7.3.6 Distorting the story: Domestic violence 
Although not an ubiquitous feature of domestic violence cases, there is sufficient 
evidence in the sample to suggest that the management of these cases was such 
as to raise concerns about how these were handled. The evidence suggests that 
prosecutors manipulated difficult evidence to ensure that these cases remained in 
the magistrates' court; only very rarely was a domestic violence case deemed 
unsuitable for summary trial. Before examining these cases, it might be worth 
taking some time to examine why this might be a favoured prosecution tactic. 
Nationally, the treatment of domestic violence cases is a cause for concern and 
this was also the case at the time of the fieldwork process (Crown Prosecution 
Service, 2001b). The Mode of Trial Guidelines are clear that cases of domestic 
violence should be handled in the same way as every other offence of violence 
and the Director of Public Prosecutions issued a press release215 shortly after the 
cessation of fieldwork, confirming that domestic violence was an aggravating 
feature: 
21 Announcing a new concerted drive to respond to domestic violence cases. 
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I want to make it as clear as I can that the CPS views the fact that an assault was 
perpetrated upon a family member as an aggravating factor. It amounts to a fundamental 
breach of trust since everyone has a right to feel safe in personal relationships. ` 16 
The local CPS office shared this concern; early in the research process a City 
team meeting was observed where the local branch discussed the problems of 
domestic violence cases. Prosecutors expressed concern that complainants were 
indicating a desire to withdraw from proceedings; usually after reconciliation 
between the parties. Privately, prosecutors expressed frustration with the victims 
of domestic violence, while publicly they explored methods of continuing with 
prosecutions in such cases, including continuing despite the withdrawal of co- 
operation. Some even suggested that charging complainants with an attempt to 
pervert the course of justice may convey a message that prosecutors did not 
appreciate such withdrawals. Whatever the methods adopted, the identified 
problem was clear; prosecutors almost expected domestic violence cases to be 
discontinued before completion, largely due to a lack of engagement on the part 
of the complainant with the process. Indeed, at the time of the DPP's press 
release, The Guardian suggested that, "[n]early half of domestic violence cases 
are dropped before they reach the court, and almost four fifths of these are 
dropped because the woman withdraws the complaint. , 217 
If the prosecutor is expecting a withdrawal, this may well impact upon the 
management of the case by the prosecutor in one of two ways. Firstly, the 
prosecutor may lack a degree of empathy for the victim, leading to a distancing 
216 28 November 2001. 
217 29 November 2001. 
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between the complainant and prosecutor. Indeed, a certain degree of cynicism on 
the part of prosecutors towards complainants in domestic violence cases was 
observed. While some prosecutors may well have expressed concern for the 
victims of domestic violence, the expectation of reconciliation weighed far more 
heavily. Secondly, the expectation of withdrawal could be expected to result in a 
concern with practical and administrative matters over justice considerations. In 
order to avoid the work associated with committal proceedings, prosecutors may 
well choose to recommend that the case remains within the magistrates' court so 
as to minimise workload. Additionally, given the numerous costs of the Crown 
Court alluded to in Chapter 2, prosecutors may wish to avoid this extra expense 
by keeping the case within the magistrates' court. In short, a prosecutor who 
lacks empathy with a particular class of complainant may well choose to favour 
more administrative concerns when deciding venue. 
The cases that will be examined shortly do point towards an approach whereby 
the prosecutor minimised the impact of some relatively serious cases, in order to 
ensure that the case remained within the magistrates' court. While this may well 
dovetail with administrative concerns, it does raise some particular issues for the 
narratives of the participants within the initial interaction. Voices were lost in the 
clamour to save money, and more importantly, justice was not being done. The 
concerns of victims of domestic violence, already hesitant to engage with the 
legal process, 218 surely deserved a response that acknowledged the full extent of 
any harm inflicted. 
2 See Lewis (2004) for a recent analysis of legal interventions into domestic violence and an 
analysis of women's thoughts on legal intervention. 
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Additionally, these cases also offer an insight into the agreement between the 
prosecutor's recommendation and bench's decision, reported both by this study 
and those concluded earlier. The following examples suggest that some cases are 
retained in the magistrates' court despite the existence of some really serious 
case features on the basis of skilful management and presentation by the 
prosecutor. This, combined with the evidence above on truncated narratives, 
suggests that prosecutors are able effectively to manage and control the 
information that is placed before the court, thereby controlling the decision 
making process. As prosecutors were able to tell the story in a particular manner, 
and this narrative pointed to a particular solution, this controlling aspect of the 
process, combined with the institutional position of the prosecutor in the mode of 
trial hearing, should explain the supremacy of prosecution recommendations. All 
of these conclusions are obviously only valid if the cases themselves do point 
towards skilful management and control by the prosecutor; it is to the domestic 
violence cases that we now turn. 
Within case 17, there was clear evidence of impact minimisation on the part of 
the prosecutor. While part of the text of this hearing has been reproduced above, 
it is worthwhile re-examining it once again: 
A bstract/Orien tation 
Prosecutor: Sir, the ABH is upon his partner [... ] 
Orientation 
What seems to have happened is that they have, she's told him that the relationship is 
over, she doesn't want him at the premises. 
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Complication 
He forces his way into her address - that's the summary only offence of using violence 
to secure entry - and she then describes how he assaulted her there, so whilst he pushes 
the door in, or kicks the door in, he punches her to the side of her neck, which she says 
causes her to move past. He goes into the living room where the child is -I think the 
child is about six months old or thereabouts - he picks up the child in his arms and kicks 
the child's bouncer towards her so that he kicks the outside of her right thigh. He then 
pulls the phone out of the socket, he takes the handset, she says he hit her with the phone 
handset two or three times to the back of her head. She puts her arms to push him away, 
he grabs her hand and bites her she says on the left forearm. She says he's holding it for 
about five seconds - she's got a circular purple mark on her left arm as a result of that. 
He shoves her with the side of his body, causing her to move out of the way. He then 
picks up the baby's milk, pushchair and what have you. Tries, she tries to take the child 
back and he uses his hand to push her right shoulder, causing her to fall onto the bed. 
Then she says he takes her tee shirt and drags her into the hallway, and says he shook 
her causing her to fall to the floor. She says he then kicks her to her left outer thigh when 
she turned around. He's shouting about the child, not being able to see the child. She 
goes into the living room. She says he comes in and stamps on the phone in the living 
room, runs into the bedroom, he tries to pick the child up, he tries to take the child as 
well. He then punches her to the left temple. She says she's feeling dizzy. She goes into 
the living room, she collapses on the floor. She says she's there two or three minutes but 
she doesn't blank out. She goes back into the bedroom at that stage. He's got the child 
and the pushchair by then. She says he runs towards her, pushes her back again into the 
living room, causing her to fall to the floor, and then he gets the phone wire she says and 
puts the telephone cord over her head and onto her neck. She says, "I realised he was 
going to choke me with the telephone cord, I grabbed it and pushed it away to stop him". 
She describes herself as feeling very frightened. She says he then grabs her arm and 
swings her causing her to fall to the bed and at that stage he goes off and I think he took 
the child. 
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Coda 
So that is the actual incidence of the assault. 
Evaluation 
She says, "I was generally concerned for my life, I thought he was going to kill me with 
the telephone cord, but he let go of the cord. " 
Result 
"As a result of this I have a blue mark to the left side of my temple, a black mark to my 
left tricep, teeth marks on my left arm", and her back, she says, is covered in bruises. 
Coda 
So that is the details of the assault Sir. 
Evaluation 
Obviously the aggravating features are the fact that there is the young child present 
whilst this is taking place, the bite which has caused obviously, a nasty mark to her arm. 
There's use of the phone to hit her on the head and there is this incident with the 
telephone cord, but that doesn't appear to have come to much as she claimed she pushed 
that away from him and that seems to be the end of that incident. So Sir, you've got in 
this court, obviously six months and that six months can reflect the fact that you haven't 
committed him to the Crown Court for sentence. So Sir, I would have said on balance, 
albeit with the aggravating features, you may feel that your powers of sentencing are 
sufficient. 
Defence Solicitor: Your worships, I appear for [the defendant], while he doesn't agree 
with that, it's not appropriate at this stage to deal with that. I would agree, however, that 
it is suitable for summary trial and I draw your attention to the fact that, particularly with 
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regard to the phone wire, there's no suggestion of marks on her neck. It's obviously a 
matter for your worships, but I would suggest that it is suitable for summary trial. 
It is worth comparing two separate passages in the text. Within the complication 
the prosecutor outlined an allegation that the defendant attempted to strangle the 
victim with a telephone cord after she was pushed to the floor. This incident was 
so serious that the victim noted how she actually feared for her own life. 
Additionally, the prosecutor, in describing this incident through the use of the 
complainants' words, added to the drama of the incident. As the prosecutor 
highlighted, this aggravating feature was also combined with a bite and the 
presence of a child. Yet, the prosecutor, when evaluating the case, minimised the 
seriousness of the incident with the telephone cord. Three points are noteworthy 
in this part of the text. Firstly, the attempted strangulation was described in 
neutral terms as an "incident" rather than an assault. Secondly, the prosecutor 
suggested that it "doesn't appear to come to much". While the extent of any 
injuries is important, the legal analysis suggests that the method of any assault 
can be an overriding consideration. 219 The potential effects of strangulation are 
so severe that this could conceivably be regarded as a case where the potential 
effects of the actions weigh heavily in any decision. As it was, the prosecutor 
chose to focus upon the lack of any injury. Finally, the prosecutor stated how the 
complainant "claimed" that he pushed the defendant away, thereby avoiding 
injury. This statement created distance between the victim and prosecutor, and 
also suggested that reliance not be placed upon the claims of the victim. All three 
points combined succeeded in minimising what could otherwise have been 
regarded as a serious incident. This work was further undertaken by the defence 
'19 See section 6.3.1.2. 
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solicitor who, in suggesting that no injury or mark was caused by the incident 
with the telephone cord, minimised the importance of this part of the allegations. 
In another domestic violence case (18), a similar process operated. The 
prosecutor used direct quotations from the witness statement to highlight the 
impact of the assault and also paused to evaluate these actions: 
Prosecutor: To read various extracts from her statements; "he grabbed hold of my legs, 
dragged me off the settee onto the floor, and then started to kick me in the legs and on 
my backside and continued by kicking me on the side of my head. " On that last feature, 
I'm sure the court will have concerns as to jurisdiction. 
While the prosecutor highlighted the aggravating nature of this feature, this was 
later minimised when evaluating the allegations: 
Prosecutor: It is curious, Sir, that on the one hand there is kicking to the head, but 
minor injuries to the head, a protracted assault in two component parts, albeit the injuries 
are fortunately minor. So what are your aggravating features? This is a matter which this 
court could try if convicted on a full facts version and commit the defendant for 
sentence. I think Sir, in terms of the trial jurisdiction, potentially within the courts. 
Once more, the prosecutor minimised the assault by suggesting it was both 
curious and fortunate that a major assault did not result in serious injuries. This 
could be regarded as another incidence of the prosecutor creating distance and 
thereby questioning the events as put forward by the victim. It was definitely a 
case where the prosecutor focused upon the injuries (or lack of) rather than the 
manner of the assault. Additionally, in both cases 17 and 18, the prosecutors 
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made reference to committing the defendant to the Crown Court for sentence. 
After the presentation of this case, the prosecutor indicated that he thought this a 
"borderline" decision as the victim was "vague" about the kick to the head and 
that no serious injury was caused. 220 He stated that while he did not wish to 
trivialise domestic violence incidents, this was not a city centre night time 
incident. Additionally, he noted that in borderline decisions he may refer to the 
defendant's previous convictions221 as decisive. This defendant possessed 12 
previous convictions for offences against the person from 1981 to 1998 and a 
host of other previous convictions for other offences. Still, the prosecutor failed 
to recommend that this "borderline" case be sent to the Crown Court. 
Although not using the devices highlighted above, the prosecutor in case 3 also 
focused upon the lack of injuries as important when analysing the actions of the 
defendant. Here the assault was again alleged to have been perpetrated by a bite 
and once more, the skin was not broken. Nevertheless, in noting the lack of any 
serious injury when evaluating the case, the prosecutor still minimised the assault 
when it would perhaps have been more pertinent to concentrate upon the manner 
of the assault. 
Case 51, an allegation of harassment, similarly raises issues about the use of a 
knife as part of a domestic conflict: 
220 Note how such vagueness about the extent of injuries did not result in the prosecutor re- 
evaluating venue in either case 9 or 55. 
221 Although obviously these will not be disclosed to the court as the Mode of Trial Guidelines 
make it clear that these are to play no part in the venue decision. 
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Abstract 
Prosecutor: The point that concerns the prosecution the most here is the reference that 
you heard in the charge to the use of the carving knife. 
Complication 
Looking directly at the statement the witness says, "He pulled a six inch carving knife 
on me and made threats towards me if I continued my friendship" with a male that they 
were arguing about. 
Evaluation 
Sir, there are no more details in the statement about that particular incident. It is a little 
vague and on that basis the prosecution say that this may be a matter which you may 
consider is borderline for your sentencing powers; this court may be adequate to deal 
with it and unfortunately, in the absence of any more detail on the incident, I don't think 
I'm in a position to take it any higher. 
District Judge: That part of the statement, what does she actually say? 
Prosecutor: I'll read that paragraph for you, Sir. 
Orientation 
"At about 19: 30 hours on [a date] I went to [the defendant's] flat. I took my son [... ]. 
Complication 
When I spoke with [the defendant] about [someone else], he became agitated and 
abusive. 
Analysis 
[The defendant] is an alcoholic in my opinion and he had been drinking on this occasion. 
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Complication 
I decided to leave, as there was no reason with him. He followed [my son] and I out of 
the flat towards the lift and continued swearing, and began questioning me about a male 
friend of mine. At this point he pulled a six-inch carving knife on me and made threats 
towards me if I continued my friendship with this man. I told him that it was none of his 
business as we are now divorced". 
There are two important features of this narrative. Firstly, the prosecutor only 
made reference to one incident. Harassment offences allege a course of conduct 
that causes harassment, alarm and distress; part of their reasoning is while these 
individual instances may well constitute separate offences, 222 the sum of these 
combine so that the course of conduct is more serious than the sum of 
allegations. In only referring to one incident, even if this was the most serious 
incident, the prosecutor inevitably lost some of the impact of the allegations 
against the defendant. Therefore, while on this individual incident the case may 
well have been borderline, other allegations that were not put before the court 
could have amended the court's understanding of the case. 
Secondly, the prosecutor minimised the impact of the allegations by creating 
ambiguity as to what happened with the knife. Before the court hearing, the 
prosecutor and defence solicitor discussed the case; the prosecutor suggested that 
the crucial component was the presence of the knife. If this remained in the 
defendant's pocket as opposed to "waving the knife around", then the prosecutor 
indicated that this would be regarded as suitable for summary trial. The defence 
solicitor initially approached the conversation on the basis that the defendant was 
222 Assaults have been interpreted in a manner that many of the allegations that amount to 
harassment, such as abusive telephone calls, can be viewed as assaults. See Ireland; Burstow 
[ 1997] 4 All. E. R. 225. 
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alleged to have been waving the knife around. While the prosecutor may have 
been simply erring on the side of caution, more effort could have been made to 
be clearer. The prosecutor did not make any reference to the distinction that was 
outlined to the defence solicitor, as well as failing to offer a firm 
recommendation. Yet, this case does not comfortably fit with the reasons for the 
differential treatment of domestic violence cases; as the protagonists were 
divorced, there was little chance of the reconciliation that might have led to 
withdrawal. Additionally, the co-operation of the victim was not central to the 
prosecution of this case; a police officer was present when the defendant was 
alleged to have abused the complainant over the phone and the conversation was 
heard on a loud speaker. 
The prosecutor's control of information put before the court was also important 
when considering the domestic violence allegations in case 67, where the 
defendant was charged with making threats to kill. The mode of trial hearing 
consisted of the prosecutor noting some essential case features; the presence of 
children was described as an aggravating feature and the prosecutor noted that 
there had been an earlier assault. These sparse details were utilised to 
recommend that the case was suitable for summary trial. In the absence of a 
complication, the District Judge asked how the threats took place. When the 
prosecutor suggested that the defendant might have had an axe in his possession, 
the District Judge unsurprisingly asked if the axe was used. We saw in Chapter 6 
how allegations of threats to kill are aggravated by the possession and use of a 
weapon, to the point that the court will, in all probability, decline jurisdiction in 
such cases. It was at this point that the prosecutor backtracked somewhat; she 
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stated that the evidence was unclear, although there was no suggestion that the 
defendant swung the axe. The District Judge noted the borderline nature of his 
decision, but he nonetheless accepted jurisdiction. 
However, the witness statement suggested that the version of events described by 
the prosecutor did not accord with those alleged by the complainant. The victim 
said that the earlier assault consisted of the defendant pinning her to the floor by 
holding the axe handle across her neck and she was only released when the 
children started to cry. The defendant released her so she could attend to the 
children and it was when so doing the defendant made the threat. He stated, 
"don't think it's over; I'm going to fucking kill you". In one sense the prosecutor 
gave an accurate version of events; the witness statement was unclear as to the 
position of the axe when the threat was made and he probably was not swinging 
it at the time. However, such a reading is more than generous to the prosecutor; 
this case was effectively managed so as not to include the allegations that 
aggravated the offence. The silence on the earlier assault with the axe handle, an 
important context to the later threats, minimised the allegations. Indeed, the 
prosecutor initially outlined the allegations in such a brief manner that no 
mention was made of the axe until the District Judge asked further questions. 
Furthermore, this case in some respects fits into the domestic violence paradigm. 
The relationship between the defendant and his common law partner was 
described in the case summary as "volatile". This may have suggested to the 
prosecutor a degree of uncertainty as to whether or not the victim would proceed 
and this, combined with the difficulty of proving allegations of making threats to 
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kill, suggests a clear motivation for the prosecutor to keep the case in the 
magistrates' court. 
Once again, in case 88, the prosecutor made a recommendation that did not fit 
with the Mode of Trial Guidelines. The defendant was alleged to have held a 
wallpaper scraper to his wife's throat, while pushing her down onto the sofa and 
saying, "who hasn't the guts to do it now. You'll squeal like a pig when I cut 
your throat". Elsewhere, the use of similar weapons was seen as an aggravating 
feature, to the extent that the court would decline jurisdiction, yet in this case the 
bench decided that it was suitable for summary trial. 
Not all cases categorised as domestic violence remained in the magistrates' court. 
For instance, case 39 was directed to the Crown Court by the bench. The 
defendant was alleged to have grabbed hold of his partner, hit her head against 
the window of the car they were in and then against the handbrake. Finally, the 
defendant was alleged to have head butted her resulting in a loss of 
consciousness. When evaluating the case, the prosecutor focused upon the head 
butt: "this is an allegation of head butting - the use of the head as a weapon - and 
I would have to say in all the circumstances I really don't think it's a case 
particularly suitable for magistrates' court trial". While the head butting was no 
doubt a serious assault, there was no reason why it should have been viewed any 
differently from a bite. However, there are aspects of this case that suggest that it 
did not raise the same concerns as other domestic violence cases in the sample. 
The conflict was not one between co-habiting partners; hence the chance of 
reconciliation, and therefore withdrawal, was lower. Additionally, the prosecutor 
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stated that the relationship was at an end; this was further evidence of the lack of 
permanence to the relationship that commonly leads to complainants 
withdrawing statements. As a result, the institutional pressures upon the 
prosecutor are less likely to weigh on the mind. 
Similarly, case 58 was directed to the Crown Court: 
Abstract 
Prosecutor: Sir, as far as these matters are concerned, I would say that they are not 
suitable for summary trial. 
Orientation 
The complainant in this matter has had an on and off relationship for a lengthy period 
with this man who is the father of her son. Prior to the assault there had been an 
argument in a public house where she works. 
Complication 
She returned in the early hours of [the day of the offence]. The defendant got in with 
some keys she'd asked him to return. He was asleep. She was struck from behind with 
what she believes to be a hammer. 
Result 
This caused pain and a lump behind her left ear. 
Complication 
There was a heated argument and she was again struck by the defendant with the 
hammer... 
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Result 
causing a lump below her right eye and a cut to the inside of her mouth. 
Complication 
She was knocked to the floor and she looked up to see the defendant about to hit her 
again, but she managed to prevent him hitting her. Damage is then caused to the house, 
Sir. 
Result 
She had to attend the [hospital] to be treated for her injuries. 
Analysis 
I'm afraid I have no details of the medical condition of the complainant, but in any 
event, the Crown say this matter is not suitable for summary trial in view of the nature 
of... 
[The prosecutor was then stopped before she could finish her submissions as the District 
Judge asked a question relating to the charges. ] 
While serious offences were minimised by prosecutors within the sample, a 
direct assault with a hammer was difficult to explain away! Additionally, the 
prosecutor within this case was one who was renowned for being thorough and 
was therefore less likely to manage cases on the basis of workload. 
Case 64, an allegation of harassment, was another domestic violence allegation 
regarded as too serious for the magistrates' court. The defendant and complainant 
were estranged partners. 
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Abstract 
Prosecutor: Sir, the prosecution represent that this is not suitable for trial in this court. 
Orientation 
As far as the section four charge is concerned, it's clear that, in actual fact it goes on for 
some considerable time... 
Complication 
involving an incident where the young woman who complains was in a car when the 
defendant came to the car and grabbed her wrists and tried to pull her out of the car. The 
complaint was made to the police and eventually the police escorted her home and her 
companion in the car is also separately escorted home because of the defendant's threats 
and his behaviour on that occasion. There was also an incident where he went to where 
she was staying with her sister, he brought a friend, there were threats made and 
eventually a window was smashed. 
Orientation/Complication 
There have been a number of different statements made by the young woman, who had 
withdrawn them on each occasion, until the most recent one where she itemises all the 
incidents going back over a considerable period and the reasons for withdrawing. 
Evaluation 
It's quite apparent that there have been a number of serious threats which she fully 
believed would be carried out against her. They are repeated threats, they all form part 
of the harassment. There is also physical violence which is incorporated within the 
harassment charge. 
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Result 
There does not appear to be any lasting physical harm that is apparent from the 
statement, but her psychological well-being is severely affected by the defendant's 
behaviour over the period of the charges. 
Evaluation 
Sir, as you can see, the bundle of the statements is quite substantial. 
District Judge: Are all the statements from the complainant? 
Evaluation 
Prosecutor: Yes they are, yes. There is also County Court involvement and injunctions 
to keep the defendant from her. 
The prosecutor's representations were based on the totality of the course of 
conduct alleged against the defendant; so whilst the prosecutor was not able to 
point to any one really serious incident, the volume of allegations was such as to 
lead to the recommendation. Additionally, some of the perceived problems with 
domestic violence cases did not apply here; while the complainant withdrew on 
earlier occasions, the reasons for withdrawing were given in this new statement. 
Also, as the complainant had also initiated civil proceedings, she had already 
displayed a degree of fidelity to legal remedies, suggesting that she would see 
these proceedings through to the end. 
It would have been difficult for the prosecutor in case 35 to minimise the 
allegations. The defendant was alleged to have banged his partner's head off a 
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wall around 20 times, kicked her to the head and ribs, head butted her, and 
squeezed her hand until the bones fractured. 
7.3.7 Alternative approaches 
One of the criticisms of the predominant narrative approach is the translation of 
everyday narratives: those that come to the law tell their stories to professionals, 
who then translate this narrative into legally relevant categories and this process 
is influenced by institutional pressures. Yet, while storytelling within the 
courtroom may enable victims, witnesses and defendants to feel that, at the very 
least, their story was aired, this would carry with it important implications. 
Firstly, narrative styles within the courtroom may be unwelcome because of the 
time used in such an approach. Truncated narratives fit with the busy workload 
of city magistrates' courts where professionals are under pressure to ensure that 
cases are processed. Others view prosecutors and defence solicitors that tell 
stories as longwinded and idiosyncratic. Secondly, such an approach may well be 
regarded as raising irrelevant details; case 19 highlights the issues at stake: 
Abstract 
Prosecutor: Your worships, the circumstances of the case are these. 
Orientation 
It's about ten to midnight on [a date]. The police are called to the area. They drive into 
[a road] from [another road] and what they actually see is this... 
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Complication 
they see a male who is obviously [the defendant], he's holding a wooden rounders bat 
in his right hand, standing over a male. The man is bleeding from a cut to his head with 
blood running down from his face. The police pull up and stop near to the males. They 
get out of the police car and the man, the man who is subsequently found to be [the 
defendant] throws his bat to the ground. 
Evaluation 
Quite where the bat had come from your worships, I honestly don't know. 
Result 
The other man is still lying on the floor and then what happens is that this defendant is 
arrested. 
Evaluation 
The defendant certainly seems to have been drinking, but whether the other man had 
been drinking, I really can't say. 
Complication 
The police actually retrieved the video. The police had been keeping a video of the area, 
had a look at it and that again, was only partially helpful. 
Result 
The defendant is subsequently interviewed. He claimed he found the weapon on the 
floor, he wasn't sure where. He claimed that he, your worships, was intervening in some 
fight, some trouble I believe, but basically he denies that he was using this bat as an 
offensive weapon. 
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Evaluation 
It's a very strange case, I have to say it is rather unclear precisely how it started. The 
man lying on the floor doesn't seem to want to make a complaint. Quite how that could 
happen, one simply doesn't know. The video apparently shows a man on the floor 
apparently trying to defend himself. It seems that at some point [the defendant] spits on 
the man while lying on the ground. There's no-one else on the street and quite how it 
started I'm afraid is very mysterious. During the first interview, he says he put down the 
weapon and chased off some men who had been beating the man up. It's a very difficult 
case your worships, it's the town centre, it's at night and it's with a baseball bat, but on 
the other hand the man lying on the floor didn't apparently wish to complain. It's rather 
a borderline case - it's probably suitable for magistrates' court trial, probably one within 
your powers. Overall, I would say that it's a case more suitable for magistrates' court 
than the Crown Court, but obviously that's for you to decide. 
The prosecutor, as is very much her style, told the narrative of the case. Other 
prosecutors may have just described this as an allegation of possession, where 
the prosecution could not prove that the weapon was used. Because the victim 
was unwilling to make a complaint, the prosecution proceeded with an allegation 
of possessing an offensive weapon. Technically therefore, the suggestion of 
assault, while explaining how the defendant came to be arrested, could not form 
part of the case against him as the prosecution would be unable to prove this in 
court. Yet, as part of her narrative style, the prosecutor made reference to these 
details and others, including the subsequent interview, and the defendant's 
consumption of alcohol. These were clearly seen as irrelevant by the defence 
solicitor: 
Defence Solicitor: Ma'am, it's a position whereby it was a rounders bat, not a baseball 
bat. The allegation is that officers come across [the defendant] in possession of the 
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rounders bat. He's standing over a man who's on the floor. He's asked to put the bat 
down, he does, he's arrested. The issue will be whether he has a lawful excuse for the 
possession of that, my client will say that he was in self-defence. Those issues will be 
argued at trial in due course. What was said during the course of the interview I don't 
think at this stage is particularly relevant. What I would ask you to consider is whether 
you feel, if convicted after trial, six months' imprisonment would be sufficient to deal 
with [the defendant]. I would submit that it is and therefore suitable for this court to deal 
with by way of trial. Ma'am I don't think there is anything more I can add than that. 
The defence solicitor specifically noted the irrelevance of the interview details 
and suggested that this was a simple case of possession of an offensive weapon, 
with a cooperative defendant where the weapon was not used. The defence 
solicitor obviously felt that the prosecutor had drifted away from the particular 
legal question before the court; we were reminded that the hearing is focused 
upon legal adjudication and is not a forum for narrative disclosure. 
7.4 Alternative narratives 
The prosecutor occupies a privileged position within the mode of trial hearing. 
We have already explored how the Mode of Trial Guidelines state that decisions 
be made on the assumption that the prosecution can prove the allegations. 223 As a 
result, the defence solicitor is not able effectively to challenge the prosecutor's 
recommendations, if such a challenge is levied at the prosecution's version of 
events. Defence solicitors, therefore, usually remain seated when asked for their 
"i The Guidelines note that, "the court should assume for the purposes of deciding mode of trial 
that the prosecution version of the facts is correct". 
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opinions on venue. 224 Nevertheless, on a few occasions, the defence solicitor was 
able effectively to mount a challenge. Linked closely to the silence of defence 
solicitors is the dependence by the bench upon the prosecution's version of 
events. We have seen in the discussion of truncated narratives how the omission 
or presentation of information can be effectively managed by prosecutors so as to 
fit with a desired recommendation. The only chance that the bench have of 
countering this problem is by asking questions - and we have seen above how 
this can sometimes uncover further information - or relying upon the defence 
solicitor to make a challenge. Defence solicitors can challenge the prosecutor's 
recommendations in one of two ways; a straight challenge of the prosecutor's 
version of events or a challenge of the presentation of events by pointing out that 
vital information from the statements has been misrepresented. 
A complete challenge with an alternative version of events to the prosecution 
was observed on two occasions; cases 86 and 91. In case 91, the defence solicitor 
was unsuccessful in this attempt. However, the defence solicitor in case 86 built 
upon a borderline not suitable for summary trial recommendation from the 
prosecutor to persuade successfully the court to retain jurisdiction. The defendant 
was alleged to have hit her sister over the head causing "a one-inch cut on the 
right eyebrow" with "a heavy glass ashtray". In response to this, the defence 
solicitor offered an alternative version of events. This was achieved by offering 
an alternative narrative where the defence solicitor acknowledged that he would 
"d Perhaps more surprising was the way in which defence solicitors failed to negotiate with the 
prosecution. Courtroom days usually started with defence solicitors queuing to speak to the 
prosecutor, usually for the purposes of negotiation. However, defence solicitors rarely questioned 
the prosecutor's recommendation on mode of trial. Rather, they usually asked the prosecutor 
what they would be recommending and no more. This part of the discussion seemed to be more 
concerned with information gathering. 
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like to place the incident within a wider context that was absent from the 
prosecutor's statement. The defence solicitor, in providing this context, was 
attempting to explain why the assault happened; part of the explanation 
concerned the stepfather's provocative actions (thereby suggesting mitigation). 
The alternative narrative also served to cast the defendant in the role of victim 
rather than aggressor. 225 The defence solicitor tried to remain within the rules of 
the game by offering this narrative from the complainant's perspective as one 
that was corroborated by the prosecution witnesses. Nevertheless, fundamentally 
these observations were aimed at offering a different narrative as well as an 
alternative interpretation of the prosecution's narrative. The defence solicitor was 
successful as the bench did retain jurisdiction. 
The only other times that defence solicitors mounted an effective challenge was 
if they were able to rely upon the witness statements that they received as part of 
advance disclosure. For instance, in case 33, the defence solicitor was clearly 
able to minimise the impact of the assault. The prosecutor recommended that the 
case be directed to the Crown Court on the basis of the injuries received; the 
victim complained of broken bones in the fingers and wrist. The defence solicitor 
noted that, according to the statements, the broken bones might well have been 
self inflicted; there was a suggestion, by a witness, that the complainant punched 
a wall. The challenge in this case was not completely' successful as the prosecutor 
was then able to rely upon a head wound as justifying the recommendation. 
Nevertheless, the defence solicitor did manage a partial victory as the prosecutor 
was forced to amend the basis of their recommendation. This type of challenge is 
225 This case therefore serves as another example of how prosecutor's storytelling practices 
operate so as to isolate the events from a wider context that could give meaning to the allegations. 
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more likely to be successful as it recognises the rules of the game; the defence 
solicitor keeps to the prosecution version of events by relying upon what are 
otherwise unfavourable witness statements. 
7.5 Conclusions 
Through an examination of narrative (re)production in the courtroom, this 
chapter has provided a number of insights into the mode of trial decision. 
Different narrative forms have been highlighted (full, truncated and absent 
narratives) that are utilised by different prosecutors at different times. The 
features of a case (whether or not it is regarded as an easy decision), the 
propensities of a prosecutor and the pressures of the working environment all 
influence the uptake and use of these different narrative forms. For example, 
simple cases presented during a busy court session are likely to be truncated so as 
to save time and energy. That some cases are tailor made for truncated narratives 
has been evidenced by the manner in which District Judges will take control of 
the proceedings and stop a prosecutor from delivering a complete narrative. 
The effect of these practices within the courtroom is that the full story of the 
participants is lost in the process. The most truncated narratives are so reduced 
that little of the detail in the allegations is put before the court. However, even 
when prosecutors utilise a storytelling style, the legal focus of the narrative 
results in a loss of context to the story. For instance, we saw in case 17 how the 
custody dispute between the parties was only implied in the prosecutor's 
observations; this detail, while possibly explaining what took place, was 
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unnecessary for the legal process. As this dispute did not serve any purpose for 
the mode of trial decision, given the factors that influence this decision, there 
was little need for these details to be given. 
The loss of the complainant's voice was most clearly seen in the domestic 
violence cases. While the mode of trial hearing is one of the few occasions where 
the victim can have their story told unchallenged, as the bench decide the issue 
on the assumption the prosecution can prove what is alleged, the narrative 
(re)production practices of prosecutors frequently resulted in a minimisation of 
the allegations. With one eye on bureaucratic and institutional pressures, 
prosecutors toned down the allegations in order to keep cases within the 
magistrates' court. While legal considerations usually dominated the construction 
of narratives within the courtroom, these cases clearly show the influence of 
institutional pressures. What is more, they also display the privileged place of the 
prosecutor within the hearing. Through the control of information that is placed 
before the court, the prosecutor is able to guide proceedings towards a favoured 
outcome. While defence solicitors would occasionally make an effective 
challenge to the dominance of the prosecution, more often than not, such 
challenges were ineffectual, resulting in most defence solicitors refusing to offer 
any observations. 
These findings resonate with the work of McConville et. al. (1991) in The Case 
for the Prosecution. For instance, they state that: 
in a very real sense, the police construct evidence (and sometimes more than 
evidence). The police have, at a most fundamental level, the ability to select facts, to 
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reject facts, to not seek facts, to evaluate facts and to generate facts. Facts, in this sense, 
are not objective entities which exist independently of the social actors but are created 
by them (McConville et. al., 1991: 56). 
The police exercise their dominant role because of the dominance they have over 
the suspect in the police station, through "territorial control", "enforced 
detention", and the "isolation" and "enhanced vulnerability" of the suspect 
(McConville et. al., 1991: 38). This is said to utilised, through the interrogation, 
to create confessions, the dominant form of evidence constructed by the police. 
The work also resonates with The Case for the Prosecution on the role of defence 
solicitors and control over the case narrative: 
the ambiguities of normal life are rendered one-dimensional by police prosecution 
practices. The police and courts will not accept the presentation of several competing 
interpretations, which would allow the adversarial process to flourish... 
In part, defence lawyers are simply outmanoeuvred, as we have seen, through police and 
CPS controlling information, charges and procedure (McConville et. al., 1991: 167). 
However, this work notes some important differences. One of the major findings 
of Case for the Prosecution was the way in which the police dominated the CPS, 
due in part to prosecutorial momentum and case construction practices. While we 
have witnessed traces of police involvement in the construction of witness 
statements, the CPS have utilised the evidence given, especially in domestic 
violence cases, to their own ends. The manner in which the prosecution are able 
to dominate proceedings also displays some subtle differences. The institutional 
control comes from the priority of the prosecution case for the mode of trial 
hearing, rather than control over the suspect. However, the thesis shares with 
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Case for the Prosecution an understanding of the role of defence solicitors as 
officers of the court; defence solicitors play by the rules of the game and 
acquiesce in the prosecutors control of the process. Indeed, one of the major 
surprises was the way that defence solicitors did not negotiate on mode of trial, 
but rather accepted the prosecution's position. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 Overview 
The thesis has analysed a particular legal decision - trial venue for either way 
cases - in a context that seeks to understand the sociological and legal aspects of 
courtroom processes. The venue decision was introduced in Chapter 2 as one 
subject to political debate and controversy. While the availability of jury trial is 
thought to be a fundamental right by many commentators, this right has been 
seen to be eroded by a succession of legislative and administrative reforms that 
limited access to the Crown Court for certain categories of offence. Throughout 
these reforms, pressure has been exerted upon the defendant's ability to elect 
Crown Court; this right has been seen as problematic, in that it has been 
exercised in cases where the defendant has either gone on to plead guilty or has 
been sentenced to a disposal within the powers of the magistrates' court. 
Nevertheless, while the procedure for determining venue has been reformed, the 
defendant's right to elect has remained. 
Chapter I widened the discussion to a review of the literature on magistrates 
courts and described both the composition of the magistrac`v and the comments 
that have been made on the quality of magistrates' justice. The evidence on the 
11i 
composition of the magistracy, while in many ways dated , 226 does raise some 
serious questions for the quality of justice in the magistrates' court. To recap,. 
while gender balanced and generally representative of ethnic minority 
communities, there is still a social class and age imbalance on the bench. While 
in some ways this helps explain why some defendants may have a preference for 
Crown Court trial and disposal, it is also an important consideration for the venue 
decision. The latter part of Chapter 3 examined the debates on the quality of 
justice within magistrates' courts and sought to show how commentators have 
suggested a number of problems with magistrates' justice. 
So far, the thesis described the actual decision to be made and how this took 
place within the context of magistrates' justice that has been described by many 
as problematic. Chapter 4 attempted to build upon this by widening the 
discussion even further; it sought an understanding of courtroom interaction that 
moved beyond a mere examination of legal precedents and the social outlook of 
magistrates, towards an appreciation of courtroom interaction as influenced by 
different social domains. Four social domains were identified that influence 
behaviour: the psychobiological, the interaction, the setting, and the contextual 
resources of the participants. This model was used to examine a selection of 
earlier courtroom research reports, so as to understand the approaches of these 
different studies. Wider theoretical debates were also introduced when examining 
contextual resources so as to place courtroom interactions within the context of 
language, storytelling, the nature of law as a social practice and legal discourse. 
226 Although updated through the work of the LCD and now the Department for Constitutional 
Affairs. 
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Overall, Chapter 4 sought an understanding of courtroom practice that firmly 
situated this practice as social interaction within a specific legal site. 
After this introduction to the mode of trial decision, Chapter 5 outlined the 
research methods to be adopted. It described the growth of the research project, 
the development of the methods utilised throughout the project and defended the 
use of direct observation as a research tool so as to understand the interaction in 
situ. Finally, this Chapter also described one of the tools used to examine the 
data: narrative analysis. Narrative analysis was described as a method that assists 
in understanding language construction within the courtroom, as well as being 
faithful to the practices of the professionals within the courtroom. 
The data collected within the field was outlined and examined in Chapters 6 and 
7. These took two alternative approaches; Chapter 6 looked at the legal aspects of 
the mode of trial decision, while Chapter 7 looked at the influence of the 
differing social domains upon action. Chapter 6 was necessary so as to not lose 
sight of the importance of legal analysis for an understanding of behaviour. 
While this could have been merged with Chapter 7- law, and knowledge of law, 
is an important contextual resource possessed by courtroom professionals - legal 
rules and understandings are such an important consideration in determining 
venue that they should be examined independently. Chapter 7 built upon this 
legal analysis by looking to wider considerations. Sometimes legal analysis was 
inadequate, so alternative explanations had to be sought - the domestic violence 
cases were used as a specific example in this regard - while, for other cases, 
social domains operated more subtly upon action. 
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8.2 The importance of law 
Chapter 6 highlighted the multitude of case factors assessed in prosecutors' and 
magistrates' decision making process. While some factors were more important 
than others, they clearly dominated the decision making process. Some case 
factors, such as the manner of the assault or the extent of any injuries received in 
offences against the person cases, were highly influential in deciding venue. 
Likewise, the amount of drugs found in the defendant's possession helped to 
determine venue. These influences could solidify into local legal cultures 
whereby certain cases would almost inevitably be processed in a predictable 
fashion. Allegations of domestic burglary, section 20 assaults, violent disorder, 
property offences where the value of the goods was over £ 10,000 and the supply 
of class A drugs were routinely deemed unsuitable for summary trial. 
Alternatively, magistrates would nearly always retain jurisdiction in cases of 
shop theft or theft from a vehicle. 
However, despite the importance of the legal factors for the decision making 
process, there remains an element of discretion in the mode of trial decision. 
Case factors are not always determinative. These guide the decision making 
process; hence we see how prosecutors describe the decision as one based upon 
intuition. Additionally, different factors present in a case can point to different 
outcomes. For instance, three cases in the sample consisted of allegations of 
biting. These serious assaults were not all deemed unsuitable for summary trial; 
two remained in the magistrates' court. Likewise, for driving offences, a near 
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miss resulted in magistrates declining jurisdiction in the City sample, while the 
bench in the County cases retained jurisdiction in similar cases. The existence of 
discretion could also be implied by the manner in which District Judges were 
more likely to retain cases. The evidence could be used to suggest that District 
Judges are more robust and therefore more likely to accept jurisdiction in serious 
and complex cases. 227 
It is at the margins of the legal process, when discretion is at its highest, that we 
see the influence of sociological explanations of behaviour. The domestic 
violence sample clearly displayed the importance of institutional pressures upon 
decision making and illuminated the position of the prosecutor within the mode 
of trial hearing. By managing the information placed before the court, 
prosecutors were able to minimise some relatively serious assaults, thereby 
ensuring the bench retained jurisdiction. Cases where the defendant was alleged 
to have attempted strangulation, held a wallpaper scraper to the throat of his 
partner, bitten the complainant, made threats while possessing a knife or pinning 
his partner to the floor with an axe handle were deemed to be suitable for 
summary trial. Due to an institutional belief that complainants in domestic 
violence cases withdraw from criminal proceedings, there exists an incentive to 
keep cases in the magistrates' court, thereby avoiding the cost of Crown Court 
proceedings and the work associated with committal for trial. However, this 
pressure was only evidenced in those cases where the prosecutor was able to 
successfully manage the case. Where the case factors unambiguously pointed to 
Crown Court trial, the prosecutor recommended that the bench decline 
227 However, as these figures were not controlled for other case variables, this is at most a 
tentative conclusion. 
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jurisdiction. In other words, not all domestic violence cases were deemed 
suitable for summary trial; if the case was far too serious, such as when the 
defendant was alleged to have hit his partner over the head with a hammer or 
banged her head against a wall over 20 times, the prosecutor would recommend 
the bench decline jurisdiction. 
The importance of discretion at the margins of the decision making process can 
also be seen in the charging practices of prosecutors. Some prosecutors would 
routinely charge summary only offences as an alternative to an either way 
offence if this adequately reflected the allegations. Assaults occasioning actual 
bodily harm could be downgraded to common assault or allegations of affray 
reduced to the summary only offence of threatening behaviour. Such practices 
would remove the possibility of the defendant electing Crown Court trial in cases 
where this was thought, for reasons of cost, to be inappropriate. One senior 
prosecutor would also prefer to proceed with indictable only offences when 
dealing with really serious allegations. This was justified on the basis of 
workload; if the case was serious enough for the Crown Court he preferred to 
send the case immediately to the Crown Court and thereby avoid committal 
proceedings. 
8.3 The nature of law 
Chapter 4 theorised on how legal language is constructed within a particular 
system or discourse, and further, how legal narratives are (re)produced in a 
particular manner. This work was very much implicit (and sometimes explicit) in 
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Chapter 7; narrative (re)production practices of prosecutors were examined in a 
manner that highlighted the control of information, the legal focus of the 
professionals and the importance of administrative concerns. The silencing of the 
defendants, witnesses and complainants was apparent in these practices. Yet, it is 
not clear the extent to which legal practice could operate in any other way as 
presently constituted. The utilisation of storytelling would be regarded as wasting 
time and introducing irrelevant details. The frustration revealed by other 
professionals to those prosecutors who adopted a storytelling approach displays 
the extent to which such reforms would be resisted. 
To highlight the legal processes at work, it is worthwhile to reassess the 
treatment of domestic violence cases once again, in addition to considering the 
construction of legal narratives more generally. Prosecutors managed courtroom 
narratives in a way that accorded with professional and legal concerns. The gap 
between the cases presented in court and the narratives of the participants 
resulted from professional practice and the objectives of the legal process. The 
system of recording, collating, selecting, abstracting and reviewing statements 
resulted in a translation of the narratives. The text produced was not designed as 
an entertaining story or even as a completely faithful account of what happened. 
Rather, it was a presentation of a case, and a one sided case at that. 
Throughout all the texts analysed, recurrent themes were identified that displayed 
the concerns of the professionals. This process of legal construction can also be 
seen in the omission of information in the mode of trial hearing. Much of the 
context to the disputes that formed the very material of courtroom work was lost 
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in the narrative reproduction process. Brief orientations, for instance, resulted in 
partial accounts, whereby the richness of a narrative was lost. However, this is 
also functional for the legal system. The prosecutor is able to paint a clear picture 
of the protagonists and the interaction. Within case 17 for example, we have seen 
how the prosecutor omitted to describe fully the access and custody dispute that 
undoubtedly coloured the events. As this was not explained, there was no means 
of deciding which party had the better claim to custody of the child. Yet the legal 
decision that had to be made could best be done without this context to the story. 
The professionals merely had to decide whether the actions of the defendant 
transgressed the criminal code; the omission of this context helped in the creation 
of a legal binary, victim/offender or aggressor/defender. By simply describing 
the actions of the defendant, in the absence of any explanation, the prosecutor 
constructed a legal case that was focused upon the legal implications of actions; a 
picture was created of an aggressive male using violence to achieve goals and a 
passive woman defending herself, her child and her property. While this may be 
an accurate description of events, 228 the narrative as constructed in court failed to 
explore any alternative explanation. 
Much of the theoretical approach developed in Chapter 4 can help to explain the 
legal narratives produced by prosecutors and the silencing of the parties that 
results. Comment was made on how autopoiesis suggests that the legal system 
"listens" to discourse from other systems. The everyday narratives of the 
participants are produced in a particular style and legal professionals listen to 
these narratives with particular purposes in mind. The information that is then 
228 This discussion is in no way designed to apologise for the use of male violence upon their 
partners. 
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selected as relevant is that which fits with the objectives of the legal system. 
Likewise, an examination of narrative (re)production suggested that narratives 
were framed with `mental maps' or `frames' in mind and the narratives thereby 
produced fitted into this pre-existing schemata. Finally, discourses were said to 
organise information in a manner that named problems and thereby pointed to a 
solution. Legal discourse therefore organises information in a manner that 
suggests a legal solution. 
However, such an approach privileges the legal aspects of the decision and the 
operation of legal processes. Legal processes cannot be seen as a seamless web 
whereby legal outcomes can be fully explained on the basis of these processes. 
As has already been explained, the theory generated attempts to place the legal 
encounter within a framework that appreciates social influences upon behaviour. 
For instance, Cotterell (1992) has explained how autopoiesis229 omits such a 
wider understanding: 
Autopoiesis theory encourages us to examine `how the law thinks', emphasising that its 
communication system has an existence and capacity for self-renewal independent of the 
motives and interests of those who work with, seek its influence, produce or avoid or are 
objects of legal communications. But sociology of law should, in my view, be concerned 
always with how people think and act, within complex patterns of freedom and 
constraint (Cotterell, 1992: 68-9). 
Other aspects of the process therefore need to be explained, not only on an 
understanding of legal practices, but also on wider sociological grounds. The 
229 This would also apply to an understanding of the Foucauldian concept of discourse. 
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analysis has shown how these influences have shaped the interaction. Courtroom 
workgroups, and the particular pressures of the setting have played their part. 
Shared cultures have shaped interactions and institutional pressures have resulted 
in specific case management practices. 
8.4 Decision making in the magistrates' court 
Chapters 3 and 4 examined previous research on the courtroom process and 
decision making within the courtroom, and therein a model of courtroom 
interaction was developed. Many of the features of courtroom interaction 
explored in those chapters can be seen in the data collected in the field. We can 
see the ideology of triviality, the marginal place of the defendant, the sometimes 
absurd nature of the proceeds, the importance of individual personality, the 
influence of courtroom workgroups and court culture, the importance of power, 
the nature of legal discourse and the manner in which legal narratives are 
constructed. 
McBarnet (1981) theorised on the ideology of triviality in magistrates' courts, an 
ideology that constructs a view of these courts as unimportant, with the real 
business of law taking place in the Crown Court. In many respects, we can see 
reflections of this view within the data. Courtroom business was swift and 
usually regarded as non-problematic. Courtroom workers processed cases 
towards an outcome, and the mode of trial hearing specifically was viewed as 
another administrative hearing, and one deemed to be particularly unimportant. 
Courtroom workers questioned the wisdom of researching mode of trial and 
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mode of trial hearings were incredibly short with only the bare details of the case 
disclosed to the court. The real unimportance of mode of trial however can be 
viewed in its juxtaposition with bail hearings; bail hearings were regarded as 
important because of the immediate outcome for the defendant while mode of 
trial hearings were nothing more than another staging post in the progress of a 
case. 
Carlen (1976b) identified the defendant as a "dummy player" in the magistrates' 
court; rather than being an actor on the stage the proceedings acted upon him or 
her. The real force in Carlen's critique related to the lack of legal representation 
in magistrates' courts and how the defendant was therefore unable to effectively 
manage a defence; given the increase in legal representation any assessment must 
change. The identification of the defendant as a "dummy player" now has 
different connotations. Within the mode of trial hearing the defendant played no 
part, other than to instruct her or his solicitor or make the decision as to election. 
The defendant is effectively a spectator; the details of the allegations are 
inspected in court with the defendant merely viewing the proceedings. 
Additionally, while the defendant may have a defence solicitor to speak for him 
or her, we have seen how little defence solicitors are involved in the mode of trial 
process. Linked to this critique is the idea of the magistrates' court as a "theatre 
of the absurd" (Carlen, 1976a). In many ways, to the outside observer, the mode 
of trial hearing would in many instances seem strange. Benches, when a 
truncated narrative is delivered, appear to be making decisions with little, if any, 
information placed before the court. To the courtroom regulars, these cases are so 
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mundane and obvious that little more needs to be said, but to anyone on the 
outside it can only be perplexing. 
In Chapter 4 the theory of social domains was utilised to highlight four different 
levels of social interaction; one of these being the importance of personality. 
Both Brown (1991) and Hogarth (1971) identified the importance of attitudes in 
decision making. Whilst it was not possible to construct psychological attitude 
surveys in the way that Hogarth did, it was possible to observe within the data 
the importance of individual styles and the differences between prosecutors. 
More specifically, some prosecutors utilised different presentational styles in the 
courtroom, and given that these styles influenced content to some extent, and the 
decisions that were made, we can see how personality impacted upon the 
decision making process. 
Courtroom workgroups were also identified as an important feature of the 
courtroom setting (Lipetz, 1980). More specifically, these workgroups can, over 
time, solidify into local court cultures whereby decision making practices are 
predictable and identifiable as part of the culture. Many research studies on 
courtroom behaviour have focused upon the importance of courtroom culture in 
explaining decision making practices (Bottoms and McClean, 1976; Flood-Page 
and Mackie, 1998; Hedderman and Moxon, 1992; Henham, 1990; Hood, 1962 
and 1972; Hucklesby, 1997; Jones, 1985; Tarling, 1979; Taxiing et. al., 1985; 
Rumgay, 1995). The influence of courtroom culture could be clearly seen within 
the study, particularly in the manner in which cases of domestic burglary, section 
20 assault, violent disorder, shop theft and theft from a vehicle were decided. For 
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other offences, the existence of truncated narratives suggests uncomplicated 
decision making associated with a local culture. The simplistic nature of the 
decisions and the way in which courtroom workers uniformly agreed on such 
decisions all evidenced a courtroom culture. Other aspects of the mode of trial 
hearing also highlighted the importance of courtroom workgroups. The actions of 
the defence solicitor, in failing to challenge the prosecutor or engage in 
negotiation, evidence a courtroom affiliation whereby they simply accept the 
prosecutor's view on mode of trial. Of course, in cases where the bench accept 
jurisdiction, the defence retain a right to elect Crown Court trial. Nevertheless, 
there is still scope for defence and prosecution disagreement when the 
prosecution recommends that the bench decline jurisdiction and this was 
infrequently observed. 
8.5 Reforming mode of trial 
The trend of reform, identified in Chapter 2, is to increase the extent of summary 
jurisdiction; successive reports and Government proposals have attempted to 
restrict the defendant's right to elect Crown Court trial in order to save resources 
and reduce delays. The procedures in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, that are yet 
to be implemented, are designed to reduce the extent to which defendants elect 
Crown Court trial and to persuade magistrates to retain more cases. For instance, 
the increase in the sentencing powers of magistrates' courts and the removal of 
the option of committal for sentence are both designed to increase the extent of 
summary jurisdiction. Herbert (2003) has commented upon these provisions and 
suggested that they do not account for local court cultures. Specifically, Herbert, 
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when addressing increased sentencing powers, noted a belief among magistrates 
and other courtroom professionals that magistrates are "already being asked to 
handle cases at the extreme of their ability" (2003: 322). This suggests that any 
increase in powers may not necessarily result in more cases being retained if the 
local court culture is resistant. Moreover, the reform may also suffer from 
unintended consequences; Herbert (2003) suggested that an increase in 
magistrates' sentencing powers may result in net widening. While magistrates 
may refuse to accept jurisdiction in more cases, they may use these increased 
powers to sentence more harshly in the cases that they retain. This is a distinct 
possibility given the increased use of custodial sentences by magistrates over the 
last ten years (Home Office, 2001b). This thesis, by also highlighting the 
importance of local cultures, supports Herbert's conclusions. More specifically, 
the routine declining of jurisdiction in serious cases, such as domestic burglaries 
and allegations of violent disorder, suggest that magistrates may well have found 
the limit of their jurisdiction. Indeed, the treatment of these categories of 
offences suggests that, rather than continually increasing the extent of summary 
jurisdiction, these offences could be reclassified as indictable only. 
The problem of unintended consequences may also result from the removal of 
the court's power to commit for sentence. The thinking behind this new 
innovation is that if the defendant knows that she cannot be committed to the 
Crown Court, she is more likely to consent to summary trial. CPS statistics 
state 230 that in 2001-2002,29 percent of either way cases that were committed to 
the Crown Court were the result of the defendant's election. In this study, the 
230 See Table 2. 
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comparable figure is 21 percent. Magistrates are therefore responsible, b} 
declining jurisdiction, for the majority of cases that are committed to the Crown 
Court. This reform, in targeting the defendant's decision, is only addressing a 
minority of the cases that are committed to the Crown Court. However, its effect 
may be to increase even further the extent to which magistrates decline 
jurisdiction. One method used by prosecutors (and legal advisers) in the sample 
to ensure that magistrates' retained jurisdiction in borderline cases, was to 
remind the bench of its power to commit for sentence if the defendant was 
subsequently convicted. If the magistrates were unsure as to the extent of their 
sentencing powers, they could retain jurisdiction and then reconsider after 
conviction. However, removal of this option may result in magistrates erring on 
the side of caution. Given that Herbert (2003) has already noted how magistrates 
believe that they are acting on the limit of their powers, such a cautious approach 
is likely. 
Other features of the proposed reforms may also be ineffective. Giving the CPS 
the power to charge suspects, rather than the police, will do little to alleviate the 
problems identified in Chapter 2. As shown by McConville et. al. (1991), the 
police, in constructing the case against the suspect, have already operated in a 
manner that closes down alternative explanations and avenues. The case 
presented to the prosecution will inevitably suggest the charge, given the manner 
in which the evidence was collected and collated. However, if this does not prove 
to be the case, one of the reasons why eventual disposal does not accord with the 
decision made in the mode of trial hearing, concerns the way in which the mode 
of trial decision is prefaced on an assumption that the prosecution can prove their 
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version of events. If a conviction does not result on this factual basis, especially 
if it is based on a bargain, then any disposal will be based on some other 
alternative version of events. Altering the manner in which charges are initially 
laid will do little to change this fact. For similar reasons, the availability of a 
sentence indication also seems unlikely to affect, to any subsequent degree, the 
outcome of the mode of trial hearing. If the hearing is prefaced on the 
prosecution case, as constructed by the police, with no explanation, mitigation or 
alternative facts, then the bench will receive only half of the story. It could be 
expected, therefore, that any sentence indication will over-estimate the sentence 
that may result from a full sentencing process, involving as it does, speeches in 
mitigation and the preparation of sentencing reports. Defendants are therefore 
less likely to respond to the sentence indication as expected. As a tool, the 
sentence indication can only operate where the defendant makes a calculation 
that it would be better to plead guilty now, rather than continue with the process. 
If the indication given is unrealistic, then this is unlikely to occur. 
Overall, the present form of the mode of trial hearing makes it difficult to amend 
in a manner that policy makers and government would like. The courtroom 
workers see it as largely unimportant; it is simply another hearing in the 
continued progression of the case. As a result, when combined with local 
courtroom cultures, hearings are truncated and brief; usually, no real details are 
presented to the court to enable a realistic decision to be made. Instead, 
courtroom workers expedite the hearing in order to move onto more important 
court business. Defence solicitors collude in this process and rarely challenge the 
recommendation of the prosecutors or present information to the court. It is 
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therefore of little surprise that, as identified by Riley and Vennard (1998) and 
Hedderman and Moxon (1992), that subsequent decisions do not accord with the 
decision in the mode of trial hearing. Defendants will be given sentences in the 
Crown Court within the powers of the magistrates' court when decisions are 
made on this basis. Quite simply, the prosecution possess too much control over 
the information placed before the court. While it may be possible to increase the 
powers of defence solicitors by removing the assumption that the prosecution can 
prove their version of events, the activities of defence solicitors and their self- 
identification as officers of the court (McConville, et. al., 1991) suggest that this 
may have only limited effect. What is more, if this was successful, this would 
turn mode of trial hearings into something akin to bail applications, with a 
corresponding increase in length and adversarial conduct. In the busiest 
magistrates' court centres, it is unlikely that the time and resources needed to 
effect such a change would be readily available, and already over-worked 
courtroom workers may resent, and therefore resist, such a change. Those 
prosecutors who did elaborate in a manner that was regarded as unnecessary 
were subject to disapproval from the other courtroom professionals. 
8.6 Narrative analysis as a research methodology 
As explained in Chapter 5, narrative analysis was utilised as a research 
methodology because it respected the natural state of the data collected in the 
courtroom, it provided a means by which the representations of prosecutors could 
be examined in situ and in a manner that did not slice the data into fragments that 
removed it from its context. In this respect, narrative analysis proved to be a most 
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valuable tool in courtroom research. It helped display the micro-structures 
inherent in the courtroom interaction and the importance of the setting. We could 
see, for instance, in truncated narratives how their form was influenced by the 
concerns of the professionals and courtroom work schedules. What is more, the 
influences upon the decision making process were brought into view - in the 
evaluation section of the narrative the prosecutor presented to the court the most 
important aspects of the case and understanding this as an evaluation clearly 
displayed the concerns of the prosecutor. It also helped demonstrate the way in 
which law (re)produced reality; the means by which messy details were reduced 
to cases and the discourse of the law. 
It also offered a means of highlighting the banal; storytelling is such a universal 
activity that we fail to recognise its significance; it is so pervasive that we no 
longer pause to consider how we utilise narrative. Therefore, at one level, 
analysing narrative seems to offer very little - it simply highlights what we all 
take for granted. But it is this very fact that makes it so useful. Any lawyer will 
quickly acknowledge that lawyers tell stories and do so with a legal focus; that 
much is obvious. However, narrative analysis allowed for an in-depth 
examination of the form and content of those stories, and led to an appreciation 
of how form influenced content. Narrative analysis illuminated what was literally 
apparent, yet somehow hidden due to familiarity. It also raised questions about 
how the stories could be any different; what else could legal professionals have 
done and how else could they have constructed narratives, if not with a legal 
focus? Whose story can and do they tell? 
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8.7 Finding voices 
Courtroom narratives do not really belong to any one party as they are subjected 
to such diverse influences. The mode of trial hearing is a product of legal 
communications that are mediated within a particular setting, involving particular 
personalities, who bring particular contextual resources to the interaction. As a 
result, it is multifaceted and complex; it is perhaps therefore naive to expect the 
narratives of the central characters to shine through the hearing. This does, 
however, raise some serious questions for legal processes. In particular, it leads 
to the inevitable question, whose process is this? Current political rhetoric 
suggests that the criminal justice system should be returned to victims and 
witnesses who the system is supposed to represent. 23' Indeed, current trends 
towards restorative justice are, inter alia, praised for the way in which they 
increasingly involve the victim within a process from which they traditionally 
have been excluded. 232 Concern with the treatment of victims within the criminal 
justice is a relatively recent phenomenon. Christie (1977) criticised the criminal 
justice system for stealing the conflicts from the parties, and in doing so, 
radically shifting our understanding of their roles: 
23' In a recent speech delivered at the University of Birmingham, Lord Falconer, the Secretary of 
State for Constitutional Affairs, noted how the criminal justice system must serve the public: 
"For too long, the courts, the law, and the justice system have been seen as the preserve 
of their key interest groups. They are not. They play a vital part in everyone's daily life. 
That doesn't mean there isn't an important role for judges, and lawyers. But what it does 
mean, though, is that all our changes to the justice system have to be measured by how 
they serve the public, and that those who run or work in the system are there to give 
service to the public... 
We are working hard so that people in the criminal justice system are treated as 
individuals with individual needs, rather than expecting them to serve the systems 
needs. " (Lord Falconer, 2004: 3-4) 
''' For a general discussion on restorative justice, see Johnstone (2002) for a more critical 
approach, see Ashworth (2002). 
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We have focused on the offender, made her or him into an object for study. 
manipulation and control. We have added to all those forces that have reduced the 
victim to a nonentity and the offender to a thing (Christie, 1977: 5). 
Before Christie reminded us of the place of victims in the criminal justice 
process, they were at best simply regarded as a resource (van Dijk, 1988; 
Newburn and Merry, 1990; Pointing and Maguire, 1988) or at worst, 
criminological theory, in focusing upon victim precipitation, would impliedly 
blame the victim for the crime (Wolfgang, 1958). Christie's call, and the rise of 
left realism, 233 has led to a renewed focus upon the place of the victim within the 
criminal justice process. A succession of different studies have highlighted the 
failure of the criminal justice system to provide an adequate response to the 
victim's interests and needs. Victims have received a poor response at the hands 
of the courts (Brereton, 1997; Rock, 1993) and the police (Newburn and Merry, 
1990; Shapland et. al., 1985). This is especially true in the case of vulnerable 
victims, including victims of rape and sexual assault (Adler, 1987; Chambers and 
Millar, 1983 and 1986; Lees, 1997), victims of domestic violence (Edwards, 
1989; Grace, 1995; Stanko, 1988), child victims (Adler, 1988) and ethnic 
minority victims (Cooper and Pomeyie, 1988). Commentators have gone so far 
as to describe victims as suffering "secondary victimisation" at the hands of the 
legal process (Doak, 2003: 6). 
As a result of these problems, policy makers and voluntary bodies have 
attempted to alleviate the worst excesses of the marginalisation of the victim 
233 Left realism moved leftist criminology from a conflict perspective towards one that 
understood the real harm inflicted upon the victim (Lea and Young, 1984). 
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through the provision of services and increased participation. These include the 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme, compensation and reparation orders, 
Victim Impact Statements, special measures to protect the victim in the 
courtroom, specialist teams to respond to sensitive crimes, Victim Support and 
Witness Support, rape crisis centres and women's refuges, the reinforcement of 
needs through the Victim's Charter and restorative justice processes. 234 Edwards 
(2004) has categorised victim participation in the criminal justice process on a 
sliding scale from control, through consultation and information provision to 
expression. Control suggests maximum victim involvement while expression 
suggests an opportunity for a victim to express their feelings but no more. 
Initiatives that are designed to address the place of the victim fit somewhere on 
this scale. So for instance, victims' services such as Victim Support and the 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme aim to address victims needs but 
without any formal level of participation, whereas Victim Impact Statements, 
depending upon how they are used, can be more or less participatory. This scale 
allows us to see why victims still complain about the level of service given by 
professionals; services and rights may fail to meet victims' expectations. For 
instance, Hoyle et. al. (1998) show how the "One Stop Shop and Victim 
Statements Pilot Projects" failed to live up to the expectations of some of the 
victims involved in the schemes. In short, they were expecting an input higher on 
the scale than the pilots allowed. However, as well as continually failing to live 
up to victims' expectations, these reforms, and an increased focus on the `rights 
of victims', may create problems for victims; either victims are used, "in the 
service of severity' or "in the service of offenders" (Ashworth, 2000: 186). Both 
23{ There is a burgeoning literature on the development of these services and participatory 
`rights'. A selection includes, Edwards (2004), Sebba (2000), Reeves and Mulley (2000), Erez 
(2000), Mawby and Gill (1987) and Maguire and Pointing (1988). 
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forms of "victim prostitution" (ibid) fail to address the age old problem of the 
abuse of victims for the furtherance of the aims of the criminal justice process. 
However, to some extent this may be inevitable, but at the very least problems 
will remain until we fully deal with the tripartite relationship at the heart of the 
criminal justice process. As Ashworth (1986) suggests, the criminal justice 
process involves three important relationships; state-offender, state-victim and 
victim-offender. Historically, the state-offender relationship has dominated 
policy and criminology, and only recently has the public and private sector and 
the academy become interested in the state-victim and offender-victim 
relationship. However, in many respects these three relationships are in tension 
and it is difficult to reconcile all three interests. So for instance, while restorative 
justice may focus upon the offender-victim relationship, this may trespass upon 
values that the state and community regard as key in the administration of 
criminal justice, such as consistency and the protection of the defendant from the 
power of the state. (Ashworth, 2002). 
If the claims of Government and policy makers are to lead to an increased role 
for the victim, this may be at the expense of other values and interests in the 
criminal justice process. However, focussing on the mode of trial process, it 
presently fails to address either the concerns of the victim or the defendant. Both 
are silenced by the form of interaction and administrative concerns of the 
professionals that operate within the courtroom. While Ashworth points to the 
relationships between the state, victim and offender, this study suggests that the 
agents of the state, in the manner in which they control the process, dominate in a 
manner that serves their own bureaucratic interests. 
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APPENDIX: 
DATA CAPTURE FORMS 
ý^ 
Name: D. O. B: 
Date of first hearing: Court list -1/5/6/7 
Offences Charged: D of O D of A D of C 
Ethnic Origin: 
Defendant represented 
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Prosecution case from file: 
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Previous Convictions: 
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Name: D. O. B: 
Date of first hearing: Date of Observation: 
Offences Charged: Plea: 
Prosecutor - SST / NSST Magistrates - SST / NSST 
Magistrate(s): 
Prosecutor: 
Prosecutors Representations: 
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General Observations on PBV hearing: 
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